Suchergebnisse

Artykuł przedstawia stanowisko Parlamentu Europejskiego (PE) wobec kluczowych zagrożeń dla bezpieczeństwa UE, a zwłaszcza problemu proliferacji broni masowego rażenia i zjawiska terroryzmu międzynarodowego. Przeciwdziałanie tym zagrożeniom należy przede wszystkim do kompetencji państw członkowskich i międzyrządowych organów UE. Wynika to z faktu, że kwestie te wchodzą w zakres Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa UE, w ramach której dominują międzyrządowe mechanizmy współpracy. W konsekwencji, rola PE w kształtowaniu polityki UE w kwestii przeciwdziałania proliferacji broni masowego rażenia i terroryzmu międzynarodowego jest ograniczona i sprowadza się przede wszystkim do wyrażania zawartych w rezolucjach niewiążących opinii. Jednakże przyjmowane przez PE rezolucje w tych kwestiach - mimo że nie wiążą pod względem prawnym - mają swoją istotną wagę polityczną i pozwalają PE, w przeciwieństwie do innych instytucji unijnych, wyrazić swoje stanowisko w sposób jednoznaczny i wyrazisty. Wynika to z faktu bycia przez PE jedyną ponadnarodową instytucją unijną mającą demokratyczną legitymację i mogącą sobie rościć prawo do sprawo¬wania parlamentarnej kontroli nad polityką UE w dziedzinie przeciwdziałania kluczowym dla bezpieczeństwa europejskiego zagrożeniom. Jest to widoczne zwłaszcza w obszarze walki z terroryzmem, który jest również przedmiotem zainteresowania wykorzystującej mechanizmy współpracy ponadnarodowej przestrzeni wolności, bezpieczeństwa i sprawiedliwości. ; The paper presents the stance of the European Parliament (EP) on the gravest threats to the security of the EU, in particular, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the issue of international terrorism. Prevention of these threats lies predominantly within the competence of EU member states and its intergovernmental bodies. Such situation is implied by the fact that these issues fall within the scope of EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within which intergovernmental collaboration mechanisms play a dominant role. This means that the EP's role in the shaping of EU's policy on the prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and international terrorism is limited and basically confined to the expression of non-binding opinions in its resolutions. However, relevant resolutions passed by the EP, though not binding in legal terms, have political significance and allow the EP, in contrast to other EU's institutions, to articulate its position in an unequivocal and clear way. This is possible since the EP is the only supranational EU institution that has democratic legitimacy and can claim the right to exercise parliamentary control over the EU's policy with respect to the prevention of the gravest threats to European security. This is particularly vivid as it comes to the fight against terrorism which is also the subject of interest for the common space of freedom, security and justice which employs intragovernmental collaboration mechanisms.

The paper presents the stance of the European Parliament (EP) on the gravest threats to the security of the EU, in particular, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the issue of international terrorism. Prevention of these threats lies predominantly within the competence of EU member states and its intergovernmental bodies. Such situation is implied by the fact that these issues fall within the scope of EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within which intergovernmental collaboration mechanisms play a dominant role. This means that the EP's role in the shaping of EU's policy on the prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and international terrorism is limited and basically confined to the expression of non-binding opinions in its resolutions. However, relevant resolutions passed by the EP, though not binding in legal terms, have political significance and allow the EP, in contrast to other EU's institutions, to articulate its position in an unequivocal and clear way. This is possible since the EP is the only supranational EU institution that has democratic legitimacy and can claim the right to exercise parliamentary control over the EU's policy with respect to the prevention of the gravest threats to European security. This is particularly vivid as it comes to the fight against terrorism which is also the subject of interest for the common space of freedom, security and justice which employs intragovernmental collaboration mechanisms.

