Suchergebnisse

The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (NDDRP) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was implemented over a period of seven years (2004- 2011) with the World Bank's support and funding. The NDDRP had three objectives: 1) disarmament of all combatants willing to be granted a status of demobilized person; 2) demobilization of all ex-combatants who met the conditions for a return to civilian life through a downsizing process of armed forces or groups; and 3) reintegrate the demobilized in the social and economic practices of the community of their choice with opportunities and conditions similar to those of other members of the community. To achieve these objectives, the DRC government initially established a National Commission of Demobilization and Reinsertion (CONADER, 2003), then established the NDDRP (2004), and finally created a new NDDRP Implementation Unit (IU-NDDRP, 2007). NDDRP was divided into three distinct phases, each capitalizing on the gains as well as the mistakes of the past. Economic reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants represented four out of five demobilized as recorded by the program. At the program's conclusion, the implementing partners decided to support the creation, legalization, and strengthening of demobilized persons' economic associations. This model of economic and social reintegration developed by the NDDRP can serve as a model framework for future rehabilitation and reintegration processes in DRC as well as in other countries. Finally, as the results were not as high as expected in regard to the number of women as well as wounded and disabled veterans demobilized, the NDDRP can be lauded for successfully reaching and reintegrating a highly significant number of Children Associated to Armed Forces and Groups (CAAFG) through special projects executed by different implementing partners.

This article introduces the special issue on DDR and 'Armed Non-Statutory Actors' (ANSAs) which we prefer to the less precise label of Armed Non-State Actors. The understanding that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs are essential in helping to prevent the recurrence of war in post-conflict situations is at the heart of current peacebuilding practice and the academic literature on peacekeeping and stabilization. But the changing strategic context of DDR programs and in particular the proliferation of ANSAs presents new challenges, the responses to which have been characterized as 'second generation' DDR. The changing context poses new questions and forces us to rethink assumptions and templates of DDR as the concept is blurred and expanded. The question is if it makes sense to hold on to the concept or whether the assumptions associated with it will get in the way of rethinking templates for violence reduction in the future.

