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In: European history quarterly, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 13-37
ISSN: 0014-3111, 0265-6914
This article explores the relationship between democracy & social democracy from the late nineteenth century through to the present. It discusses the emergence of different concepts of democracy within European social democracy at different times during this period & attempts to locate key junctures in the relationship between those two concepts. After investigating the strong links between radical democracy & social democracy in the second half of the nineteenth century, it goes on to argue that Marxism, through an anti-pluralist legacy which social democratic reformists & revisionists tried hard to overcome after 1900, considerably influenced social democracy's perception of democracy. Yet a fundamental ambiguity of social democracy towards democracy was only overcome under the conditions of the Cold War & the long economic boom after 1945. In the 'golden age' of social democracy between the 1940s & the 1960s, Social Democrats fully endorsed the politics of pluralist democracy. From the 1970s onwards, when the 'social democratic consensus' came under intense criticism from the political Right, the commitment of social democracy to democracy remained one of the few uncontentious areas, & the renaissance of social democratic fortunes in the 1990s has tended to focus on democracy as a key element of 'new' social democracy in Europe. [Copyright 2002 Sage Publications Ltd.]
The current populist challenges in western liberal democracies should not be seen as evidence of their decline, but as a constituent part. The history of democracy shows us that such challenges enable democracy's growth and evolution. As these modern conflicts and crises see populists seek to capitalise on the discontent of the people, it is evident that much of the conflict comes from tensions between the rule of law and majority rule. Elites seeking to preserve the liberal democratic system need to make their arguments in defence of the rule of law and democratic values, rather than assuming them to be self-evident. We should only become concerned over the fate of liberal democracy when the conflict moves from dialogue into physical violence, or as in Hungary, where the executive has dismantled counter-majoritarian checks. It is only then that the departure from democracy truly begins.
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ISSN: 1612-9008
ISSN: 2196-8276