Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in reducing the supply of illegal drugs entering the United States, focusing on: (1) the decline in DOD's aerial and maritime support allocated to counterdrug activities from fiscal years 1992 through 1999 and some of the consequences and reasons for the decline; (2) the obstacles DOD faces in helping foreign governments counter illegal drug activities; and (3) DOD's counterdrug strategy and the need for performance measures to judge its counterdrug program effectiveness."
A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the role of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in shaping the national drug control budget that the President ultimately proposes to Congress to implement the National Drug Control Strategy, focusing on: (1) whether the process ONDCP followed to certify federal agencies' drug control budgets for fiscal year (FY) 1999 was consistent with statutory requirements; and (2) the system ONDCP has developed to assess the extent to which drug control agencies and programs achieve intended results."
Federalism issues have been neglected in the scholarship on drug control policy. This Article addresses both empirical and normative questions relating to federal-state-local relations in the "war on drugs." Contrary to common views of federal domination and national uniformity, drug control policy actually varies considerably from state to state. State diversity has increased since the mid- 1990s, when drug reformers began to use the ballot initiative to change state laws. While the federal government has contested these reforms, it has not sought to use its preemption powers to enforce federal preferences. The Article employs public choice models to explain the current federal role, giving particular attention to the unusual degree of "in-kind" assistance given by federal law enforcement officials to local police agencies. While such in-kind assistance helps to decentralize drug policymaking and reduce agency costs, it also undercuts legislative control and public accountability. Leading theoretical models of federalism support the ideal of decentralized decision making in drug policy. Decentralization encourages policy innovation and enhances overall citizen satisfaction. While prior commentators have not fully appreciated the present degree of decentralization in drug policy, federal-state-local relations are nonetheless in need of reform, particularly to enhance legislative control and public accountability. Accordingly, the Article proposes reforms that are intended to reduce the federal distortion of drug policy debates at the state and local level, subject federal drug enforcement decisions to a greater degree of local political control, and increase the accountability of local law enforcement to local political institutions.
Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since the early 1970s to help the Colombian National Police and other law enforcement agencies, the military, and civilian agencies reduce illegal drug production and trafficking. Recognizing that illegal drug activities are a serious problem, the Colombian government announced a counternarcotics plan known as Plan Colombia. This testimony reviews the U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. Although U.S.-provided assistance has enhanced Colombian counternarcotics capabilities, its usefulness has sometimes been limited because of long-standing problems in planning and implementation. For example, little progress has been made in launching a plan to have Colombia's National Police assume a larger role in managing the aerial eradication program, which requires costly U.S. contractor assistance. The governments of the United States and Colombia face continuing and new financial and management challenges in implementing Plan Colombia. The costs and activities needed to implement the plan are unknown at this time, and it will take years before any significant reduction in the drug trade is seen. Colombia must resolve problems with its political and economic stability and improve its management of counternarcotics funding in order to successfully implement Plan Colombia. The testimony summarized the October report, GAO-01-26."
Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the results of its review of the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) strategies and operations in the 1990s, focusing on: (1) the major enforcement strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches DEA has implemented in the 1990s to carry out its mission; and (2) whether DEA's strategic goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and performance measures are consistent with the Office of National Drug Control Policy's National Drug Control Strategy."
A chapter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the strategies and operations of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the 1990s, focusing on: (1) what major enforcement strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches DEA has implemented in the 1990s to carry out its mission, including its efforts to: (a) target and investigate national and international drug traffickers; and (b) help state and local law enforcement agencies combat drug offenders and drug-related violence in their communities; (2) whether DEA's goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and performance measures are consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy; and (3) how DEA determined its fiscal year 1998 staffing needs and allocated the additional staff."
This article puts forward a constructivist-interpretivist approach to interface conflicts that emphasises how international actors articulate and problematise norm collisions in discursive and social interactions. Our approach is decidedly agency-oriented and follows the Special Issue's interest in how interface conflicts play out at the micro-level. The article advances several theoretical and methodological propositions on how to identify norm collisions and the conditions under which they become the subject of international debate. Our argument on norm collisions, understood as situations in which actors perceive two norms as incompatible with each other, is threefold. First, we claim that agency matters to the analysis of the emergence, dynamics, management, and effects of norm collisions in international politics. Second, we propose to differentiate between dormant (subjectively perceived) and open norm collisions (intersubjectively shared). Third, we contend that the transition from dormant to open – which we term activation – depends on the existence of certain scope conditions concerning norm quality as well as changes in power structures and actor constellations. Empirically, we study norm collisions in the area of international drug control, presenting the field as one that contains several cases of dormant and open norm collisions, including those that constitute interface conflicts. For our in-depth analysis we have chosen the international discourse on coca leaf chewing. With this case, we not only seek to demonstrate the usefulness of our constructivist-interpretivist approach but also aim to explain under which conditions dormant norm collisions evolve into open collisions and even into interface conflicts.
Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the counternarcotics efforts of the United States and Mexico, focusing on: (1) Mexico's efforts in addressing the drug threat; and (2) the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance provided to Mexico."
Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the counternarcotics efforts of the United States and Mexico, focusing on: (1) Mexico's efforts in addressing the drug threat; and (2) the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance provided to Mexico."
International drug trafficking looms large in the future of international relations. Although drug production and consumption can no longer be labeled as problems belonging to a few discrete nations, some countries' identities in the international arena are still shaped by their perception as drug-producing nations. Bolivia is one such country. Coca and cocaine have dominated its modern history and will continue to dominate its future. Bolivia's experience, however, is representative of not only other Andean nations' struggles with the drug epidemic, but of the international community's struggle with drug trafficking. This Note sheds light on the legal tools to address international drug trafficking. Bolivia's history of coca production, use, and legislation is used as the backdrop to today's perplexing international drug situation. Also, this Note analyzes international involvement in Bolivia, focusing on U.N. responses to drug trafficking. The United States currently dominates this hemisphere's action against cocaine trafficking, inspiring sharp criticism from other nations for its unilateral legal action. This Note concludes that only a multilateral approach, with increased involvement by Andean nations and the entire Latin American region, will solve the current international drug crisis.
This report discusses the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2005 , which would reauthorize ONDCP for five years, through FY2010, and authorize funding in specific annual amounts for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Program, the media campaign, a Southwest Border violence study, and several anti-methamphetamine initiatives.
There are good reasons to legally regulate drugs markets, rather than persist with efforts to ban all non-medical uses of psychoactive substances. Regulated cannabis and coca markets are already a reality in several countries, with more likely to follow. But ignoring or denying that such policy shifts contravene certain obligations under the UN drug control treaties is untenable and risks undermining basic principles of international law. States enacting cannabis regulation must find a way to align their reforms with their international obligations. Reaching a new global consensus to amend the UN drug control conventions so as to accommodate cannabis regulation is not feasible for the foreseeable future, and the options that do not require consensus are limited. For countries choosing to regulate cannabis, notwithstanding the drug treaty provisions intended to disallow such a step, a proactive way forward would combine: (1) providing evidence of the ineffectiveness and negative consequences of the prohibitionist approach; (2) underscoring the inconsistencies and historical errors embedded in the treaty regime, and the political and procedural obstacles to its modernization; (3) explaining the shift to regulation with arguments of citizens' health and safety, and justifying it with an appeal to human rights obligations; (4) acknowledging that regulation contravenes certain drug treaty provisions and arguing that a limited period of 'respectful non-compliance' is unavoidable; and 5) preparing to resolve the legal conflict by submitting new reservations or by elaborating a new agreement among like-minded countries on the basis of the inter se procedure for treaty modification, as provided by Article 41 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
There are good reasons to legally regulate drugs markets, rather than persist with efforts to ban all non-medical uses of psychoactive substances. Regulated cannabis and coca markets are already a reality in several countries, with more likely to follow. But ignoring or denying that such policy shifts contravene certain obligations under the UN drug control treaties is untenable and risks undermining basic principles of international law. States enacting cannabis regulation must find a way to align their reforms with their international obligations. Reaching a new global consensus to amend the UN drug control conventions so as to accommodate cannabis regulation is not feasible for the foreseeable future, and the options that do not require consensus are limited. For countries choosing to regulate cannabis, notwithstanding the drug treaty provisions intended to disallow such a step, a proactive way forward would combine: (1) providing evidence of the ineffectiveness and negative consequences of the prohibitionist approach; (2) underscoring the inconsistencies and historical errors embedded in the treaty regime, and the political and procedural obstacles to its modernization; (3) explaining the shift to regulation with arguments of citizens' health and safety, and justifying it with an appeal to human rights obligations; (4) acknowledging that regulation contravenes certain drug treaty provisions and arguing that a limited period of 'respectful non-compliance' is unavoidable; and (5) preparing to resolve the legal conflict by submitting new reservations or by elaborating a new agreement among like-minded countries on the basis of the inter se procedure for treaty modification, as provided by Article 41 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
