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In 2011, Nasser Al-Awlaki, a terrorist on the US 'kill list' in Yemen, was targeted by the CIA. A week later, a military strike killed his son. The following year, the US Ambassador to Pakistan resigned, undermined by CIA-conducted drone strikes of which he had no knowledge or control. The demands of the new, borderless 'gray area' conflict have cast civilians and military into unaccustomed roles with inadequate legal underpinning. As the Department of Homeland Security defends against cyber threats and civilian contractors work in paramilitary roles abroad, the legal boundaries of war demand to be outlined. In this book, former Under Secretary of the Air Force Antonia Chayes examines these new 'gray areas' in counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism and cyber warfare. Her innovative solutions for role definition and transparency will establish new guidelines in a rapidly evolving military-legal environment
Intro -- Foreword -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Cyber Analysis and Targeting -- 1.1 Key Cyber Analysis and Targeting Questions -- 1.2 Organization of This Book -- Bibliography -- Chapter 2: Cyber Policy, Doctrine, and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) -- 2.1 Background -- 2.1.1 Policy, Doctrine, and TTP Definitions -- 2.2 Introduction -- 2.3 Policy -- 2.3.1 Use of Force Policy for Cyber -- 2.3.2 Authorities -- 2.3.2.1 Maritime Example: Harbor Lights and World War II (Delayed Authorities) -- 2.3.2.2 Pre-delegation of Authorities -- 2.3.3 Schmitt's Six Criteria to Establish State Responsibility -- 2.3.4 Policy Example: Coreflood Botnet -- 2.4 Doctrine -- 2.4.1 Example US Department of Defense (DoD) Instructions, Directives, and Doctrine for Cyberspace Analysis and Targeting -- 2.4.2 Critical Security Controls (CSC) -- 2.5 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) -- 2.6 Summary -- Bibliography -- Chapter 3: Taxonomy of Cyber Threats -- 3.1 Background -- 3.2 NIST Cyber Taxonomy Examples -- 3.3 Cyber System Threats: Risk Evaluation and Cyber Threat Understanding -- 3.3.1 Cyber Security Data Standards -- 3.3.2 DREAD, STRIDE, and CVSS -- 3.3.3 Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis (PASTA) -- 3.4 Data-Sharing Models -- 3.4.1 Cyber Threat Data Providers -- 3.4.2 Cyber Threat Data and System Defense -- 3.5 System Engineering and Vulnerability Evaluation -- 3.5.1 DoD Cyber Security Analysis Approaches and Tools -- 3.5.2 Analysis and Targeting Use of Cyber Threat Data Examples -- 3.5.2.1 Use of Vulnerabilities/Exploits for Cyber System Defense -- 3.5.2.2 Use of Vulnerabilities/Exploits for Cyber System Attack -- 3.6 Summary -- Bibliography -- Chapter 4: Cyber Influence Operations -- 4.1 Cyber Influence Operations Background -- 4.1.1 Information Operations (IO) Background -- 4.1.2 Influence Operations, Advertising, and Propaganda.
Intro -- Table of Contents -- About the Author -- About the Technical Reviewer -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1: Cyber and Warfare -- Definition -- Declaration -- Just War Theory -- Jus ad Bellum -- Jus in Bello -- International Agreements -- Expectation of Protection -- Summary -- Chapter 2: Legal Authority -- Title 50-Intelligence Community -- Title 10-Department of Defense -- Maintaining Military Operations -- Covert Action -- Bringing It Together -- Known US Responses -- Example 1 -- Example 2 -- Example 3 -- Example 4 -- Espionage -- Defining Espionage -- Title 18 -- Cyber and Espionage -- Summary -- Chapter 3: Cyber Exploitation -- Refined Definition -- Exploitation -- Types of Exploitation -- Code Vulnerability -- Misconfiguration -- Human Mistake -- Illegitimate Use of Legitimate Credentials -- Valuing Vulnerability Categories -- Title Implications -- Summary -- Chapter 4: Cyber-Attack -- Attack Types -- Denying the Enemy -- Attacks that Degrade -- Non-cyber Example -- Cyber Example -- Cyber-Physical Example -- Attacks that Disrupt -- Non-cyber Example -- Cyber Example -- Cyber-Physical Example -- Attacks that destroy -- Non-cyber Example -- Cyber Example -- Cyber-Physical Example -- Manipulating the Enemy -- Human Perception: Aggressive -- Non-cyber Example -- Cyber Example -- Cyber-Physical Example -- Human Perception: Protective -- Non-cyber Example -- Cyber Example -- Cyber-Physical Example -- Sensor Perception: Aggressive -- Non-cyber Example -- Cyber Example -- Cyber-Physical Example -- Sensor Perception: Protective -- Non-cyber Example -- Cyber Example -- Cyber-Physical Example -- Espionage -- Summary -- Chapter 5: Cyber Collection -- Cyber Intelligence Gathering -- Cyber Domain Collection Examples -- Open Source Collection -- Non-cyber Example -- Cyber Intelligence Example -- Cyber Reconnaissance Example.
