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Standard prisoners' dilemma games offer players the binary choice between cooperating and defecting, but in a related game there is the third possibility of leaving the game altogether. We conceptualize exiting as taking the individual beyond the reach of externalities generated in the original group, and on that basis—together with the assumption of self-interested (dollar-maximizing) behavior on the part of all players—we derive the prediction that the exit option will drain the community or group more of cooperators than of defectors.But experimental data do not support this prediction; cooperators do not leave more frequently than defectors and, in fact, there is evidence that defectors are more prone to leave than cooperators. We consider and reject the possibility that this failure of prediction results from the (admitted) greater optimism of cooperators about the incidence of cooperation "here," and present data supporting the hypothesis that cooperators often stay when their personal interest is with exiting because of the same ethical or group-regarding impulse that (presumably) led them to cooperate in the first place. Cooperation can be produced for a group or community either by inducing people to cooperate or by inducing those who are going to cooperate to stay in the game, and ethical considerations seem to underlie the decision to stay as well as the decision to cooperate while staying.

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CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 88 S401-19 ; Includes bibliographies. ; Microfiche. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Three different types of N-person social dilemma games were employed: the Prisoner's Dilemma (NPD), the Chicken Dilemma (NCD), and the Trust Dilemma (NTD). Subjects, who were classified a priori as either a cooperator (n = 58) or a defector (n = 68), participated in one of the social dilemma games before they received bogus feedback: they were told that the majority had chosen the defecting alternative D, or that the majority had chosen the cooperative alternative C. As predicted, (1) both before and after feedback, more defecting choices were made in the NPD than in the NCD, whereas in the NCD more defecting choices were made than in the NTD; (2) before and after feedback, defectors made more defecting choices than cooperators; (3) after majority D feedback more defecting choices were made than after majority C feedback. In addition, it appeared that in NPD and in NTD, defectors were especially sensitive to majority D feedback in that it facilitated their natural inclination to prefer D-choices. No support for Kelley and Stahelski's triangle hypothesis was observed.

THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT TRUE EVALUATIONS OF SOVIET STRENGTH ARE DIFFICULT BECAUSE THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY TECHNOLOGY ONLY COMES FROM FOUR SOURCES, OFFICIAL SOVIET FORCES, SOVIET EMIGRES AND DEFECTORS, FOREIGN ARMS TRANSFERS, AND NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF RECONOISSANCE. THOUGH AN ACCURATE PICTURE CAN BE ASSEMBLED USING THESE TECHNIQUES, THE PROCESS IS SLOW AND INCREMENTAL.

Analysis of various domestic factors in the two Koreas, especially in South Korea influencing the unification process. Perceptions of South and North Koreans toward unification: Results of three surveys, the one carried out in South Korea among North Korean defectors in June 1978, the other two carried out among South Koreans in May 1983 and July 1985. Need for the continuation of dialogue between South and North Korea. (DÜI-Sen)