Klappentext: W czasie drugiej wojny swiatowej Dolny Slask byl miejscem szczególnym. Wlasnie tam, z dala od linii frontu, rozpoczeto budowe najwiekszej kwatery Adolfa Hitlera, ulokowano liczne zaklady zbrojeniowe i tajne laboratoria badawcze. Na Dolny Slask ewakuowano równiez ludnosc cywilna z obszarów zagrozonych alianckimi nalotami i sprowadzono olbrzymia ilosc dóbr materialnych. Najcenniejszymi skarbami nie byly jednak depozyty bankowe, zloto zrabowane w krajach okupowanych czy surowce niezbedne do prowadzenia wojny, ale dziela sztuki. Wsród nich znajdowaly sie setki kolekcji prywatnych i publicznych, dziesiatki tysiecy obrazów, rzezb, grafik, unikalne dokumenty archiwalne, cenne ksiegozbiory i numizmaty. Bezpieczne schronienie zapewnily im dolnoslaskie palace, zamki i koscioly, a opieke nad nimi sprawowal prof. Günther Grundmann, regionalny konserwator zabytków, który do dzis uchodzi za postac kontrowersyjna i zagadkowa. Dzieki unikalnym dokumentom odnalezionym w niemieckich archiwach powstala Lista Grundmanna - szczególowa relacja z akcji zabezpieczania dziel sztuki na Dolnym Slasku. Jej przebieg i kulisy tworzenia ponad 100 skladnic, w których przechowywano bezcenne skarby kultury, wzbogaca 300 niepowtarzalnych fotografii.

The article presents international relations (or relations among nations) as based on a voluntarily accepted and previously negotiated agreements and treaties which form ground for a quite efficient and mostly peaceful anarchic system (order). Based on a libertarian political philosophy, supported by selected international relations theories, the article shows that even between the agencies of territorial monopoly on the use of force and decision making who are in possession of a military forces or weaponry of mass destruction there can exist peaceful and beneficial bilateral and multilateral contacts and relations based on the norms of the international law (characterized as norms and rules of behavior for governments with respect to relations with other governments), despite the fact that war is still one of the possible scenarios of a governmental action on the international arena. Furthermore it has been shown that, contrary to the arguments of some libertarian thinkers, weaponry of mass destruction even in the hands of governments can contribute to stabilizing the international system which proves that - from the libertarian point of view immoral and unethical entities - the States are capable of operating in the anarchic system in a very different manner than the authors like Thomas Hobbes would like to think, wrongly depicting anarchy as a permanent conflict of everyone against everyone, belli omnia conta omnes. In the conclusion main flaws and drawbacks of the anarchic international system are pointed out, however major advantages from the libertarian perspective of the system in question are raised as well.

The article presents international relations (or relations among nations) as based on a voluntarily accepted and previously negotiated agreements and treaties which form ground for a quite efficient and mostly peaceful anarchic system (order). Based on a libertarian political philosophy, supported by selected international relations theories, the article shows that even between the agencies of territorial monopoly on the use of force and decision making who are in possession of a military forces or weaponry of mass destruction there can exist peaceful and beneficial bilateral and multilateral contacts and relations based on the norms of the international law (characterized as norms and rules of behavior for governments with respect to relations with other governments), despite the fact that war is still one of the possible scenarios of a governmental action on the international arena. Furthermore it has been shown that, contrary to the arguments of some libertarian thinkers, weaponry of mass destruction even in the hands of governments can contribute to stabilizing the international system which proves that - from the libertarian point of view immoral and unethical entities - the States are capable of operating in the anarchic system in a very different manner than the authors like Thomas Hobbes would like to think, wrongly depicting anarchy as a permanent conflict of everyone against everyone, belli omnia conta omnes. In the conclusion main flaws and drawbacks of the anarchic international system are pointed out, however major advantages from the libertarian perspective of the system in question are raised as well.