In: NATO science for peace and security series. E, Human and societal dynamics volume 147
Intro; Title Page; Foreword; Contents; Introduction; Chapter 1. Policy and Diplomacy; Cyber Defense of Japan -- Proposal of Conceptual Framework; Dealing with an Evolving Cyber Threat Picture -- Developing a Joint European Response; Japan's IoT Security Policies; Deterrence by Resilience in Cyberspace; Chapter 2. Operations and Technology; The Data-Centric Defense-in-Depth Approach in the Cyberspace Operations; Understanding Offense in Cybersecurity; Efficient Cyber Security Operations with New Emerging Technologies
In: Marine corps gazette: the Marine Corps Association newsletter, Band 100, Heft 5, S. 57
ISSN: 0025-3170
In: Journal of Military Studies: JMS, Band 4, Heft 1, S. 1-37
ISSN: 1799-3350
Abstract
The growing importance of cyberspace to modern society, and its increasing use as an arena for dispute, is becoming a national security concern for governments and armed forces globally. The special characteristics of cyberspace, such as its asymmetric nature, the lack of attribution, the low cost of entry, the legal ambiguity, and its role as an efficient medium for protest, crime, espionage and military aggression, makes it an attractive domain for nation-states as well as non-state actors in cyber conflict.
This paper studies the various non-state actors who coexist in cyberspace, examines their motives and incitements, and analyzes how and when their objectives coincide with those of nation-states. Literature suggests that many nations are currently pursuing cyberwarfare capabilities, oftentimes by leveraging criminal organizations and irregular forces. Employment of such non-state actors as hacktivists, patriot hackers, and cybermilitia in state-on-state cyberspace operations has also proved to be a usable model for conducting cyberattacks. The paper concludes that cyberspace is emerging as a new tool for state power that will likely reshape future warfare. However, due to the lack of concrete cyberwarfare experience, and the limited encounters of legitimate cyberattacks, it is hard to precisely assess future effects, risks and potentials.
In: Palgrave pivot
While the deterrence of cyber attacks is one of the most important issues facing the United States and other nations, the application of deterrence theory to the cyber realm is problematic. This study introduces cyber warfare and reviews the challenges associated with deterring cyber attacks, offering key recommendations to aid the deterrence of major cyber attacks.
