Suchergebnisse

Lecturing the Dutch in public probably makes them more stubborn rather than less stubborn. And they are already stubborn enough,' wrote a British diplomat in July 1947. How did the United States, the United Kingdom and France view the Indonesian War of Independence in the period of 1945-1949? Did they show understanding for the Dutch political and military policies or rather for the Indonesian position, and in what ways did they try to influence the parties? Where did the Dutch get their military equipment to wage war in Indonesia? In 'Diplomatie en geweld', the authors show how other countries and the recently founded United Nations were involved in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict and how they helped determine its course and outcome. In doing so they focus not only on the political and diplomatic aspects of the struggle, but also on foreign views on the use of violence by the Dutch armed forces

DeBock, J.: Internationale betrekkingen. De rol van de diplomatie en de potentiele samenwerking met militairen. - S. 1-8. VanHoof, R.: Gezondheidsproblemen bij operaties. - S. 9-23

Te midden van een gewelddadige strijd om macht en religie vlucht in 1537 de laatste katholieke aartsbisschop van Noorwegen, Olav Engelbrektsson, naar de Nederlanden van Karel V. Op zijn vlucht neemt de kerkvorst een groot deel van de schat van de Nidaroskathedraal in Trondheim mee naar Deventer: de bijl van Sint-Olav, twee kronen, kelken, monstransen en andere kostbaarheden.00Dit boek volgt het spoor van de aartsbisschop, zijn gevolg en de kerkschatten. Een jarenlange zoektocht in archieven en musea levert een verrassend verhaal op over ballingschap, diplomatie en Noors erfgoed in de Habsburgse Nederlanden aan het begin van de Reformatie. Misschien geeft dit verhaal wel aanleiding tot nieuw archeologisch onderzoek naar Noors kerkzilver op de zeebodem

After the Vienna Congress in 1815, the Allied ministers did not return home, but continued their negotiations in Paris. They deliberated on the measure of reparation payments and arrear payments that France owed to the other European states. The new peace also rested on financial securities. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands assumed a large part in these conferences, since through the mass of private claims it was France's largest creditor. In this article we demonstrate how, as one of the essentials of the new concert diplomacy of 1815, smaller powers such as the Netherlands were allowed to weigh in on the Four Powers' deliberations in Paris. The political conundrums regarding these financial securities and reparationshave not been charted and analysed before. Through previously unstudied sources,such as the minutes of the Paris Ministerial Conference, we discuss the influence a secondary power could exert provided they deployed smart financial experts. Under that condition large political and financial gains could be made.

Offizieller Standpunkt von Staaten/Staatengruppen