The article aims to look at Russian culture as a soft power through the prism of the large-scale invasion of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and to analyze the changes in its perception that have occurred as a result of these events. Russian culture, especially high culture, is known and appreciated in the world, which gives it the power of attraction and the possibility of exerting influence. At the same time, it is not only a source of prestige and a tool for promoting Russia, but also spreading Russian imperial myths that contributed to the invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, the operation of Russian cultural institutions outside the borders of the Russian Federation is strictly controlled by the authorities, and its popularization is treated as a "special operation". Russian culture imposed imperial optics on the perception of "near abroad", deprived Ukraine of the right to its history, identity and cultural heritage. Due to its colonial nature, it does not perceive the suffering of oppressed nations, and is therefore unable to prevent the tragedy of their destruction, as is the case with Ukraine and its culture. As a result of the initiated war, Russia has embezzled some of its soft power. However, there is no consensus among the international community regarding the imposition of sanctions on Russian culture. Ukrainian cultural activists accuse the international community of hypocrisy because, in defending Russian culture, it does not perceive the deliberate and systematic destruction of Ukrainian culture. Russian culture requires a reinterpretation and unmasking of the imperial optics, as consuming it indiscriminately poses a threat to the national security of the "near abroad" states.

In the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, the North Atlantic Alliance faced its most serious predicament since the ColdWar. Its mission in Afghanistan revealed growing discrepancies between the member states. The Georgian crisis of 2008, the missile defence project and the enlargement showed a lack of coherence. NATO has split up into two or more factions. A crucial question arose as to NATO's ability to resolve the three main strategic dilemmas which have grown more pressing since the end of the ColdWar: (1) the choice between collective defence as the key role of NATO (Art. 5) and its out-of-area role of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism; (2) the choice between the transatlantic nature of NATO and its global partnerships; (3) the choice between the concept of the global military engagement of NATO and the so called comprehensive approach involving the cooperation of NATO with other security organizations such as the UN, the EU and the OSCE in reconstructing post-conflict regions. NATO's performance in managing these challenges will bear critically on its future. The Strategic Concept from Lisbon 2010 has helped to clarify many controversial issues within the organization. NATO has managed to mitigate the risk of developing into a multi-tier organization. Relations between the factions have relaxed although interests appear to remain as diverse as they were before. ; In the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, the North Atlantic Alliance faced its most serious predicament since the ColdWar. Its mission in Afghanistan revealed growing discrepancies between the member states. The Georgian crisis of 2008, the missile defence project and the enlargement showed a lack of coherence. NATO has split up into two or more factions. A crucial question arose as to NATO's ability to resolve the three main strategic dilemmas which have grown more pressing since the end of the ColdWar: (1) the choice between collective defence as the key role of NATO (Art. 5) and its out-of-area role of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism; (2) the choice between the transatlantic nature of NATO and its global partnerships; (3) the choice between the concept of the global military engagement of NATO and the so called comprehensive approach involving the cooperation of NATO with other security organizations such as the UN, the EU and the OSCE in reconstructing post-conflict regions. NATO's performance in managing these challenges will bear critically on its future. The Strategic Concept from Lisbon 2010 has helped to clarify many controversial issues within the organization. NATO has managed to mitigate the risk of developing into a multi-tier organization. Relations between the factions have relaxed although interests appear to remain as diverse as they were before.

This paper is the comparative analysis of two historically interdependent systems or socio-economic regimes: democracy and capitalism. The author argues that capitalism serves democracy only to a certain extent, and only within its own established framework. When capitalism takes the "wicked" form, it leads to the distortion of democracy, and even to its destruction. The above analysis has covered the problems of expansion of the vexing phenomenon of poverty, social inequality, accelerated global warming, protectionism and the privileged position of the highly developed countries, the controversy surrounding the governments' approval of apparently democratic and privileged position of the USA. The author's reflections are based on the reliable statistical data from the public institution sources and the author's own empirical research. ; Przedmiotem artykułu jest analiza porównawcza dwóch historycznie zależnych od siebie systemów lub ustrojów społeczno-gospodarczych: demokracji i kapitalizmu. Autor stawia tezę, że kapitalizm jedynie do pewnego stopnia służy demokracji i tylko w ramach przez nią ustalonych. Kiedy kapitalizm przyjmuje formę "niegodziwą", doprowadza do zniekształcenia demokracji, a nawet do jej zniszczenia. Przeanalizowane zostały problemy dokuczliwego rozszerzania się zjawiska biedy, nierówności społecznych, przyspieszonego ocieplania klimatu, protekcjonalizmu i uprzywilejowanej pozycji państw wysokorozwiniętych, kontrowersji wokół legitymizacji rządów pozornie demokratycznych i uprzywilejowanej pozycji USA. Przedstawione przez autora rozważania oparte są o miarodajne dane statystyczne ze źródeł instytucji publicznych oraz empiryczne badania własne.