The economic or political economy of conflicts and civil wars in Africa is an expanding field with an increase in research and literature especially in the last few decades. However, less attention has been devoted to the role of political economy in peacebuilding operations/interventions. This dissertation examines the extent to which political economy, specifically its elements in terms of interests, incentives, and institutions shapes the conceptualization, design and implementation of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and the prospects for sustainable peace. The Niger Delta Amnesty (NDA) is used as an empirical case study.:CHAPTER ONE GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1 Introduction 1.1 State of the art 1.1.1 The political economy of peacebuilding 1.1.2 Institutions in rentier states 1.1.3 Resource curse discourse and interests 1.1.4 Wealth distribution and incentives 1.2 Research question 1.3 Problem statement 1.4 Overview of research methodology 1.4.1 Structural framework of the political economy approach 1.4.1.1 Neoliberalism Approach 1.4.1.2 Neopatrimonialism approach 1.4.2 Comment on sources 1.4.2.1 Research design 1.4.2.2 Research method 1.4.2.3 Data generation method 1.4.2.4 Method of data analysis 1.5 Challenges in the field 1.6 The structure of the dissertation CHAPTER TWO HISTORICIZING OIL CONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA REGION 2 Introduction 2.1 Analyzing the Origins and dynamics of the Niger Delta Conflict 2.1.1 The Geography and People of the Niger Delta 2.1.2 Pre-colonial Niger Delta and the Emergence of European Trade in Nigeria (1444 – 1850) 2.1.3 Colonial Considerations: Increasing Agitations, Palm oil Production and the Discovery of Oil (1851 – 1960) 2.1.4 Independent and Post Independent Nigeria and the Foundations of the Oil Conflict (1960 – Present) 2.1.5 Militant Movements in the Niger Delta in the Recent Past (1990s – Present) 2.2 Nigerian Political Economy, State Policy Response and the Nature of the Nigerian State 2.2.1 A Survey of the Nigerian Political Economy 2.2.2 State-centric Responses to the Niger Delta Oil Conflict (1960 – 2009) 2.2.2.1 Positive "Carrot" Approach 2.2.2.2 Coercive "Stick" Approach 2.2.3 An Explanation of the Nature and character of the Nigerian State 2.3 Conclusion CHAPTER THREE THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STATE AND NON-STATE INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA 3 Introduction 3.1 Furthering Institutional Scholarship and Debates 3.1.1 The Mainstream Debate 3.1.2 The Critical School 3.2 State-to-State Institutional Interaction 3.2.1 Institutions as "Rules of the Game" 3.2.2 Differential Power Distribution 3.2.3 Formal Institutional Bargaining 3.3 Non-state Driven Institutional Interlinkage 3.3.1 Institutions as socially shared rules/traditional systems 3.4 State and Non-state Institutional Exchange 3.4.1 Institutional Bricolage 3.4.2 Institutional Credibility 3.5 State, Non-state and International Collaboration 3.5.1 Complexities of NDA and DDR Institutions 3.5.2 Complementarity of NDA and DDR Institutions 3.5.3 Limited Access Order in NDA and DDR Institutions 3.6 Implications of Statutory, Non-Statutory and International Institutions to NDA and DDR 3.6.1 Lack of Coordination 3.6.2 Exacerbation of Conflict 3.6.3 Weak Hybridized Institutions 3.7 Conclusion CHAPTER FOUR CONCEPTUALISING INTERESTS AND INCENTIVES IN THE FRAMING OF THE NIGER DELTA AMNESTY AND DDR PROGRAM 4 Introduction 4.1 Mapping Actor Network Analysis in the Niger Delta Conflict 4.1.1 The Nigerian Government 4.1.2 Oil Communities 4.1.3 Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) 4.2 Contested Interests: Actors, Encounters and Entanglements in the Niger Delta 4.2.1 Powerful Versus Powerless Encounters 4.2.2 Elitists Entanglements 4.2.3 Intra and Inter Community Contestations 4.2.4 MNOCs and Niger Delta Communities' Confrontations 4.3 Conclusion CHAPTER FIVE A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NIGER DELTA AMNESTY, DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAM 5 Introduction 5.1 Amnesty: A Peacebuilding Practice 5.2 The NDA and DDR Program and the Politics of conceptualization 5.3 NDA and DDR Program and the Art of Negotiation 5.4 NDA and DDR: The Practice of Planning 5.5 The Implementation Process of the Niger Delta Amnesty and DDR Program 5.5.1 The Disarmament Phase 5.5.2 The Demobilisation Phase 5.5.3 The Reintegration Phase 5.6 Niger Delta Amnesty and DDR Process: A Shift from a Neoliberal Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) Principles to a Neopatrimonial DDR Practice 5.6.1 From a people centered approach to a patron-client driven approach 5.6.2 From a flexible, transparent and accountable doctrine to a non-transparent and unaccountable DDR process 5.6.3 Nationally Owned 5.6.4 From an Integrated IDDRS Norm to a non-integrated approach 5.6.5 From a well-planned IDDRS to a haphazard DDR 5.7 Conclusion CHAPTER SIX GENERAL CONCLUSION 6 Introduction 6.1 Main Research Questions and Empirical Findings 6.2 Theoretical and Empirical Contribution 6.3 Potential Concerns for Future Research BIBLIOGRAPHY

