Suchergebnisse

EU law obliges Member States to introduce such management and control systems for the implementation of financial instruments on their territory to ensure their proper functioning and compliance with the objectives and principles of EU development policy. Within the limits set by the principles and provisions of treaty and statutory law, Member States are free to design these systems. The aim of the article is to present an outline of the national model for the implementation of EU funds in Poland from a procedural perspective (described in full detail in the author's monograph cited below). The study mainly used a methodology of analytical research (modelling) and doctrinal legal research (analysis of subject literature) with elements of comparative legal research. The analysis shows that the research results indicate that the most frequently used and at the same time the basic method of implementing development policy instruments is using special administrative procedures. These procedures (referred to in the doctrine as third generation procedures) differ from the general administrative procedure in certain elements like stronger formalization, accelerating the trial, methods of proof, remedies, and others. Due to the administrative nature of these proceedings, the control of decisions or other acts issued in them is exercised before administrative courts. Only some disputes relating to claims arising from co-finance decision or contracts and other claims in contractual or tortious matters are settled in the polish common courts. Such construction and specificity of the characterized system is justified by the purposes and functions of EU development policy and nature of its financial instruments. Also for this reason the requirements placed on implementation procedures in terms of their public accessibility and functionality should be seen from a different perspective than standard jurisdictional procedures, designed for general administrative or civil matters.

Brexit is likely to herald fundamental changes in the operation, scope and practice of EU development policy, due to the UK's key role in leading and defining the geographical and sectoral remit of policy, and through its provision of large-scale funding. Through a focus on the EU's relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States, this article explores these potential impacts. It highlights the importance of the timing of Brexit in relation to the contemporaneous renegotiation of EU–ACP relations and the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework and argues that the focus on static impacts of Brexit, in terms of removing the UK from the 'EU equation', overlooks the broader dynamics of political economy in which it is situated. Through the analysis of the anticipatory adjustments and discursive dynamics in EU development policy that articulate the pursuit of material interests, the article helps understand both the dynamics of Brexit and the broader transformations in which it is located.

AbstractThe Union's constitutional regime for development policy has traditionally progressed alongside two parallel tracks. In addition to a general regime for all developing countries, there exists a special regime for African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP countries). The Union's general development policy originated as a flanking policy within the Common Commercial Policy. This trade-centricity was only relativised by the insertion of an express development aid competence in 1992. The Union's development cooperation competence can today be found in Article 209 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and allows the Union to adopt legislative acts or conclude international agreements to reduce poverty within developing countries. By contrast, the Union's special development regime has had a very different constitutional source. It stemmed from the 'colonial' association to the Union (quaits Member States) of certain dependent 'oversees countries and territories' for which the 1957 Treaty of Rome had provided a limited development competence. Once these countries gained independence in the 1960s, however, the Union had to transfer this special regime to its contractual association competence under Article 217 TFEU. The association regime for ACP countries has itself undergone a number of significant changes with the transition from the Lomé Convention(s) to the Cotonou Agreement.