Suchergebnisse

The purpose of this dissertation is to describe and analyze how the Soviet Union attempted to win the sympathies of the Swedish population during the period 1945-1958 through the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) and the Sweden-Soviet Union Societies. The dissertation includes the central Soviet decision-making apparatus' general formulation of strategy and what means were to be used to win the sympathies of populations in other countries. Concerning VOKS's work targeting Sweden, this dissertation examines the general strategies and means used in practice. This dissertation links these activities with realism which serves as an analytical framework. Realism focuses states seeking their security in the international system. Security is considered achievable through strategies for using different means of force, in this case, diplomacy and its sub-instruments in the form of soft power and public diplomacy. Immediately after World War II, VOKS was seen by the Soviets as a tool for countering American and British propaganda. VOKS's reorganization in the early 1950s led to more country-specific activities. Increasingly in the 1950s VOKS sought out partners from outside organizations associated with national communist parties. This strategy aimed to optimally convey the message and to popularize the Soviet Union. This also led to a decline in VOKS's importance. VOKS during the period 1945-1958 can be viewed as a collaborative project between the state and the party. The Soviet Union, through VOKS, used the Sweden-USSR Society to popularize the country among the Swedish public. VOKS took increasingly greater control over the societies' activities, which were reviewed and approved by the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm and VOKS in Moscow. To develop these societies, VOKS increased its efforts to influence the Communist Party of Sweden (SKP) to take part in the societies' activities. At the suggestion of VOKS in Moscow, the local Sweden-USSR societies formed a national organization in the autumn of 1950 called the Sweden-Soviet Union Federation. After 1953, VOKS's interest intensified in implementing and developing cultural collaborations with other actors in addition to the societies. Near the end of VOKS's existence, representatives from the Soviet Embassy and VOKS tried to establish an intergovernmental cultural agreement with Sweden. However, no such agreement was ever signed. The Soviet Union continued to channel most of its public diplomacy toward Sweden through the societies.

Since the early 1950's the foreign policy of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) towards Sweden and the other Western European states was dominated by a striving for diplomatic recognition. This thesis examines that striving through an analysis of the East German-Swedish relations from 1949 until 1972. The main focus is on the years 1954-1972. The thesis draws mainly on East German archival material from the ruling communist party SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) and the GDR foreign ministry. A starting point of the thesis is that GDR generally used all its contacts abroad to further its foreign political goals. GDR's efforts to develop the relations with Sweden on seven different areas are investigated. An important aim is to analyse GDR's political utilisation of areas, such as culture and traffic, that normally are not considered political or studied by traditional political history. The application of the concept of public diplomacy is central in this context. The analysis of the Ostseewoche (Baltic Week) is a significant part of the investigation of areas that traditionally not are considered as being part of foreign policy. The Osteewoche was a week filled with cultural activities and sport. The analysis of the inaugural ceremony and other activities of the Ostseewoche shows that even official East German ceremonies were used for purposes of foreign policy. However, GDR's relations with Sweden on the normal foreign policy arenas such as diplomacy and economy are also analysed. Great weight is given to analysing the perceptions of the political elite and the foreign policy actors to understand why certain actions were taken and why certain elements were significant of the GDR foreign policy. The question of which political instruments were the most important to the East German efforts to improve the relations with Sweden is also investigated. An important result of the thesis is that GDR had a comprehensive strategy for the development of the relations with Sweden. The main elements of this strategy were in place 1958 and did largely not change since. The spreading of a positive GDR-image was a very significant element of the East German foreign policy. Sweden was one of the most important Western European countries to the GDR foreign policy during this period of time.

Three tense events involving the US Army and the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache nations in Oklahoma in the decades after the end of the Great Plains Wars seemed destined to end in violence: The Ghost Dance in 1890−91, the death of three Kiowa boys in a blizzard in 1891 and the transfer of Geronimo and around three hundred Chiricahua Apache Indians to Oklahoma in 1895. In all of these events a US Cavalry officer, Hugh Lenox Scott, played a key role as a soldier-diplomat. Through his linguistic skills and inter-cultural competence, Scott, assisted by Iseeo, a Kiowa army scout and close friend of Scott's, managed to prevent the three situations from erupting in violence. These outcomes are in stark contrast to what happened around the same time in the Northern Plains, where violence erupted on several occasions, most conspicuously at Wounded Knee in December 1890, when US troops killed between 150 and 200 Lakota Indians. The purpose of this micro historical study is to highlight how the military, in concrete action, could promote peace and development in their dealings with American Indians and to explore the significance of personal relations, tolerance and trust for the maintenance of peace. These factors were crucial for the more peaceful development on the Southern Plains compared with in the north. In promoting peace, moreover, Scott not only acted as a diplomat in relation to the Indians; he also successfully advised his superior commanders not to send troops into the field in order to uphold order and quell any possible unrest. Such deployment of troops, Scott was convinced, was like putting a keg of gunpowder in front of an open fire and risked sparking uncontrolled and lethal violence between the soldiers and the Indians, to the detriment of the latter, as happened at Wounded Knee. Based on his long service as a soldier-diplomat, Scott later in life developed a general theory about the military as a peacemaking institution. According to Scott, it was politicians and the people who made war and the task of the military was to conquer the peace. His styling of the US soldier as the "harbinger of peace and mercy", however, depended on Scott ignoring the many instances when the US military had failed to maintain peace and order, both in relation to the American Indians and in colonies overseas. ; Förmedlare i imperialistisk expansion: Möten och kontakter i USA:s gränsland (1876−1916)