Suchergebnisse

In a globalized world the "foreign" aspect is getting more and more important. Despite the much talked about pros and cons, this also means that a number of unforeseen challenges should be met. Karel De Gucht, Belgium's Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposes ten theses regarding preparation and coordination of policies, civic service, communication and public diplomacy, qualification and education of its personal, a network of posts abroad, supportive material and services (informatics and security mainly). References. O. van Zijl

Apart from Belgian's OSCE Presidency (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), two other important topics in 2006 Belgian foreign affairs were economic diplomacy and the European policy. Concerning economic diplomacy the text addresses the problems surrounding two German branches on Belgian territory: the Volkswagen assembly line and DHL. Furthermore, increased importance of economic diplomacy is a well decided approach of the current Minister for Foreign Affairs De Gucht, emphasizing that in bilateral discussions the economic aspect has to be taken into account at all times. Regarding the European policy of ongoing development of European security and defense policy (EVDB) and civic-military cooperation are addressed. Transatlantic relations have improved since 2003 (Iraq war), changing into a "agree where we can, agree to disagree where we can't" attitude, Belgium diplomatic language has lost its rougher edges, and "the glorious three", three years of Belgium presidency (OSCE 2006, UN Security Council 2007-2008) in which the country gained in expressiveness, but lost character opposite large power such as Russia, the US and China. Regarding the UN Security Council a main objective was abolishing the veto right for permanent member states. Tables, Figures, References. O. van Zijl

Why did the Dutch hold on to Western New Guinea, one of the many territories that constituted the Dutch East Indies (modern-day Indonesia), when the colony became independent in 1949? This thesis argues against the traditional explanation that it was due to a singular Dutch 'decolonization trauma': an inability to let go of the glorious colonial past, combined with resentment against Indonesian nationalist leaders such as Sukarno. It shows that historians have overstated the importance of emotions in Dutch colonial policy-making and diplomacy after 1949, mainly because of their narrow scope of analysis, which has traditionally been restricted to trilateral relations between the Netherlands, independent Indonesia (which wanted to incorporate Western New Guinea, if need be with military means) and the allegedly 'anti-colonial' United States. This thesis situates Dutch decision-making in the Western New Guinea Crisis in a much wider network, incorporating the colonial policy, diplomacy and perception of other Western powers such as Britain, France, Australia, Belgium and Portugal between 1930 and 1962. It is argued that, when viewed within this network and its discourse, the Dutch decision to retain Western New Guinea is best explained with rational actor theory. The decision was inspired not so much by emotions as by cost-benefit analyses, which included the possibility of transferring the territory to a new Indonesian regime—which the Dutch expected to be more forthcoming to the interests of the Papuans, the native inhabitants of Western New Guinea, and the Dutch (economic) interests in Indonesia than the regime headed by Sukarno. Research into hitherto neglected French, Belgian, British and Dutch archives also shows that the Netherlands could count on much more support for its New Guinea policy from its Western allies—including the US—than traditional historiography suggests. It remains true that the United States forced the Netherlands to hand over Western New Guinea to Indonesia in 1962, but the Kennedy ...

A little appreciated member of the international community in 2004, Belgium has developed the previous years into a constructive diplomatic element that takes to heart its international responsibility (examples: troops in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Balkans, and an effective diplomatic intervention concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo). Responsibly for this success are called Belgian impartiality, its open ears, imagination and collaboration regarding multilateralism. Furthermore, the EU's enlargement by 10 states is discussed, the rejecting of the European Constitution by France and the Netherlands, and the strengthened position of the BENELUX within the EU. A second topic: relations with the neighboring countries France, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg. A last item discusses cooperation in multilateral development projects. References. O. van Zijl

An assessment of Belgian foreign policies promulgated since the summer of 1999 by the current government of prime minister Guy Verhofstadt is presented. The following issues, identified as the most important in the 1999-2002 period, are discussed: (1) the handling of the dioxin crisis of 1999 by the state secretary for international commerce Pierre Chevalier & the minister of foreign affairs Louis Michel, (2) an engagement in peace diplomacy in Central Africa, (3) the European Union (EU) chairmanship by Belgium begun in May 2001, (4) Belgian support & criticism of American military reactions to September 11, & (5) the principles of ethical diplomacy in action. Belgian assertive diplomacy to defend national economic & commercial interests threatened by the dioxin crisis & the country's contribution to solidifying the EU are recognized as positive developments. However, the lukewarm solidarity with the US in the wake of September 11 is found to be damaging to the country on the international arena, & the ad-hoc policies developed for Central Africa are criticized for being only a damage control resulting from "fence-sitting" throughout the 1990s. The three year foreign policy of the current government is found to produce "mixed results" & contain both positive & negative elements. Z. Dubiel