In the political system of Peoples' Republic of Poland, Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) for more than four decades has played a key role in all areas of country's policy. In the end of the 80's, as a result of changes in Poland, fractures within the Party deepened. They were a result of differences in understanding of the requirements for, the scale and pace of reforms both in the party and the country. The article follows the last few months of functioning of PZPR when, after the June '89 elections, a deep division within the party took place. Consequently it has been dissolved during the 11th Congress, fated by, inter alia, crisis of confidence in own arguments, strength and own leaders. This moment is a major key in the process of destruction of political system, that has been functioning in Poland since 1940's. ; W systemie politycznym PRL PZPR przez ponad cztery dekady odgrywała kluczową rolę we wszystkich sferach polityki państwa. W końcu lat 80., w wyniku zachodzących w Polsce procesów, podziały wewnątrz PZPR pogłębiały się. Wynikały one ze zróżnicowanego rozumienia potrzeb, skali oraz tempa reform tak w partii, jak i w państwie. Artykuł przybliża ostatnie miesiące funkcjonowania PZPR, kiedy to po wyborach w czerwcu 1989 roku nastąpił w niej głęboki podział. W efekcie na XI Zjeździe została rozwiązana, o czym przesądził m.in. ogromny kryzys zaufania we własne racje, siły i kierownictwo ugrupowania. Moment ten stanowi istotny element w procesie destrukcji systemu politycznego funkcjonującego w Polsce od lat 40. XX wieku.

The aim of the article is to present the results of research on the effects of the coronavirus COVID-19 on the economies of the Three Seas Initiative countries and to try to answer the question about the future of the Initiative. It was assumed that the development and future of this initiative, which is still shaping its identity, and the possibility of achieving its goals, will depend on the economic possibilities of the states that make it up and the decisions made by the heads of states. The analysis was based on the latest macroeconomic statistical data published by Eurostat and the IMF, concerning: GDP, industrial production, budget deficit, public debt, unemployment and inflation. The article outlines the genesis of the Three Seas Initiative and its goals, in order to explain its essence and assumptions. In order to assess the development possibilities of the Three Seas Initiative countries and forecast their economic security in the context of COVID-19, a simplified forecasting method was used, prepared by a team of researchers in a research grant, consisting in distinguishing global megatrends, the socalled wild cards, weak signals, and based on them, possible scenarios were created. They include a forecast of changes in macroeconomic indicators in the context of megatrends and conclusions on the future of the initiative. The scale of the virus's destruction and its impact on the macroeconomic security of countries will depend on the number and intensity of successive waves of the pandemic, and on the degree of reveal of unfavourable phenomena (wild cards) and the intensity of phenomena currently observed in the form of weak signals. The political will of the leaders of states and the European Union to respect the debt limits set out in the Maastricht Treaty, as well as the will and real possibilities of launching development investments will also be important.

During the Cold War constructing nuclear weapons was extremely expensive, which limited the possibility of having it, only to the world's economic powers. The first owners of the destructive, nuclear technology was: United States and Soviet Union. In the meantime of the US-Soviet nuclear technology race, the role of other countries continued to grow. In this second category race, initially, at the forefront was United Kingdom. This situation changed, when China and France joined the race. In subsequent years, the nuclear club expanded by Israel, India, Pakistan and South Africa and the nuclear weapons stockpile continued to grow, exceeding a level of more than 65,000 in 1986. It is said that nuclear potential saved global community from the U.S. and the Soviet Union using it against each other, instead triggering a substitute wars, in third world countries. However, declarative support for various nonproliferation initiatives, as it took place in the years 1945-1991, often do not have the impact on the reduction of the real threats of proliferation and usage of weapons of mass destruction. No doubt the nuclear potential developed by Islamic Republic of Iran, or Kim Jong-un's aspirations that are posing a threat to international security ; Podczas zimnej wojny skonstruowanie broni nuklearnej było bardzo kosztowne, co ograniczało możliwość jej posiadania tylko do potęg gospodarczych. Pierwszymi dysponentami destrukcyjnej technologii jądrowej były Stany Zjednoczone i ZSRR. Pomimo tego, w międzyczasie amerykańsko-radzieckiego wyścigu technologii jądrowej, rola innych krajów wciąż rosła. W tym wyścigu drugiej kategorii, początkowo, na czele stała Wielka Brytania. Sytuacja ta zmieniła się, gdy do wyścigu włączył się Pekin oraz Francja. W kolejnych latach do klub atomowego dołączyły: Izrael, Indie, Pakistan i RPA, a zasoby nuklearne wciąż rosły, by w 1986 roku przekroczyć poziom 65 tys. głowic. Mówi się, że to potencjał jądrowy uchronił jednak przed wzajemnym atakiem USA i Związek Radziecki, wywołując jednak wojny zastępcze, w państwach trzecich

