Suchergebnisse

Abstract
This paper aims to explain the adaptation of North Korean elite defectors who fled from North Korea. Data used for the purpose of this article came from surveys of North Korean defectors conducted in the late 2000's. Findings of the realized research indicate that the majority of senior defectors are experiencing less psychological and material issues when adjusting to society than regular North Korean defectors. The paper will proceed in three steps: explaining the notion of defectors, outlining their background, and focusing on their adaptation in South. Although defectors as a whole has emerged as of the most research group as a minority in South Korea, the so-called senior defectors have hardly been spotlighted. Basically North Korean senior defectors are supposed to strengthen the anti-Kim movement and legitimize the power of the South Korean government and the image of South Korea abroad. What has to be enlightened upon is the fact that North Korean senior defectors partially disagree with the integration policy of South Korean authorities. A major research question emerges: How are the experience of elite defectors localized in South Korea? How do their specific identities impact their opinion within the South Korean society? The aim of the article is also to categorize senior defectors and to provide in a single document a list of senior North Korea defectors based abroad. This kind of information is only available for Korean speaking readers. I wanted to make it accessible to the Englishspeaking community.

When intelligence officers defect, they take with them privileged information and often communicate it to the receiving state.

Theoretical work on parliamentary government leads to the expectation that parties will defect from governing coalitions when they anticipate greater payoffs in replacement governments or after new elections; similarly, governments as a whole (or their prime ministers) will dissolve legislatures prematurely with the same expectation in mind. Surprisingly, however, very little empirical work has been done to assess the extent to which defectors from or dissolvers of coalition governments actually manage to profit from their actions. We also know very little about what happens to coalition members who engage in government-ending disputes. The purpose of this paper is to address these deficiencies by examining the fates of dissolvers, defectors, and disputers in West European democratic systems since 1945. The results show that parties generally end up no better off, and usually worse off, in terms of measurable benefits when they engage in these types of action.

Refugees experience various kinds of trauma during the migration process, which can cause psychiatric problems such as posttraumatic stress disorder. However, in the process of overcoming traumatic experiences, they may also experience posttraumatic growth (PTG). This study examined the level of PTG and its associated factors among North Korean defectors, including posttraumatic stress symptoms (PTSS). In total, 212 North Korean defectors completed self-report questionnaires measuring PTG (PTG inventory), PTSS (Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Checklist, PCL-5), quality of life (WHOQOL-BREF), and various sociodemographic variables. Participants completed the survey online, from July 27 to August 4, 2020. Participants reported a moderate level of PTG scores (51.7 ± 15.4, range 0-80). To determine the impact of PTSS on PTG among North Korean defectors, we conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis. In the final model, several sociodemographic factors (years in South Korea, education in North Korea, religion, and employment status), overall quality of life (β = 0.321, p < 0.001), and PTSS (β = 0.162, p = 0.035) were positively associated with PTG, whereas living with family (β = - 0.1261, p = 0.040) and loneliness (β = - 0.401, p < 0.001) were negatively associated with PTG, accounting for 36.6% of the variance in PTG scores (p < 0.001). This is the first large-scale study describing the level of PTG and its associated factors among North Korean defectors residing in South Korea. Further, our study provides suggestions for future research in this area, and interventions for improving PTG among this group. ; open

This qualitative study addresses the deficit in current Korean government policy in integrating young North Korean defectors and demonstrates the catalysts and inhibitors of young North Koreans integrating to South Korean society. It does so through secondary source, narrative analysis and by examining young North Korean defectors' responses in primary interviews in other studies on life in South Korea. The responses were coded by theme and organized into three categories of concern for young defectors based on their responses: culture and language, power, and income and housing. The results informed recommendations understood through Ager and Strang's domains of integration and are based on current practices in aiding displaced people employed by states and intergovernmental actors. These recommendations were addressed to the Korean government. The goal of this research is to improve the lives of young North Korean people in South Korea by questioning current local integration approaches which do not incorporate Forced Migration thought in their implementation.