After the Vienna Congress in 1815, the Allied ministers did not return home, but continued their negotiations in Paris. They deliberated on the measure of reparation payments and arrear payments that France owed to the other European states. The new peace also rested on financial securities. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands assumed a large part in these conferences, since through the mass of private claims it was France's largest creditor. In this article we demonstrate how, as one of the essentials of the new concert diplomacy of 1815, smaller powers such as the Netherlands were allowed to weigh in on the Four Powers' deliberations in Paris. The political conundrums regarding these financial securities and reparationshave not been charted and analysed before. Through previously unstudied sources,such as the minutes of the Paris Ministerial Conference, we discuss the influence a secondary power could exert provided they deployed smart financial experts. Under that condition large political and financial gains could be made.

Internal dispute, the crisis surrounding the war in Iraq, arguments concerning the financial perspectives for 2007-2013 and a double negative result of the referenda (in France and the Netherlands) concerning the European Constitution, mean a crisis for the EU. In the year and a half which have expired between 2005 and 2007, many plans have progressed slightly, but little have been concretized. In defense of Prime Minister Verhofstadt's "The United States of Europe", on socioeconomic policies, technological cooperation, unified justice, security policies, diplomacy, and a European army -- a plan that has not found its way to either the public or high political discussions. It is suggested to take it up with a limited number of member states, so that other countries will follow later. In general, the author reproaches European politicians lack of emotion: more open conflicts of Left against Right, large against small, swiftly and non-too-soft -- therein lies the nature of democracy, and therefore also the future of European politics. Figures, References. O. van Zijl

The foreign policy of the current Belgian government led by the prime minister Guy Verhofstadt, with Louis Michel as the foreign minister, is evaluated, focusing on the country's active stance on the economic & political integration of the European countries & peaceful resolution of conflicts in Central Africa. Belgium's unwavering support & relentless efforts on behalf of the European Union (EU) intensified even more as the country assumed the organization's chairmanship in May 2001, & Michel's personal involvement & physical presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) & the Great Lakes region (Rwanda & Burundi) testify to the shift by the current government toward proactive diplomacy by Belgium toward its former colony & trust territory. The ethical dimension of Belgian foreign policy is noted, mentioning the country position on human rights, support for the International Tribunal in the Hague, & the moral prerogatives followed in the Pinochet, Haider, & Berlusconi controversies. It is observed, however, that many of the country's initiatives abroad may be undercut by the government unwillingness to back its policies with foreign economic aid. Adapted from the source document.

J.C.H. Blom, P. Romijn, Srebrenica, een 'veilig' gebied. Reconstructie, achtergronden, gevolgen en analyses van de val van een Safe Area, I, II, III, Bootsma, P., ed. D.C.L. Schoonoord, Dutchbat III en de bevolking. Medische aangelegenheden. Bevoorrading door de lucht C. Wiebes, Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië, 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten B. Naarden, Beeld en Balkan. Waarneming en werkelijkheid in Zuidoost-Europa G. Duijzings, Geschiedenis en herinnering in Oost-Bosnië. De achtergronden van de val van Srebrenica. Thorough and balanced? A closer look at the NIOD report, J. W. L. BrouwerThis vast report contains many interesting chapters, notably on the fall of the Srebrenica enclave and the minor political scandals that subsequently erupted in the Netherlands. Unfortunately, the report was published in such haste that editing errors abound. This does not make the reporteasy reading. Furthermore, there are a number of contradictions between the conclusions in the first part and the final conclusions. Lastly, the strong condemnation of Dutch diplomacy in 1991-1993 and, in particular, the denunciation of the Foreign Minister, Mr Van den Broek, is inconsistent with the stated intentions of the authors to refrain from making any political judgements.