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The author examines the role of pseudo operations in several foreign counterinsurgency campaigns. Pseudo operations are those in which government forces disguised as guerrillas, normally along with guerrilla defectors, operate as teams to infiltrate insurgent areas. This technique has been used by the security forces of several other countries in their operations, and typically it has been very successful. A number of factors must be taken into account before attempting pseudo operations, especially their role in the intelligence and operational systems. Although it is likely that most insurgent movements have become more sophisticated, many of the lessons learned from previous pseudo operations suggest their continued usefulness in counterinsurgency campaigns. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1747/thumbnail.jpg

This monography examines the role of pseudo operations in several foreign coutnerinsurgency campaigns. Pseudo operations are those in which government forces disguised as guerrillas, normally along with guerrilla defectors, operate as teams to infiltrate insurgent areas. This technique has been used by the security forces of several other countries in their operations, and typically it has been very successful. A number of factors must be taken into account before attempting pseudo operations, especially their role in the intelligence and operational systems. Although it is likely that most insurgent movements have become more sophisticated, many of the lessons learned from previous pseudo operations suggest their continued usefulness in counterinsurgency campaigns. ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Peer-punishment is an important determinant of cooperation in human groups. It has been suggested that, at the proximate level of analysis, punitive preferences can explain why humans incur costs to punish their deviant peers. How punitive preferences could have evolved in humans is still not entirely understood. A possible explanation at the ultimate level of analysis comes from signaling theory. It has been argued that the punishment of defectors can be a type-separating signal of the punisher's cooperative intent. As a result, punishers are selected more often as interaction partners in social exchange and are partly compensated for the costs they incur when punishing defectors. A similar argument has been made with regard to acts of generosity. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether the punishment of a selfish division of money in a dictator game is a sign of trustworthiness and whether punishers are more trustworthy interaction partners in a trust game than non-punishers. We distinguish between second-party and third-party punishment and compare punitive acts with acts of generosity as signs of trustworthiness. We find that punishers are not more trustworthy than non-punishers and that punishers are not trusted more than non-punishers, both in the second-party and in the third-party punishment condition. To the contrary, second-party punishers are trusted less than their non-punishing counterparts. However, participants who choose a generous division of money are more trustworthy and are trusted more than participants who choose a selfish division or participants about whom no information is available. Our results suggest that, unlike for punitive acts, the signaling benefits of generosity are to be gained in social exchange.

AbstractThe defection thesis holds that members of marginalized social groups are obligated not to express views important to others in the group that are regarded by the others as substantively wrong. In this essay, I evaluate arguments that seek to vindicate the defection thesis and conclude they all fail. Then, I argue that we have reason to believe sanctioning defectors in certain ways is wrongful and that the expression of their contentious ideas is good for members of marginalized groups. We are left to conclude both that members of marginalized groups have no obligation to suppress certain heterodox views and that it is likely wrong to sanction them for expressing these views even if it were wrong for them to do so.

This article examines British deception during the early years of the Cold War, and how a Soviet defector named Grigori Tokaev contributed to British plans and operations. Tokaev provided valuable insights into the Soviet Union, allowing British intelligence to craft more intricate deception operations, political and military. The manner in which he was used, and the extent to which his idiosyncrasies were tolerated, underline the difficulties the British authorities faced as they attempted to apply the lessons of the Second World War deception to the Cold War environment. The case offers new perspectives on both the relatively under-examined subject British deception operations against the USSR, and the history of one of the most prominent Cold War defectors.

This article examines British deception during the early years of the Cold War, and how a Soviet defector named Grigori Tokaev contributed to British plans and operations. Tokaev provided valuable insights into the Soviet Union, allowing British intelligence to craft more intricate deception operations, political and military. The manner in which he was used, and the extent to which his idiosyncrasies were tolerated, underline the difficulties the British authorities faced as they attempted to apply the lessons of the Second World War deception to the Cold War environment. The case offers new perspectives on both the relatively under-examined subject of British deception operations against the USSR, and the history of one of the most prominent Cold War defectors.

