Developed or Developing? The first database detailing International Organizations, treaties', and Generalized System of Preferences (GSPs) approaches to categorizing countries as developing (or developed). Find out which criteria are used to designate countries as "developing" in dozens of documents, and compare how 200 jurisdictions are classified under almost 20 different lists
The rapid urbanization in many developing countries over the past half century seems to have been accompanied by excessively high levels of concentration of the urban population in very large cities. Some degree of urban concentration may be desirable initially to reduce inter- and intraregional infrastructure expenditures. But in a mature system of cities, economic activity is more spread out. Standardized manufacturing production tends to be de-concentrated into smaller and medium-size metropolitan areas, whereas production in large metropolitan areas focuses on services, research and development, and non-standardized manufacturing. The costs of excessive concentration (traffic accidents, health costs from exposure to high levels of air and water pollution, and time lost to long commutes) stem from the large size of megacities and underdeveloped institutions and human resources for urban planning and management. Alleviating excessively high urban concentration requires investments in interregional transport and telecommunications to facilitate de-concentration of industry. It also requires fiscal de-concentration, so that interior cities can raise the fiscal resources and provide the services needed to compete with primate cities for industry and population.
The history of development has paid only little attention to cultural projects. This book looks at the development politics that shaped the UNESCO World Heritage programme, with a case study of Ethiopian World Heritage sites from the 1960s to the 1980s. In a large-scale conservation and tourism planning project, selected sites were set up and promoted as images of the Ethiopian nation. This story serves to illustrate UNESCO's role in constructing a "useful past" in many African countries engaged in the process of nation-building. UNESCO experts and Ethiopian elites had a shared interest in producing a portfolio of antiquities and national parks to underwrite Ethiopia's imperial claims to regional hegemony with ancient history. The key findings of this book highlight a continuity in Ethiopian history, despite the political ruptures caused by the 1974 revolution and UNESCO's transformation from knowledge producer to actual provider of development policies. The particular focus on the bureaucratic and political practices of heritage, bridges a gap between cultural heritage studies and the history of international organisations. The result is a first study of the global discourse on heritage as it emerged in the 1960s development decade.
This paper reviews the small but growing literature on intergenerational educational mobility in the developing world. Education is a critical determinant of economic well-being, and it predicts a range of non-pecuniary outcomes such as marriage, fertility, health, crime, and political attitudes. We show that developing nations feature stronger intergenerational educational persistence than high-income countries, in spite of substantial educational expansion in the last decades. We consider variations in mobility across gender and region, and discuss the macro-level correlates of educational mobility in developing countries. The paper also discusses the literatures on (i) concepts and measures of educational mobility, (ii) theoretical perspectives to understand educational persistence across generations, (iii) the role that education plays in the economic mobility process, and (iv) differences in the type and quality of education as vehicles for intergenerational persistence, and it applies these literatures to understand educational mobility in the developing world.
