The dynamic civilisation transformations observed worldwide in recent years have arisen from the rapid development of information and the ICTs that support it. Cyberspace is a new sphere affected by these processes, and it evolves alongside the threats occurring therein. Nowadays, no country's cyberspace is entirely secure. Cyber threats are characterised by unpredictability and global reach. In modern times, cyberspace is a symbol of development, the freedom of speech, and the right to privacy and every interference in the behaviours of its users is associated with an attack on these values. The article discusses the fundamental problems concerning operations in cyberspace justified by the violation of human rights but should also be assessed in the context of interference with the scope of individual rights and freedoms, including in times of seemingly normal functioning, namely in times of peace.
Approaching Military Revolutions -- The Epistemology of RMA -- A Paradigm Shift -- Understanding (1): Piercing the Fog of War in Fluid Spaces -- Understanding (2): Fluidifying the Solid? -- Waging War in Network-centric Conditions -- Striking in Network-centric Conditions.
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This article presents the ethical issues using offensive cyberspace operations. Previously enshrouded in secrecy, and now becoming the new norm, countries are using them to achieve their strategic interests. Russia has conducted offensive operations targeting Estonia, Georgia and the Ukraine; Hamas was targeting Israeli targets; and Iran has been targeting U.S. targets. The response has varied; Estonia and Georgia struggled with the attacks and were unable to respond while Ukraine tried to respond but it was inefficient. Israel's response on Hamas offensive operations was an air strike on a building with Hamas Cyber-operatives. Iran shot down a U.S. Drone over the Strait of Hormuz, and the U.S. initially intended to respond with kinetic capabilities in the form of missile strikes. However, in the last minute, the U.S. chose to respond with offensive cyberspace operations targeting the Iranian missile systems. This last-minute change of response choosing between kinetic or cyber capabilities shows a need to further investigate how offensive cyberspace operations can be used against which targets from an ethical perspective. This article applies anticipatory ethical analysis on U.S. offensive operations in the "Global Hawk"-case when Iran shot down a U.S. drone over the Strait of Hormuz. Anticipatory ethical analysis looks at emerging technologies and their potential consequences. Offensive cyberspace operations present a range of possibilities, which include lowering the risk of harm to cyber operatives' lives belonging to the responding nation. However, a response can also be kinetic. Therefore, the analysis of the "Global Hawk"-case is compared with the Israeli-air strike of the building of Hamas Cyber-operatives. The authors argue that applying anticipatory ethical analysis on offensive operations and kinetic operations assist decision makers in choosing response actions to re-establish deterrence.
Are cyber operations as revolutionary as the headlines suggest? Do they compel rival states and alter international politics? By examining cyber strategy as a contemporary form of political warfare and covert action, this book demonstrates that the digital domain complements rather than replaces traditional instruments of power.
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In: Stevens, T. in War with shadows: Persistent engagement and the power-topologies of US military cyberspace operations. In S. Matviyenko and K. Hilstob, eds. Cyberwar Topologies: In Struggle for a Post-American Internet (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press), Forthcoming
Intro -- Foreword -- Abstract -- Introduction -- 1. Background -- 1.1. Articles, News Items, Blogs -- 1.2. Western Studies -- 1.3. Ukrainian Studies -- 1.4. The "Ideological Problem" of Russian Historiography -- 2. The Crimean Internet in Figures: 2011-2014 -- 3. The Russian "Information Warfare Machine". The Main Actors -- 4. Russia's Activity. The Channels of Information Influence (October-December 2013) -- 4.1. Internet Forums -- 4.2. The GRU and Facebook -- 4.3. The Twitter of "Crimean Events" -- 4.4. The Blocking of Facebook -- 4.5. The Nationwide Anti-Ukrainian Campaign in Russia: The Crimean Dimension -- 5. The Ukrainian Response. Countermeasures Against Foreign Information Influence -- Conclusions -- References -- Appendix -- Short Biography of the Author.