FEATURES: Special Commentary. Limits of Negative Peace, Faces of Positive Peace — Patricia M. Shields. A Wake for Counterinsurgency? Abandoning Counterinsurgency: Reviving Antiterrorism Strategy—Steven Metz. Insurgent Defectors in Counterinsurgencies—Jacqueline L. Hazelton. War among (& for) the People. Rethinking NATO Policy on the Protection of Civilians—Sten Rynning. Military Force and Mass Migration in Europe—Matthew N. Metzel and John M. Lorenzen. War and Social Perception. Casualties of Their Own Success: The 2011 Urination Incident in Afghanistan—Paolo G. Tripodi and David M. Todd. Third-Force Influences: Hollywood's War Films—John Chapin, Marissa Mendoza- Burcham, and Mari Pierce. Army Expansibility. Expanding Brigade Combat Teams: Is the Training Base Adequate?—Esli T. Pitts. Rapid Expansion and the Army's Matériel: Is There Enough?—Robb C. Mitchell.

The two decades between 1955 and 1976, bookended by the beginning of amilitary coup that ousted populist President Juan Perón in 1955 and the dictatorshipthat replaced a democratically elected government in 1976, was a periodof tremendous political radicalism that would leave a permanent impression onArgentina's political history. During this period, left wing parties in Argentina,already "extensive, prolific, [with] countless complexities and contradictions," 2gradually transformed from traditional orthodox parties of the left and the labormovement into a 'new left,' introducing a wide range of ideological influences.The nueva izquierda drew from crowds of intellectuals, university students,defectors from traditional parties, guerrillas, and social movements, raisinga challenge to the legitimacy of traditional leftist parties in representing thespectrum of political concerns and ambitions of the left.

Many interactions in modern human societies are among strangers. Explaining cooperation in such interactions is challenging. The two most prominent explanations critically depend on individuals' willingness to punish defectors: In models of direct punishment,individuals punish antisocial behavior at a personal cost, whereas
in models of indirect reciprocity, they punish indirectly by withholding rewards. We investigate these competing explanations in a field experiment with real-life interactions among strangers. We
find clear evidence of both direct and indirect punishment. Direct punishment is not rewarded by strangers and, in line with models of indirect reciprocity, is crowded out by indirect punishment opportunities. The existence of direct and indirect punishment in daily life indicates the importance of both means for understanding the evolution of cooperation.

The paper aims at understanding the structural features of the bargaining coalitions in the Doha Round of the WTO. We provide an empirical assessment of the preferences of each negotiating actor looking at general economics indicators, development levels, structure of the agricultural sectors, and trade policies for agricultural products. Bargaining coalitions are analyzed by grouping countries through a cluster analysis procedure. The clusters are compared with existing coalitions, in order to assess their degree of internal homogeneity as well as their common interests. Such a comparison allows the detection of possible "defectors", i.e. countries that according to their economic conditions and policies seem to be relatively less committed to the positions of the coalition they join.

A strategy contest in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with an exit option after each game is developed. The whole model is assumed to represent the conditions for egoistical cooperation in a large and anonymous society, which is based mainly on exchange relationships and voluntary cooperation between individuals; therefore, it is appropriate for studying the social stability of free markets. The strategies have no memory, effects of reputation do not exist, and defectors cannot be identified, traced, and held responsible for their actions. This scenario abandons the preconditions usually regarded as necessary for establishing cooperation. Nevertheless, egoistical cooperation may emerge in this model. It turns out that egoistical cooperation is much more robust than realized by most game-theoretical and sociological analyses.

