Suchergebnisse

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "This report discusses Multilateral Development Banks (MDB), which provide financial support for projects and programs that promote social and economic progress in developing countries. GAO provides (1) summaries of each bank's mission, function, and operations; (2) key bank financial data covering the last three fiscal years; and (3) information on the U.S. investment in capital and voting percentages in each MDB. GAO found that MDBs are autonomous international financial entities that finance economic and social development projects and programs in developing countries. The MDBs primarily fund these projects and programs using money borrowed from world capital markets or money provided by the governments of member countries. MDBs enable developing countries to access foreign currency resources on more advantageous terms than would be available to them on the basis of their own international credit standing. The MDBs provide assistance in the form of loans, equity investments, loan and equity guarantees, and technical assistance. Direct lending is the primary vehicle of development assistance. The United States is the largest member in most of the MDBs discussed in this report, contributing significant amounts to support the missions of the MDBs and subscribing a significant amount to MDBs' callable capital."

Moore reviews 'Multilateral Development Banks, Volume 1: The African Development Bank' by E. Philip English and Harris M. Mule.

The conventional paradigm about development banks is that these institutions exist to target well-identified market failures. However, market failures are not directly observable and can only be ascertained with a suitable learning process. Hence, the question is how do the policymakers know what activities should be promoted, and how do they learn about the obstacles to the creation of new activities? Rather than assuming that the government has arrived at the right list of market failures and uses development banks to close some well-identified market gaps, this paper suggests that development banks can be in charge of identifying these market failures through their loan-screening and lending activities to guide their operations and provide critical inputs for the design of productive development policies. In fact, they can also identify government failures that stand in the way of development and call for needed public inputs. This intelligence role of development banks is similar to the role that modern theories of financial intermediation assign to banks as institutions with a comparative advantage in producing and processing information. However, while private banks focus on information on private returns, development banks would potentially produce and organize information about social returns.

The conventional paradigm about development banks is that these institutions exist to target well-identified market failures. However, market failures are not directly observable and can only be ascertained with a suitable learning process. Hence, the question is how do the policymakers know what activities should be promoted, how do they learn about the obstacles to the creation of new activities? Rather than assuming that the government has arrived at the right list of market failures and uses development banks to close some well-identified market gaps, we suggest that development banks can be in charge of identifying these market failures through their loan-screening and lending activities to guide their operations and provide critical inputs for the design of productive development policies. In fact, they can also identify government failures that stand in the way of development and call for needed public inputs. This intelligence role of development banks is similar to the role that modern theories of financial intermediation assign to banks as institutions with a comparative advantage in producing and processing information. However, while private banks focus on information on private returns, development banks would potentially produce and organize information about social returns.