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In: The SAIS review of international affairs / the Johns Hopkins University, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Band 36, Heft 2, S. 29-39
Cyber-attacks have increased since the 1988-Morris worm and can target any connected device from any place in the world. In 2010, Stuxnet received a lot of attention as the first cyber-weapon. Its targets were the Iranian nuclear enrichment centrifuges. Nation states are developing cyberspace capabilities to conduct offensive cyberspace operations. Academic researchers have been calling for a more transparent discussion on offensive capabilities and have pointed out the positive impact researchers had during the development of nuclear capabilities. Shrouded in secrecy, the development of offensive capabilities used for operations makes it difficult to conduct research. Therefore, one way to mitigate this is to conduct a systematic review of the current state of research in offensive cyberspace operations. The systematic review method makes it possible to establish certain inclusion and exclusion criteria and systematically go through academic articles to identify the contents, thoughts and research focus of academic researchers. Six scientific databases were queried and 87 articles were read and clustered. The first insight is that, based on the results of the queried databases, research about offensive cyberspace operations is limited. The resulting clusters are a general cluster about cyberspace operations, followed by research in policy, decision-making, governance, capabilities, levels, models, training, deterrence and international affairs. These are then further grouped into: a) general cyberspace operations; b) deterrence; c) international affairs; d) modelling, simulation and training. The article concludes that research into offensive cyberspace operations is maturing as more information is becoming public. Secondly, current research lists some good basic ideas regarding effects which can be achieved through offensive cyberspace operations, how they should be conducted, and related tools, techniques and procedures. However, discrepancies in research efforts exist, with the majority of research coming primarily from the western world. In addition, secrecy and the resulting limited access to information, coupled with research being either too technically focused or too qualitatively focused, show that there still remains room for research in this field. Finally, some directions for future research are examined.
In: The SAIS review of international affairs / the Johns Hopkins University, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Band 36, Heft 2, S. 29-39
The aim of this article is to present how Chinese strategies are manifested into offensive cyberspace operations targeting Sweden. It is commonly known that People's Republic of China (PRC, and in this definition the meaning of thegovernment and its military), uses five-year plans (FYP) for social and economic steering strategy of their country. This has been going on since 1953 until today. In 2015, the national strategic plan Made in China 2025 (中国制造2025) was launched by Le Keqiang, the Premier of the State Council of PRC. The main goal with this plan is to strengthen the economic development. In addition, Chinese military strategists noted the importance of information warfare and intelligence during military operations. This article is based on open sources: the official English translated version of the 13th Five-year plan (FYP) and other reporting on cyberspace operations linked to the PRC. A number of cases are presented to highlight the link between the PRC FYP and their targets. Next, the current situation in Sweden is presented and how the country is targeted by PRC-linked activities, both in and through cyberspace, but also military infiltration on academia. The results show that Sweden has been, and is continuously the target of offensive cyberspace operations. In parallel, the country is also the target of military infiltration on the academia, and direct investment strategies such as Huawei attempting to compete for the 5G frequency actions arranged by the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority. In conclusion, Sweden will continue to experience cyberespionage from PRC on all levels and on all domains; science, technology, IP and privacy information theft. Previously unveiled cyberspace operations cases in this article have proven to be a convenient strategy for the PRC to reduce its research and development gap in several ways; innovatively, financially and to shortening the time-to-market (TTM).
Cyberwarfare, like the seismic shift of policy with nuclear warfare, is modifying warfare into non-war warfare. A few distinctive characteristics of cyberwar emerge. Cyberwarfare has blurred the distinction between adversary and ally. Cyber probes continuously occur between allies and enemies alike, causing cyberespionage to merge with warfare. Espionage, as old as war itself, has technologically merged with acts of cyberwar as states threaten each other with prepositioned malware in each other's cyberespionage probed infrastructure. These two cyber shifts to warfare are agreed upon and followed by the US, Russia and China. What is not agreed upon in this shifting era of warfare are the policies upon which cyberwarfare is based. This book charts the policies in three key actors and navigates the futures of policy on an international stage. Essential reading for students of war studies and security professionals alike.
"Russia's brazen use of cyber operations to interfere in elections, conduct information warfare, and as part of its ongoing conflicts with neighboring states has made international headlines. However they have also maintained a thin veneer of deniability and have avoided clear red lines that would be widely accepted as acts of war. While cyber operations possess the means to achieve mischievous, subversive, and potentially destructive effects, how is an injured state supposed to respond? Scott Jasper seeks to bring clarity to this problem by undertaking an in-depth look at the legal and technical aspects of actual Russian cyber operations. He puts Russia's use of cyber in the context of their military and information warfare doctrines and looks at examples from the 2016 US presidential election, the 2017 NotPetya mock ransomware attack, the 2017 French presidential election, and many more. Jasper proposes deterrence, defense, resilience, and cost-imposition responses and offsetting strategies for the United States and other states who have been on the receiving end of these attacks. This book will make a major contribution to helping scholars, students, and the national security community understand Russian cyber competition and how to respond"--
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