"This unique volume is the first book to provide both the theory and practical examples that practitioners, researchers, educators, and students need to successfully build, play, and learn from cyber wargames. Cyber wargaming is a powerful approach for solving interactive, complex problems that involve cyberspace in a variety of settings. Wargames teach us about human decisionmaking and the consequences of those decisions, particularly in the face of uncertainty. The contributors to this book are a diverse group of experts who explain what cyber wargames are, how they work, and why they offer insight into real world problems that other methods cannot match. As this book shows, the lessons learned through cyber wargaming are not merely artifacts of these games-they shed light on how people interpret, act upon, and experience cyberspace in real life. The examples in this book cover topics such as cyber action during kinetic war, information effects on potential conflict between the United States and China, individual versus group decision making, the intersection of cyber conflict and nuclear crisis, professional military education, business resilience, emerging technologies, and more"--
World Affairs Online
In: Changing face of war
"As a society that has revered learning and education for millennia, China has a long history of valuing information. As early as the 1980s, the People's Republic of China (PRC) began to pay attention to information technology."--Provided by publisher
Defence date: 9 November 2016 ; Examining Board: Professor Nehal Bhuta, European University Institute (EUI Supervisor); Professor Jean d'Aspremont, University of Manchester; Professor Marco Roscini, University of Westminster; Professor Joseph H. H. Weiler, European University Institute & New York University ; This doctoral dissertation investigates the wide range of conceptualizations and categorizations that are applicable to state-sponsored cyber operations. State-sponsored cyber operations, namely recourse to cyber means by one State against another, are generally labelled 'cyber warfare'. This is neither a legal nor a prescriptive term; it reflects, however, a disproportionate focus on the realm of warfare. Avoiding hasty or overly simplistic characterizations of situations as cyber warfare is important to avoid further deterioration of their relations leading potentially to military escalation. This dissertation defines state-sponsored cyber operations according to international law and demonstrates that the majority of these incidents fall outside of the realm of (cyber) warfare and, therefore, need to be addressed separately and approached differently. Most state-sponsored cyber operations do not actually violate the prohibition of the use of force or the law of armed conflict, but rather they impinge the territorial sovereignty of the targeted States, the principle of nonintervention, or human rights. Cyber warfare is only the tip of the iceberg. An entire world lies submerged: cyber operations below the threshold of cyber warfare. While the emerged part concerning cyber warfare is well-studied and widely known, this thesis endeavours to shed light on the submerged, and arguably bigger, part that has been understudied and is less known. Parts I and II map the circumstances in which state-sponsored cyber operations violate international law. They demonstrate inter alia that most cyber operations remain under the threshold of cyber warfare, while they may constitute a breach of territorial sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention or even human rights law in most cases. Part I also analyzes the duty of diligence of third States. Part III deals with the attribution of cyber operations, analysing the attribution to the machine, to the human perpetrator, and focusing more specifically on the attribution to the sponsoring State. Part IV focuses on the consequences of an internationally wrongful cyber operation, mainly the obligations deriving from the law of State responsibility, and the remedies to address it, notably the recourse to self-defence, retorsion and countermeasures.
BASE
In: Stem in the military
"Cyber technology-or cyber tech-is a major part of warfare, but it might seem too complex or complicated for young people to understand. However, with the help of this clear and comprehensive guide to military cyber tech, readers can become experts on this exciting STEM topic. The accessible main text and detailed sidebars are paired with graphic organizers and full-color photographs to give readers an up-close look inside warfare in the digital age. Readers also sharpen their critical-thinking skills with a series of questions designed to help them form their own opinions"--
In: Documentary and Reference Guides
Intro -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Reader's Guide to Related Documents -- Introduction -- 1. U.S. Cyber Strategy Documents -- Document 1: National Security Strategy of the United States (1987) -- Document 2: National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (1995) -- Document 3: National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era (1997) -- Document 4: Quadrennial Defense Review (1997) -- Document 5: A National Security Strategy for a New Century (1999) -- Document 6: Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001) -- Document 7: The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (2003) -- Document 8: The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today -- a Vision for Tomorrow (2004) -- Document 9: The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (2005) -- Document 10: Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006) -- Document 11: National Defense Strategy (2008) -- Document 12: National Security Strategy (2010) -- Document 13: Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2010) -- Document 14: The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Redefining America's Military Leadership (2011) -- Document 15: International Strategy for Cyberspace (2011) -- Document 16: Quadrennial Defense Review (2014) -- Document 17: National Security Strategy (2015) -- Document 18: The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: The United States Military's Contribution to National Security (2015) -- Document 19: The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy (2015) -- Document 20: National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2017) -- Document 21: Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (2018).
In: Bridging the gap
A bold re-conceptualization of the fundamentals driving behavior and dynamics in cyberspace. Most cyber operations and campaigns fall short of activities that states would regard as armed conflict. In Cyber Persistence Theory, Michael P. Fischerkeller, Emily O. Goldman, and Richard J. Harknett argue that a failure to understand this strategic competitive space has led many states to misapply the logic and strategies of coercion and conflict to this environment and, thus, suffer strategic loss as a result. The authors show how the paradigm of deterrence theory can neither explain nor manage the preponderance of state cyber activity. They present a new theory that illuminates the exploitive, rather than coercive, dynamics of cyber competition and an analytical framework that can serve as the basis for new strategies of persistence. Drawing on their policy experience, they offer a new set of prescriptions to guide policymakers toward a more stable, secure cyberspace.
World Affairs Online