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Front Cover -- Title Page -- Half Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Note on Transliteration -- Introduction -- Part I: Soviet Defectors in the Public Record -- 1. What Has Been Written About Soviet Defectors? -- 2. What Have Defectors Written About Themselves? -- 3. What Did Soviet Defectors Say? -- Part II: The KGB Wanted List: 1945-1969 -- 4. The KGB Wanted List: A General Characterization -- 5. Personal Data on Defectors -- 6. Defection and Its Aftermath -- 7. Criminal Allegations and Expected Punishment -- 8. Spy and Fake Defectors -- 9. Defections Before and After the Berlin Wall -- 10. Defections Under Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev -- Part III: Defections From 1969 to the Present -- 11. Defection and Legal Emigration -- 12. Trends in Post -1969 Defection -- 13. Defection and Détente -- Conclusion -- Appendixes -- List of Abbreviations Used in Appendixes -- 1A Passev List (May 1945-April 1969) -- IB Those Missing From the Passev List (1945- 1969) -- 2A Sample Entry of the KGB Wanted List (Vladislav Krasnov) -- 2B Ethnic Background of Defectors -- 2C Annual Distribution of Defections -- 2D Countries of Defection -- 2E Countries of Residence -- 2F Court Sentences For Defectors -- 2G List of "Anti-Soviet" Organizations Associated With Defectors -- 2H List of "Anti-Soviet" Organizations Sponsored By Foreigners -- 2I Defections Before and After the Berlin Wall -- 2J Defections Under Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev -- 2K Ethnic Distribution of Defectors Under Different Rulers -- 3 Composite List of Defectors (May 1969 to Present) -- 3A Defecting Scholars and Intellectuals (1969 to Present) -- 3B Defecting Musicians and Singers (1969 to Present) -- 3C Defecting Dancers (1969 to Present) -- 3D Defecting Seamen and Fishermen (1969 to Present) -- 3E Defecting Athletes and Sportsmen (1969 To Present)

Abstract
This paper aims to explain the adaptation of North Korean elite defectors who fled from North Korea. Data used for the purpose of this article came from surveys of North Korean defectors conducted in the late 2000's. Findings of the realized research indicate that the majority of senior defectors are experiencing less psychological and material issues when adjusting to society than regular North Korean defectors. The paper will proceed in three steps: explaining the notion of defectors, outlining their background, and focusing on their adaptation in South. Although defectors as a whole has emerged as of the most research group as a minority in South Korea, the so-called senior defectors have hardly been spotlighted. Basically North Korean senior defectors are supposed to strengthen the anti-Kim movement and legitimize the power of the South Korean government and the image of South Korea abroad. What has to be enlightened upon is the fact that North Korean senior defectors partially disagree with the integration policy of South Korean authorities. A major research question emerges: How are the experience of elite defectors localized in South Korea? How do their specific identities impact their opinion within the South Korean society? The aim of the article is also to categorize senior defectors and to provide in a single document a list of senior North Korea defectors based abroad. This kind of information is only available for Korean speaking readers. I wanted to make it accessible to the Englishspeaking community.

When intelligence officers defect, they take with them privileged information and often communicate it to the receiving state.

Theoretical work on parliamentary government leads to the expectation that parties will defect from governing coalitions when they anticipate greater payoffs in replacement governments or after new elections; similarly, governments as a whole (or their prime ministers) will dissolve legislatures prematurely with the same expectation in mind. Surprisingly, however, very little empirical work has been done to assess the extent to which defectors from or dissolvers of coalition governments actually manage to profit from their actions. We also know very little about what happens to coalition members who engage in government-ending disputes. The purpose of this paper is to address these deficiencies by examining the fates of dissolvers, defectors, and disputers in West European democratic systems since 1945. The results show that parties generally end up no better off, and usually worse off, in terms of measurable benefits when they engage in these types of action.