학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 국제학과(국제지역학전공), 2012. 2. 문우식. ; With the rising inflow of North Korean refugees into South Korean society, different social issues related to the adjustment of North Korean defectors are emerging, asking simultaneously for the necessity to help a successful adaptation of the defectors in South Korean society. In case of German unification, the lack of inner integration after the achievement of political unification has resulted—to a large extent—from the four decades of different political socialization process based on distinctive cultural and political ideals in the East and West German societies. Since a significant degree of political socialization is accomplished by education, the role of education, particularly political and moral education, in promoting social integration by cultivating mature democratic civic qualities among the members of society to respect social values and order becomes critical. In this regard, the function of political and citizenship education in Germany throughout the unification process, especially in bridging the psychological gap between the East and West Germans, provides valuable lessons to be deliberated in preparing for the unification of Korea. Besides, as South Korean society has become more multicultural, the direction of political and unification education needs to contemplate and incorporate the issues of multiculturalism. Concerning these aspects, this study analyzes the characteristics of political and citizenship education in Germany before and after the unification in comparison to political education in the context of unification education in South and North Korea with some related problems and challenges. In addition, the investigation of the adjustment of North Korean defectors offers a meaningful guidance in preparing for different social issues which might occur throughout the unification process of the South and the North. ; 남한 사회로 유입되는 북한이탈주민의 수가 증가함에 따라 탈북자들의 성공적인 남한 사회 정착을 위한 지원이 요구되고 있으며, 이와 동시에 이들의 적응에 관련한 다양한 사회적 쟁점들이 새로이 대두되고 있다. 독일의 경우, 정치적 통일의 성취 이후에 나타난 내적 통합의 부족은 대개 동독과 서독 사회의 특유한 정치•문화적 사상에 기반한 지난 40년간의 상이한 정치사회화 과정에서 기인한 것이다. 정치사회화의 상당한 부분이 교육에 의하여 이루어지기 때문에 교육의 역할, 특별히 사회 구성원간에 사회적 가치와 질서를 존중하는 성숙된 민주 시민의 자질을 배양함으로써 사회적 통합을 촉진하는 정치와 도덕교육의 역할이 더욱 강조되고 있다. 이러한 관점에서, 독일의 민주시민 교육은 통일과정 전반에 걸쳐 동•서독인 상호 간의 심리적 거리감을 메워주는 역할을 함으로써 한국의 통일을 준비함에 있어서 숙고해야 할 중요한 교훈을 제시하고 있다. 그 뿐만이 아니라, 남한 사회가 더욱 다문화 되어감에 따라서 정치와 통일 교육의 방향을 설정할 때 다문화주의에 대한 논의도 함께 다루어져야 한다. 이러한 점을 고려하여, 본 연구는 통일 전후 독일 민주시민 교육의 특성을 남•북한 통일교육의 맥락에서 정치교육이 당면한 문제 및 과제와 함께 비교하여 분석한다. 이와 더불어서, 탈북자들의 적응 현황에 대한 조사는 남•북한 통일과정에서 일어날 수 있는 다양한 사회적 쟁점을 대비하는데 있어서 의미 있는 지침을 제공하여 준다. ; Master

This dissertation consists of three chapters in the field of applied microeconomics with a focus on labor economics and behavioral economics. It covers various topics and methods. A common theme is the importance of decisions. Our economy is the result of innumerable decisions made by individual and institutional agents. The decisions are constraint by resources and differ in complexity and impact. All three chapters contain empirical analyzes of such decisions reaching from binary decisions in the stylized context of the prisoners dilemma, over individual training and employment choices and consequences in late-careers, to the impact of the political choice of the minimum-wage introduction on income inequality and poverty. In the first chapter we study how individuals make decisions in the stylized context of the repeated prisoners' dilemma. In a meta-study we reanalyze 12 experiments on the repeated prisoner's dilemma (PD) and identify three distinct types of players: defectors, cautious cooperators and strong cooperators. The defectors defect with a high probability in every round. Both cooperating types play semi-grim behavior strategies. This simple three-type mixture fits significantly better than any model consisting of combinations of (generalized) pure strategies from the literature, which we fitted at the treatment level (considering 1051 pure-strategy mixtures), even when we use constant specifications of the three types across all experiments. The three best fitting strategies vary slightly across experiments, however. Structurally analyzing these strategies, we find that subjects have limited foresight and subjectively assign utility values to the four states (cc,cd,dc,dd) of the supergame, which relate to the original stage-game payoffs in a manner compatible with inequity aversion. This subjectively transforms the prisoners dilemma game into a coordination game and can reliably explain the strategies used across all 32 treatments. In the second chapter I study how individual decisions interplay ...