In an attempt to facilitate transition from conflict to peace, Disengagement, Disassociation, Reintegration and Reconciliation (DDRR) initiatives are key in fostering national dialogue and reconciliation. While much literature exists on the disengagement component of the process, very few scholars have documented in detail the screening phase and its challenges. Indeed, the screening phase is critical to ensure the success of a DDRR program, especially in contexts dominated by non-state armed groups (NSAGs). This publication examines how the Government of Niger (GoN) implements the screening process for disengaged combatants associated with Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa (BH/ISIS-WA). Thanks to the screening process, this article also explores the linkages between BH/ISIS-WA surrenders and judicial actors, as an opportunity to collect information on arrested associates in an environment with weak state presence characterized by heightened insecurity. The Government of Niger has made progress in the treatment of defectors by updating its legal framework, through the creation of a National Program on disengaged combatants and the set-up of an action plan to seek international support. The GoN is therefore trying to align itself based on respect for the International humanitarian laws and United Nations resolutions, in order to promote the human rights of both BH/ISIS-WA repentants and the communities into which they integrate. Additionally, the GoN strives to integrate lessons learnt from other Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs dealing with Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) across the African continent, in particular the case of Somalia. The overall process is managed by the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) but includes several other governmental agencies as well. In some instances, parts of the DDR implementation chain benefit from the support of international partners. The author of this article was in charge of providing technical assistance to the Government of Niger in developing a national strategy for disengaged persons associated with BH/ISIS-WA. He also assisted state actors to implement program components, such as the screening phase and the legal framework.

Several years ago a devastating civil war that raged in Sri Lanka for 3 decades between the state army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), finally ended. One of the immediate issues that the country had to face in the aftermath of the war was dealing with the remnants of the LTTE combatants. For that purpose, the state launched the program of Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR). The program appeared to be unique in many ways, different from the DDR programs initiated and conducted by the UN in other countries recovering from civil war. One of such features distinctive for Sri Lanka, was that DDR was launched in the absence of the ceasefire or peace agreement between belligerents, in the condition of a total victory of the state army. What has attracted the attention of the international community, was the full monopoly on the development and execution of the program by the government of Sri Lanka, with the UN left outside. In this research project I look into how DDR in Sri Lanka is different from the conventional vision on DDR. I bring up a question on whether the Sri Lankan DDR is simply a tool for maintaining the political influence, or it challenges the very understanding of the concept. To analyse the data collected during the fieldwork in Sri Lanka, I employ theories on statehood, human security and peacebuilding.

Although it is common for armed groups to splinter (or "fragment") during contexts of multi-party civil war, current guidance on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) does not address the challenges that arise when recalcitrant fighters, unwilling to report to DDR, break ranks and form new armed groups. This Practice Note addresses this issue, drawing lessons from the multi-party context of the DRC and from the experiences of former members of three armed groups: the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma), the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), and the DRC national army (FARDC). While the findings indicate that the fragmentation of armed groups may encourage desertion and subsequent participation in DDR, they also show that active armed groups may monitor DDR programs and track those who demobilize. Remobilization may follow, either as active armed groups target ex-combatants for forced re-recruitment or as ex-combatants remobilize in armed groups of their own choice. Given these dynamics, practitioners in settings of partial peace may find it useful to consider non-traditional methods of DDR such as the use of mobile patrols and mobile disarmament units. The temporary relocation of ex-combatants to safe areas free from armed groups, or to protected transitional assistance camps, may also help to minimize remobilization during the reintegration phase.

Germany has a long history of literary censorship. Following the Second World War and the division of Germany into the Federal Republic of Germany in the West and the German Democratic Republic in the East, both states simultaneously decried censorship in their constitutions and proceeded to unofficially censor literature. A vast amount of research and attention has focused on the censorship program of the East German Ministry for Culture. Little attention, however, has been given to censorship in West Germany, despite its critical role in the development of a new cultural identity and perception of the former East Germany. This work presents a depiction of the many forms of West German literary censorship as it pertains to East Germany between 1945 and 1995, with an analysis of the consequences following reunification. It will be argued that literary censorship was employed by West Germany as a cultural political instrument against the communist state of the German Democratic Republic, thereby permanently shaping the West German public's perception of the former East Germany and obstructing integration of East German collective experience into reunified German society.