Brain Drain in Developing Countries Frederic Docquier, Olivier Lohest, and Abdeslam Marfouk An original data set on international migration by educational attainment for 1990 and 2000 is used to analyze the determinants of brain drain from developing countries. The analysis starts with a simple decomposition of the brain drain in two multiplicative components, the degree of openness of sending countries (measured by the average emigration rate) and the schooling gap (measured by the education level of emigrants compared with natives). Yet recent theoretical studies emphasize several compensatory effects, showing that a limited but positive skilled emigration rate can be beneficial for sending countries (Commander, Kangasniemi, and Winters 2004; Docquier and Rapoport 2007; Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport 2001, forthcoming; Schiff 2005 provides a critical appraisal of this literature). However, without reliable comparative data Frederic Docquier (corresponding author) is a research associate at the National Fund for Economic Research; professor of economics at the Universite Catholique de Louvain, Belgium; and research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn, Germany; his email address is docquier ires.ucl.ac.be. Olivier Lohest is a research is a researcher at the Institut Wallon de l'Evaluation, de la Prospective et de la Statistique, Regional Government of Wallonia Section I presents the data set on the brain drain, as measured by the emigration rate of post-secondary-educated workers, and describes the average brain drain from developing countries by income group and country size. Section II decomposes the brain drain into two multiplicative components: the degree of openness, measured by the average emigration rate of workingage natives, and the schooling gap, measured by the relative education attainment of emigrants compared with natives. 202 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW The Docquier Marfouk (2006) study, which collected census, registry, and survey data from all OECD countries, enables the size of these biases for developing countries to be evaluated. 40 million) 1990 Worlda High-income countries Developing countries Low-income countries Lower medium-income countries Upper-medium-income countries Least developed countries Landlocked developing countries Small island developing economies Large developing countries (. Cross-Section Regression Results (2000 data) OLS-1 General model Variable Country size Native population (logs) Small island developing economies Level of development Proportion of post-secondary educated natives 100 (logs) GNI per capita (logs) Least developed country Oil exporting country Sociopolitical environment Political stability Government effectiveness Religious fractionalization Geographic and cultural proximity Distance from selectiveimmigration countries (logs) Distance from EU15 countries ( The analysis starts with a simple multiplicative decomposition of the brain drain into two components: degree of openness of sending countries, as measured by average or total emigration rate, and schooling gap, as measured by the relative education level of emigrants compared with natives.
Relying on an original data set on international migration by educational attainment for 1990 and 2000, we analyze the determinants of the brain drain from developing countries. We start from a simple decomposition of the brain drain in two multiplicative components, the degree of openness of sending countries (as measured by their average emigration rate) and the schooling gap (as measured by the relative education level of emigrants compared to natives). Using various regression models, we put forward the determinants of these components and explain cross-country differences in skilled migration. Unsurprisingly, the brain drain is strong in small countries which are not too distant from the major OECD regions, which share colonial links with OECD countries and which send most of their migrants to host countries where quality-selective immigration programs exist. More interestingly, the brain drain increases with political instability and the degree of fractionalization at origin; it globally decreases with natives' human capital.
Relying on an original data set on international migration by educational attainment for 1990 and 2000, we analyze the determinants of the brain drain from developing countries. We start from a simple decomposition of the brain drain in two multiplicative components, the degree of openness of sending countries (as measured by their average emigration rate) and the schooling gap (as measured by the relative education level of emigrants compared to natives). Using various regression models, we put forward the determinants of these components and explain cross-country differences in skilled migration. Unsurprisingly, the brain drain is strong in small countries which are not too distant from the major OECD regions, which share colonial links with OECD countries and which send most of their migrants to host countries where quality-selective immigration programs exist. More interestingly, the brain drain increases with political instability and the degree of fractionalization at origin; it globally decreases with natives' human capital.
Metadata only record ; The author traces the history of the push for developing countries to become the "breadbasket" of the world, supplying nontraditional agricultural products to a worldwide market, and how this has forced developing countries to rely heavily on chemical pesticides to reach such goals. Local and global environmental contamination are subsequently becoming big issues due to the use of older, non-patented, toxic, inexpensive and harmful chemical in developing areas because programs to control harmful pesticide use are abandoned or limited due to governmental and/or financial restraints. This has lead directly to the high rate of pesticide-related toxicity in humans, with the highest rates of intoxication in developing countries. The authors contend that both the person spraying and bystanders can be affected by drifting sprays, residues, storage, water and soil contamination, improper use of empty containers and the contamination of oils and food (p. 30). The author argues that regulations and education are the two key factors to reducing pesticide-related problems in developing regions.
Given the low level of tax revenue and the contradictory structure of tax legislation in many developing countries, there is broad agreement on the need for tax reforms in those countries. The following article reviews the problems associated with instituting such changes.
This literature review summarizes recommendations and challenges encountered when establishing cardiac surgery centers in developing countries and common heart diseases encountered abroad. Cardiac surgery is not widely available in most developing countries, and most patients have no choice but to live in morbid conditions. The ideal continuous treatment for these patients would be provided by a local, sustainable cardiac surgery center. A collaborative effort from international volunteers, nongovernmental organizations, local governments, and private benefactors is necessary to facilitate adequate cardiac care in developing countries.