The concepts of recognizing elements of nature as having legal personality have been appearing for many years as proposals for a new approach to ecology. Recent years have brought specific solutions in this regard. Attempts to recognize rivers (but not only rivers) as separate legal entities can be found in various places around the world. This is not a common trend, only a few such cases can be identified in the applicable legislation. The article is devoted to the analysis of the best-known examples of this type of activity. In 2017, the legal system of New Zealand recognized the Whanganui River as a legal person. Talks are ongoing about further solutions of this kind. Apart from environmental protection reasons, the basic motives for this type of solution are cultural considerations – connected with Maori beliefs and values. In the legal systems of India and Colombia, the courts have attempted to recognize the rivers (Ganges and Yamuna in India, the Atrata River, and the entire Amazon ecosystem) as legal persons. The motives for this type of activity were primarily ecological – protecting priceless parts of nature from destruction. ; Koncepcje uznania elementów natury za mające osobowość prawną pojawiają się od wielu lat jako propozycje nowego podejścia do ekologii. Ostatnie lata przyniosły w tym zakresie konkretne rozwiązania. W różnych miejscach na świecie spotkać można próby uznania rzek (ale nie tylko) za odrębne podmioty prawa. Nie jest to powszechna tendencja, tylko kilka takich przypadków można zidentyfikować w obowiązujących ustawodawstwach. Artykuł poświęcono analizie najbardziej znanych przykładów tego rodzaju działań. W systemie prawnym Nowej Zelandii uznano w 2017 r. rzekę Whanganui za osobę prawną. Toczą się rozmowy na temat dalszych tego rodzaju rozwiązań. Podstawowym motywem takich rozwiązań, oprócz względów ochrony środowiska, są względy kulturowe – związane z systemem wierzeń i wartości Maorysów. W systemach prawnych Indii i Kolumbii sądy podjęły próby uznania rzek (Gangesu i Yamuny w Indiach, rzeki Atrata oraz całego ekosystemu Amazonki) za osoby prawne. Motywy tego rodzaju działań były przede wszystkim ekologiczne – ochrona bezcennych części przyrody przed zniszczeniem.

In 2003, the Council of Europe, the highest political organ of the European Union, resolved to adopt the European Security Strategy. This document outlined three fundamental objectives for the EU: stability and good governance in the area of the EU's closest neighbors; creating an international order that would be based not only on bilateral relations, but primarily on efficient multilateral relations; and preventing threats, whether new or traditional. The Strategy assumed that the EU would take the responsibility for international security both in the realm of 'peace keeping' (peace and defensive missions) and 'peace-making' (peace and offensive missions). Defining the threats that the European Union needs to defy, the Strategy enumerates local conflicts, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their potential use against the territory of the EU and its member states, collapsing states, and conflicts breaking out in such states and their neighborhood, as well as organized crime. The assessment of numerous threats to internal and external security, presented in the European Security Strategy, remains up-to-date. There have also emerged new threats for Europe that result from the need to ensure energy security, primarily with respect to the diversification of energy sources. The significance of climate change to international security has increased. The same applies to IT security or piracy. The EU has been rather anxious about the intensification of frozen conflicts, in particular the outbreak of war between Russia and Georgia. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has indicated that the enlargement process is a significant stabilizing factor in the EU neighborhood. Fundamental importance is also attached to the review of cooperation principles with the USA, the crucial role of the UN in the international system, and cooperation with regional organizations, such as the African Union. There is also the need to develop a strategic partnership with NATO, in particular in terms of operational cooperation. Another key factor in the strengthening of the EU's global position is the development of a civil and military crisis response system.

