Suchergebnisse

Held at Oklahoma City, Okla., Oct. 24-27, 1966. ; "Sponsored by the Subcommittee on Government Research, pursuant to S. Res. 218, 89th Cong., and the Frontiers of Science Foundation of Oklahoma, for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Since J. Stalin's death the Soviet & US gov's have moved into a new post-cold-war relationship in which continuing pol'al rivalry is combined with some pol'al cooperation to keep this 'competitive co-existence' peaceful. Incentives for cooperation are strong, centering in common interest in reducing the danger of thermonuclear war. But obstacles, too, are strong: resistance by some 3rd World states, resistance by some elements of both of the cooperating gov's, & the continuing intense competition for influence in the 3rd World, which creates imbalances & crises. Despite all the obstacles, the incentives to US-Soviet cooperation may prevail. But it a cooperative relationship is to endure, it will have to become more extensive & evolve into an entente. The precondition of this is some curtailment of power rivalry, which would not, however, mean a global bargain. Furthermore, some element of trust would have to be built into the Soviet-US relationship. The Soviet-US cooperative arrangement could take 2 diff forms: either a 'condominium' based on a division of spheres of influence or an alliance on behalf of the growth of internat'l order. The latter would be more in accord with the needs of the situation & the genius of the 2 peoples. HA.

Much has been written about transitional justice in the circumstances of organised states progressing towards democracy. Another category of transitional justice demanding equal study and resolution has, however, emerged. That is the interim administration of justice in the vacuum of the disrupted state following traumatic internal conflict, usually involving war crimes and crimes against humanity. Two things are characteristic of this circumstance: first, the requirement for a deployed international military force to do 'something' about fundamental law and order while waiting for the civil administrative 'cavalry' to arrive; second, the fact that a civil administrative element will eventually have to take over from the military and will also be required to do 'something' about the immediate law and order problem but in a manner that leads into the long term reconstruction and 'end state' process. In the future, this environment may also include the operation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), where many issues of jurisdiction, investigation, prosecution and the impact on long term rehabilitation will need to be managed.

Recent research has begun to examine patterns of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) perpetrated by peacekeepers deployed in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Yet, SEA makes up only a fraction of credible allegations of misconduct by peacekeepers. In this article we explore the contours of misconduct in UN PKOs beyond SEA allegations. We argue that the behavior of military forces in their own countries should easily predict their behavior when deployed as part of UN PKOs, which are typically set in fragile, postconflict countries where civilians have minimal protections or legal recourse. Using an original dataset of misconduct in PKOs from 2009 to 2016, we find the behavior of PKO contributor states toward their own populations strongly and consistently predicts the behavior of these states' military forces in UN PKOs. These findings have implications for the vetting, supervision, and composition of PKOs.

The Alliance's Strategic Concept as a formal document is a statement in which NATO points out political and military resources and the means of gaining assumed goals. It re-defines basic tasks and rules, determines main features of the new security environment, displays full-scale approach to the collective security and constitutes the background for future reforms and transformations of its member's armed forces. In the new Alliance's Strategic Concept the need of engaging NATO out of its border lines, in order to prevent particular threats, is clearly outlined. It forces the expeditionary feature on the Alliance and therefore the respective abilities are required. Those abilities focus on carrying out expeditionary operations; hence one of the leading aspects will be the use of aviation. The paper consists of two principal parts. The first part focuses on the analysis of current NATO's Strategic Concept in a context of leading its expeditionary operations beyond the area of its responsibility. Attention was drawn upon the essential problems with implementation of expeditionary operations in the future. The second part gives us characteristics of the aviation as one of the key tools in Alliance's expeditionary operations. The key requirements which the aforementioned forces need to fulfil were presented, as well as the estimated scope of the use of aviation in typical expeditionary operations.

The way war is waged is evolving quickly - igniting the rapid rise of private military contractors who offer military-style services as part of their core business model. When private actors take up state security, their incentives are not to end war and conflict but to manage the threat only enough to remain relevant. Arduino unpacks the tradeoffs involved when conflict is increasingly waged by professional outfits that thrive on chaos rather than national armies. This book charts the rise of private military actors from Russia, China, and the Middle East using primary source data, in-person interviews, and field research amongst operations in conflict zones around the world. Individual stories narrated by mercenaries, military trainers, security entrepreneurs, hackers, and drone pilots are used to introduce themes throughout. Arduino concludes by considering today's trajectories in the deployment of mercenaries by states, corporations, or even terrorist organizations and what it will mean for the future of conflict. The book follows private security contractors that take on missions in different countries with a variety of challenges. First-hand data and intimate knowledge of the actors involved in the market for force allow a fully grounded narrative with personal input. Through this prism, readers will gain a better understanding of the human, security, and political risks that are part of this industry. The book specifically reveals the risk that unaccountable mercenaries pose in increasing the threshold for conflict, the threat to traditional military forces, the corruption in political circles, and the rising threat of proxy conflicts in the US rivalry with China and Russia.

This article explores the phenomenon of military naming, that is, the act of giving a name to military practices such as military operations, weaponry, and military units. The basic theoretical supposition is that military naming is a simple and useful mechanism that might be employed to blur undesired aspects-such as the human and economical costs-associated with the respective practices. Inspired by John B. Thompson's "strategies of operation of ideology," the research uses the construct of strategies of annihilative naming to analyze a corpus of 239 Israeli names of military operations and weaponry. By using names coming from nature and the Bible, the Israeli military uses three strategies-naturalization, euphemization, and legitimation-that mediate Israeli public opinion toward controversial military operations as well as weaponry development. Future research of other military names will support the construction of generalizations about this important phenomenon. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society/Sage Publications Inc.]

The paper covers operations features of Huntington Ingalls Industries, one of the leading contractors of the US Department of Defense (DoD), in terms of financial performance and business outlook. In general, taking into account the increase in the DoD budget and the increase in appropriations for the procurement of military equipment and weapon systems, as well as R&D, we can say that this had a positive impact on companies of the US military–industrial complex as a whole (both larger and smaller) and led to improved financial performance and level of investment attractiveness. At the same time, it is quite obvious that the high growth rates of the DoD budget cannot be maintained for a while, which in the long run presents significant risks for the companies, as it can lead to a decrease in funding and the volumes of government contracts. Since there are a significant number of studies and publications for large companies in the sector, the author puts emphasis on smaller companies, the number of papers on which is small, but analysis on which is important because of their role and functions in the US military–industrial complex. These include Huntington Ingalls Industries, which specializes in the implementation of the US Navy's shipbuilding program. The analysis showed that the dynamics of its financial and economic operations, in general, can be characterized positively, despite the observed moderate decrease in values of some financial ratios. The outlook for its business in the long run can be assessed as sustainable, but for the period after 2025, attention should be paid to a number of risks that are primarily associated with a reduction of the US Navy shipbuilding program.