Das 1947 vom II. Pädagogischen Kongreß in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone verabschiedete Erziehungsprogramm wird erstmals auf der Grundlage der jetzt zugänglichen Quellen analysiert. Einer staatspädagogisch-affirmativen Lesart wird eine der Tradition kritischer Bildungstheorie verpflichtete Lesart gegenübergestellt. Beide werden bis in die Kontroversen zurückverfolgt, die in den Jahren 1946/47 unter Beteiligung namhafter Erziehungswissenschaftler bei den Beratungen über das Programm zwischen Befürwortern einer affirmativen und Vertretern einer nicht-affirmativen Bildungstheorie ausgetragen worden sind. (DIPF/Orig.) ; For the first time, the educational program passed by the Second Pedagogical Congress in the Soviet sector, in 1947, is analyzed on the basis of sources now accessible. A state pedagogical-affirmative reading is juxtaposed with a reading indebted to the tradition of critical educational theory. Both these readings are traced back to the controversies which were part of the debates on the educational program in the years 1946/47 and in which participated well-known educational scientists, with the Champions of a dogmatic State pedagogy on the one side and representatives of a non-affirmative theory of education on the other. (DIPF/Orig.)

Renamo's recent upsurge against the Mozambican Frelimo-led government after 22 years of relative stability has challenged the country's often celebrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process (1992–1994). Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Maringue (Sofala province), the location of the rebels' wartime headquarters and a post-war Renamo stronghold, this paper shows that while the DDR program supposedly ended Renamo's command and control structure, the former rebel network continued to be a central feature of ex-combatants' social worlds. Former Renamo combatants spend most of their time in the company of their 'colleagues of the trenches' and engaged in relationships of dependency with political Renamo leaders and former commanders. These relationships were not only shaped by the former military structure, but also by friendship, marriage, and patronage dynamics, providing ex-Renamo combatants with physical and economic safety, a sense of belonging and economic possibilities. Recent events in Mozambique suggest that the post-conflict continuation of informal wartime networks is a threat to peace and a failure of demobilization. Nevertheless, the fieldwork conducted in Maringue reveals that the dismantling of the command and control structure is often in vain, as it may be worthwhile for ex-combatants to maintain ties with their former military group for various reasons. Therefore, I argue that it may be useful to consider these networks based on the former armed group in processes of violence reduction, also in the development of DDR programs, as these may offer possibilities for the re-positioning and transformation of (former) armed actors.

Renamo's recent upsurge against the Mozambican Frelimo-led government after 22 years of relative stability has challenged the country's often celebrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process (1992 to 1994). Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Maringue (Sofala province), the location of the rebels' wartime headquarters and a post-war Renamo stronghold, this paper shows that while the DDR program supposedly ended Renamo's command and control structure, the former rebel network continued to be a central feature of ex-combatants' social worlds. Former Renamo combatants spend most of their time in the company of their 'colleagues of the trenches' and engaged in relationships of dependency with political Renamo leaders and former commanders. These relationships were not only shaped by the former military structure, but also by friendship, marriage, and patronage dynamics, providing ex-Renamo combatants with physical and economic safety, a sense of belonging and economic possibilities.Recent events in Mozambique suggest that the post-conflict continuation of informal wartime networks is a threat to peace and a failure of demobilization. Nevertheless, the fieldwork conducted in Maringue reveals that the dismantling of the command and control structure is often in vain, as it may be worthwhile for ex-combatants to maintain ties with their former military group for various reasons. Therefore, I argue that it may be useful to consider these networks based on the former armed group in processes of violence reduction, also in the development of DDR programs, as these may offer possibilities for the re-positioning and transformation of (former) armed actors.

DNA damage response (DDR) leads to DNA repair, and depending on the extent of the damage, to further events, including cell death. Evidence suggests that cell differentiation may also be a consequence of the DDR. During the formation of the infective hypha in the phytopathogenic fungus Ustilago maydis, two DDR kinases, Atr1 and Chk1, are required to induce a G2 cell cycle arrest, which in turn is essential to display the virulence program. However, the triggering factor of DDR in this process has remained elusive. In this report we provide data suggesting that no DNA damage is associated with the activation of the DDR during the formation of the infective filament in U. maydis. We have analyzed bulk DNA replication during the formation of the infective filament, and we found no signs of impaired DNA replication. Furthermore, using RPA-GFP fusion as a surrogate marker of the presence of DNA damage, we were unable to detect any sign of DNA damage at the cellular level. In addition, neither MRN nor 9-1-1 complexes, both instrumental to transmit the DNA damage signal, are required for the induction of the above mentioned cell cycle arrest, as well as for virulence. In contrast, we have found that the claspin-like protein Mrc1, which in other systems serves as scaffold for Atr1 and Chk1, was required for both processes. We discuss possible alternative ways to trigger the DDR, independent of DNA damage, in U. maydis during virulence program activation. ; This work was supported by grants from Spanish government (BIO2011-27773 and BIO2014-55398-R). ; Peer Reviewed