Unia Europejska od dekady podejmuje działania na rzecz konsolidacji rynków zbrojeniowych. Jednak istotną przeszkodą w tym procesie są zróżnicowane interesy, strategie bezpieczeństwa i możliwości poszczególnych państw członkowskich. Polska i Grecja są nielicznymi członkami UE, którzy w ostatnich latach zwiększają swoje wydatki obronne. Oba kraje jednak w swoich zakupach zbrojeniowych kierują się innymi celami. Polska obawia się lądowego starcia z przeciwnikiem posiadającym broń masowego rażenia i demonstrującym lekceważenie dla norm prawa międzynarodowego. Natomiast dla Grecji potencjalnym przeciwnikiem jest członek tego samego sojuszu wojskowego, bardziej przewidywalny w swoich zachowaniach, a ewentualne starcie miałoby charakter powietrzno-morski. Grecja natomiast bardziej niż Polska narażona jest na ataki terrorystyczne i niekontrolowane migracje. Polska posiada liczący się przemysł zbrojeniowy i część zapotrzebowania wojskowego może wyprodukować o własnych siłach. Grecja jest zmuszona do importowania o wiele większej ilości broni. Trudno więc liczyć na standaryzację uzbrojenia na europejskich rynkach czy też na znaczące zbliżanie strategii bezpieczeństwa rozmaitych członków UE. ; The European Union has been acting to consolidate arms markets for a decade. These endeavours have been seriously impeded by the diverse interests, security strategies and potential of individual member states. Poland and Greece are among the few EU members that have been increasing their defence expenditure in recent years. They are driven by different objectives when making their arms purchases, though. Poland fears a land confrontation with an enemy possessing weapons of mass destruction and demonstrating disregard for the norms of international law. Greece, in turn, sees a potential enemy in a member of the same military alliance, whose behaviour is more predictable, and where the potential confrontation would occur in the air and at sea. Greece is also at a greater risk of terrorist attacks and uncontrolled immigration than Poland. Poland has a considerable arms industry and is able to produce a part of its military supplies on its own. Greece is required to import weapons to a much greater extent. It is therefore difficult to assume the standardisation of weapons in European markets or any considerable convergence of security strategies implemented by different EU members. ; 8 ; Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej

In 2003, the Council of Europe, the highest political organ of the European Union, resolved to adopt the European Security Strategy. This document outlined three fundamental objectives for the EU: stability and good governance in the area of the EU's closest neighbors; creating an international order that would be based not only on bilateral relations, but primarily on efficient multilateral relations; and preventing threats, whether new or traditional. The Strategy assumed that the EU would take the responsibility for international security both in the realm of 'peace keeping' (peace and defensive missions) and 'peace-making' (peace and offensive missions). Defining the threats that the European Union needs to defy, the Strategy enumerates local conflicts, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their potential use against the territory of the EU and its member states, collapsing states, and conflicts breaking out in such states and their neighborhood, as well as organized crime. The assessment of numerous threats to internal and external security, presented in the European Security Strategy, remains up-to-date. There have also emerged new threats for Europe that result from the need to ensure energy security, primarily with respect to the diversification of energy sources. The significance of climate change to international security has increased. The same applies to IT security or piracy. The EU has been rather anxious about the intensification of frozen conflicts, in particular the outbreak of war between Russia and Georgia. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has indicated that the enlargement process is a significant stabilizing factor in the EU neighborhood. Fundamental importance is also attached to the review of cooperation principles with the USA, the crucial role of the UN in the international system, and cooperation with regional organizations, such as the African Union. There is also the need to develop a strategic partnership with NATO, in particular in terms of operational cooperation. Another key factor in the strengthening of the EU's global position is the development of a civil and military crisis response system.