The demobilization of the Israeli labor movement
In: The journal of Israeli history: politics, society, culture, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 123-146
ISSN: 1744-0548
In: The journal of Israeli history: politics, society, culture, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 123-146
ISSN: 1744-0548
In: Nature, society, and thought: NST ; a journal of dialectical and historical materialism, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 5-39
ISSN: 0890-6130
In: International peacekeeping, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 181-201
ISSN: 1743-906X
In: The political quarterly, Band 17, Heft 2, S. 165-173
ISSN: 1467-923X
In: Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 188
In: American political science review, Band 38, Heft 6, S. 1137-1153
ISSN: 1537-5943
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, or DDR, has been widely advocated for decades as an essential component of postconflict peacebuilding. But DDR in practice has generated more questions than answers. Does the approach work, contributing to postconflict stabilization and the reintegration of former combatants? Can it work better? What constitutes success? What accounts for failures? Do the potential risks outweigh the potential benefits? Drawing on his extensive experience in the field, Desmond Molloy considers these questions and more as he traces the evolution of DDR theory and practice from the mid-1980s to the present
In: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7732
SSRN
Working paper
World Affairs Online
In: The China quarterly: an international journal for the study of China, Heft 146: China's military in transition, S. 336-359
ISSN: 0305-7410, 0009-4439
In their repeated attempts to refute the "China threat" syndrome, Chinese leaders stress, among other things, the 25 percent cut of about one million troops in the size of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), announced in the mid-1980s. The author explores demobilization under Mao Zedong and after his death and problems and implications of demobilization. He points out that ostensibly, China's post-Mao demobilization has been remarkable. Within a few years over one million troops, one quarter of the PLA, have reportedly been transferred to civilian life. China's military strength is compared with those of some other countries. (DÜI-Sen)
World Affairs Online
In: Public administration review: PAR, Band 5, S. 73-80
ISSN: 0033-3352
In: Slavic review: interdisciplinary quarterly of Russian, Eurasian and East European studies, Band 76, Heft 3, S. 703-709
ISSN: 2325-7784
Our essay proposes that while the predominant concept of revolution as driven by the mobilization of social, political, and cultural forces has value, at least as important for understanding the revolutions of 1917 was the dramatic demobilization of army, police, state, and society. We suggest that revolutions often see a conflict between affective mobilization (in which some portion of the citizenry becomes much more enthusiastic about particular social and political projects) and structural demobilization (in which the failure of major state institutions and economic enterprises makes positive social and political change nearly impossible). In early 1917, affective mobilization on behalf of the war and the regime was in decline, but structural mobilization was at its peak. The February Revolution brought a sudden radical structural demobilization. This structural demobilization both made it possible for relatively modest numbers of revolutionary forces to succeed in October 1917 and made the emergence of widespread apathy and disillusionment in 1918 much more likely.
SSRN
Working paper
In: Comparative politics, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 275-301
ISSN: 0010-4159
MILITARY COUP OF SEPT. 11, 1973 INITIATED A RAPID PROCESS OF POLITICAL DEMOBILIZATION IN CHILE. THE ARTICLE EXAMINES THAT PROCESS AND EXPLORES ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE CENTRAL POLICY GOALS OF THE CHILEAN JUNTA. IT FOCUSES SPECIFICALLY ON THE REGIME'S EFFORTS TO CONTROL TRADE UNIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES, AND ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE SOME PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE COMPARATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHILE'S STATE.