In 2009, hostilities were brought to an end in Burundi when the FNL rebel group laid downweapons. In exchange for peace, ex-rebels benefited from a disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR) program to finance their return to civilian life. A few years earlier,another rebel group (CNDD-FDD) had gone through the same program. In this paper, weassess the impact of this complex program from a theoretical and an empirical viewpoint.First, we develop an agricultural model in order to predict the impact of demobilization cashtransfers on beneficiary and non-beneficiary households. Then, we test the theoretical modelby using a household panel dataset collected in rural Burundi. We find that, in the shortrun, the cash payments received by ex-combatants had a positive direct impact on purchasesand investments of beneficiaries, as well as an indirect positive impact on non-beneficiaries.We also find that the direct and indirect impacts on purchases vanish in the long run. Theseresults suggest that reinsertion grants may favour the acceptation of ex-combatants in theirlocal communities in the short run, but are most likely not sufficient for peace to hold.More generally, it emphasizes the importance of considering spillovers in the evaluation ofdevelopment programs. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

yes ; The success of programmes that relate to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants into civilian life is dependent on four crucial aspects. First, it is essential that there is insightful and comprehensive planning that is based on sound research and analysis in order for a realistic strategy to be developed. Second, it is critical that the requisite political will exist at all levels to implement this strategy efficiently and effectively. Third, these programmes are typically expensive and time-consuming processes, and hence the necessary resources, namely financial and material support, and technical expertise, need to be secured. Fourth, it is vital that effective monitoring and evaluation systems are included in DDR processes, and that these systems are an integral part of the implementation strategy. The purpose of this paper is to examine critically current DDR developments, as well as explore the possible next steps for DDR. This will include the consideration of the current state of DDR and the extent to which initiatives such as the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) and the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR), as well as other contemporary policy instruments and programmes encompass a human security perspective and reflects the interests of the poor. The key question that this paper will explore is: to what extent does current or "third generation" DDR programming differ from those DDR initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s (or "second generation")1; and to what extent do they contribute to the sustainable alleviation of poverty?

The paper analyses mainly non-vocational courses offered by a sample of 47 out of the approximately 900 public adult education centres (Volkshochschule - VHS) in Germany. The focus is on courses, events or other learning forms dealing with refugees in Germany from 1947 to 2015. Refugees can be taught in all-refugee or in mixed-groups, but it can also mean that flight and refuge is an educational issue for non-refugees. The method of program analysis is used. The results demonstrate changes over time. German adult education centres have partly turned into language schools for refugees and migrants. Civic or liberal education courses have lost importance. Refugees and migrants are addressed more than in the past when mainly non-refugees were informed about the reasons why people become refugees. Finally, ideas for courses are put forward. They are related to past practices and other studies. (DIPF/Orig.)

This article examines the future of the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq. The PMF is militias that assisted the coalition forces in liberating Iraqi cities from ISIS control. However, in the aftermath of that operation, the PMF now poses a major threat to the future of state-building (PMF) after the fall of an umbrella organization of armed in Iraq. Their armed strength and loyalties to leaders other than the Iraqi government, combined with evidence from existing research on pro-regime militias, suggest that the PMF poses a high- threat in an unstable environment if not managed carefully. Therefore, this article addresses the following question: What can be done with the various militias of the PMF to ensure a secure and sustainable future in Iraq? The Iraqi government has already taken the first steps to mitigate the PMF's threat by integrating them into the national army, but further integration is required. Since undergoing any disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating (DDR) program is unlikely in Iraq at present, this article recommends employing the PMF for the purpose of infrastructure reconstruction or its support.