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In the 1990s, American public diplomacy was built down & neglected following its merits during the Cold War. After September 11, (2001), this field has, however, had a renaissance. But at present, the Cold War situation is inverted. In the struggle against communism, the US typically faced hostile regimes with populations yearning for Western ideology & values. Today a heavy reliance on mechanisms of marketing seems to have deteriorated US public diplomacy, whereas the Arab world is far from fertile soil for US public diplomacy. America's current enemies tend to be sub-national actors with hostile perceptions of the US, & larger populations show strong anti-American sentiments. Most activities that are labeled public diplomacy also belong in the realm of propaganda, but so-called white propaganda -- ie, the sender is known. But can public diplomacy work unless the state it originates from combines it with a policy that is saleable to the target audience? 1 Figure, 51 References. Adapted from the source document.

A review essay on books by (1) Mai'a K. Davis Cross, The European Diplomatic Corps. Diplomats and International Cooperation from Westphalia to Maastricht (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); (2) Carne Ross, Independent Diplomat: Dispatches from an Unnaccountable Elite (London: Hurst & Co., 2007); (3) Brian Hocking and David Spence [Eds], Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) & (4) Graham Ziegner [Ed], British Diplomacy: Foreign Secretaries Reflect (London: Politico's, 2007).

Discusses how the role of diplomats has changed remarkably since the early 1980's and how this change was accelerated by the fall of the Soviet Union and the expansion of the internet. Back in the 1980s, a diplomat had to understand French and spent most of his time as an observer with an ambassador plenipotentiary. In 2010, the diplomat seldom dresses in a suit and carries often an activist role between private parties and governments. L. Pitkaniemi

Is the classic diplomat one of globalization's many victims? Has foreign policy become an underutilization of domestic politics? We still have an international state system, based on diplomacy as a tool, where dialogue and negotiation between equal players are the axiom, or is it about to dissolve in their regions and religions? How should foreign policy is organized and managed in order to be optimally equipped for global common challenges? These are some of the issues that the sacking stream of books on international politics, economics and diplomacy takes up. One category sheds new light on the bureaucratic state, the global system and the challenges it faces. The Christian Westphalian order has evolved since the mid-1600s, based on sovereignty, strategy and balance of power, but the world is now moving back to something similar to a pre-modern state system, characterized by system clash, legitimacy struggle and the emergence of new powers who want to transform the ground rules, in the worst case, override them completely. Adapted from the source document.

This article prevents a historical summary of Norway's 1971 role in the normalization of relations between China & Thailand. Norwegian ambassador to Beijing Ole Alegrd met with Thailand's Foreign Affairs Minister Thanat Khoman, who made it known to Alegrdthat Thailand wished to have diplomatic relations with China. Alegrd's performance as diplomatic negotiator in this process is here described by former ambassador Sten Lundbo, who also reveals the effect that the UN General Assembly's resolution to invite China to assume a place in the UN. This development came then as a natural segue to invite China to participate in direct negotiation with Thailand. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were finally established in 1975, thanks largely to the Norway's diplomatic management of the situation, as is described in this article. C. Brunski

It is well known that the US-Russian dialogue was 'reset' in 2009 under US President Obama and his Russian counterpart Medvedev although it is doubtful whether this symbolic commitment really created conditions for better, or closer, intergovernmental relations. In the following, I analyse how signs of renewed cooperation emitted by the respective political leaderships reflected on multilateral fora in which both the United States and Russia are represented, with a particular emphasis on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN Security Council. The overall impression is that US-Russian diplomatic collaboration in 2009-2011 remained limited and focused on fewer issues, but that both sides deliberately avoided 'disturbing' each other's priority interests. A specific observation from the OSCE is that Russia's diplomatic initiatives were better prepared than previously and in the future may carry greater weight, at least on the European mainland. Unlike the United States, which acts through the Security Council when it believes that it can forge a coalition to pursue a particular objective, in 2009-2011 Russia's UN diplomacy still remained defensive. Adapted from the source document.