The issue of developed and developing country using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model that focuses on factors that can be addressed by policy choices of both governments and international organizations are discussed. Investment in new technologies requires the availability of capital, either from external sources or from internal sources such as equity markets. The access to capital through the equity markets would also be important, as those countries have more well-developed stock markets that reward companies for making productivity-enhancing investments in IT. Wealth is the single most important factor influencing IT investment but other factors are significant as well. The factors driving IT diffusion are different for developing countries than for developed ones. The availability of investment resources, the level of complementary assets, and openness to foreign investment all play a role in driving IT investment in developing countries.
The purpose of this report is to introduce and present key components of the regulatory governance agenda, and to discuss its relevance for developing countries. The paper identifies failings and knowledge gaps relevant to the implementation of regulatory governance initiatives, and it discusses how lessons already learned can guide reformers and donor organizations in their continued efforts to promote sustainable growth and private sector development through better and more efficient regulation. Following the executive summary and this introduction, the paper is divided into the following sections: regulatory governance - what is it? This section defines and introduces basic concepts of regulatory governance. Regulation and economic growth - in this section, the links between regulatory governance reforms and economic growth are clarified. Major building blocks of a regulatory governance system - this section explores the main building blocks of a regulatory governance system and highlights elements of relevance for developing countries. Application of regulatory governance tools and approaches in developing countries. This section summarizes the pros and cons for applying regulatory governance tools in developing countries, and summarizes the recorded results and experiences with regulatory governance tools in three developing countries. Looking ahead: should donors and governments invest more in regulatory governance? The paper concludes with the lessons learned and not yet learned, and challenges ahead for the regulatory governance agenda in developing countries.
This article develops a theoretical framework to analyze options for financing infrastructurein developing countries. We build a basic model that gives motivations for usinga combination of public finance, private debt and private equity. The model is thenextended in a number of ways to examine a variety of factors that are important fordeveloping countries when considering financing choices. We focus in particular on keyinstitutional weaknesses that are often important for infrastructure investment. Overall,we show that such weaknesses can be key in determining financing choices, but that theydo not all push in the same direction. Financing schemes must therefore be adapted toconsider the institutional limitations that are most pertinent in any given context. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published
Measures to actively facilitate trade are increasingly seen as essential to assist developing countries in expanding trade and benefiting from globalisation. Although often viewed as narrowly concerned with the ease and speed of Customs procedures, even greater trade cost reductions and trade and welfare benefits may be reaped from a broader view of trade facilitation (TF) that incorporates transportation, distribution and communication issues. A number of TF reforms are particularly beneficial: improving procedures, especially Customs clearance; introducing automation and use of information technology; reducing excessive documentation requirements; addressing lack of transparency in import and export requirements; addressing lack of modernisation of and cooperation between Customs and other government agencies. The review identifies the types of TF reforms that could address these problems and deliver a return in terms of increased revenue collection efficiency, reductions in trade costs and promotion of greater regional cooperation (at least in Customs and transport, especially as many TF measures are appropriate for inclusion in regional integration agreements).
Due to population growth, water is reported to be becoming increasingly scarce throughout the world. Some 1.3 billion people are without access to clean water, and in some regions water wars are already threatening. These reports are well known - but are they also true? The present paper will argue that it is not global water scarcity but policy failure and misallocation of resources that are responsible for the inadequate access to drinking water: • Many countries are aiming for national self-sufficiency in staple foods. Some countries in arid areas are subsidizing the expansion of irrigated agriculture, which accounts for roughly 70 % of the world's water consumption. • In the cities a good share of water is lost from the water-supply network, and supply failures often occur because public water utilities, which are often poorly managed, are at the end of their financial tether. • Many residents of urban slums are not connected to the water-supply network and are thus forced to pay prices to water vendors that are far higher than the subsidized drinking-water tariffs. • Water wars are for the most part not genuine conflicts over scarce water but a symptom of deeply rooted historical and political conflicts, while water scarcity presents the occasion, or at best a catalyst, for additional tensions.