EU development policy: evolving as an instrument of foreign policy and as an expression of solidarity
In: Journal of contemporary European research: JCER, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 89-100
ISSN: 1815-347X
In: Journal of contemporary European research: JCER, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 89-100
ISSN: 1815-347X
World Affairs Online
In: Romanian journal of european affairs, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 5-29
ISSN: 1841-4273
World Affairs Online
In: Perspectives on European politics and society: journal of intra-European dialogue, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 241-255
ISSN: 1570-5854
In: Third world quarterly, Band 31, Heft 1, S. 159-168
ISSN: 0143-6597
In: Studia diplomatica: Brussels journal of international relations, Band 62, Heft 2, S. 121-137
ISSN: 0770-2965
World Affairs Online
Security sector reform (SSR) is a core element of the European Union's (EU) efforts to prevent violent conflicts and stabilise post-conflict situations. The existing legal framework excludes the use of EU budgetary sources to finance assistance to the armed forces of partner countries. Under the umbrella of Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development (CBSD), the EU seeks to address this funding gap and enable the financing of training, equipment and infrastructure to military actors. The main rationale behind CBSD is the assumption that security is a precondition for development, and that sustainable development can only be achieved when state institutions – including the military – acquire adequate capacities. To implement the CBSD initiative, the European Commission in July 2016 proposed to adapt the Regulation establishing the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). The IcSP is the EU's main instrument to fund conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. The Commission's proposal to amend the IcSP Regulation envisages the introduction of new types of assistance measures that address CBSD demands. Both EU institutions and the wider development community have controversially discussed the Commission's proposal. This Briefing Paper engages this debate and discusses the possible implications of the IcSP reform. The main argument of the paper is that the implementa¬tion of CBSD, as proposed by the European Commission, is likely to contribute to the securitisation of EU development policy. The provision of training and equipment to military actors is needed to preserve the EU's credibility and effectiveness as a security provider in countries such as Somalia and Mali. However, the use of the IcSP for funding CBSD activities sets a precedent for using development instruments within the EU's budget for financing assistance to military actors. Without a precise justification for the link between the proposed activities and EU development objectives, CBSD risks subordinating development policy to EU security goals. One key problem of the debate over CBSD is a lack of clarity concerning the scope of the envisaged assistance measures. Moreover, there is considerable uncertainty regarding EU development policy forming the legal basis of the Commission's proposal. Finally, civil society organisations fear that the proposed IcSP reform marks the beginning of a trend of shifting EU priorities from civilian to military instruments to address crises and violent conflicts. The main challenge is to address these concerns and find a suitable, permanent arrangement for funding CBSD activities within the EU's next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) between 2021 and 2027. In the short term, greater transparency of the envisaged CBSD activities and a substantive debate about their links to EU development policy objectives are needed. In the medium term, the EU should create a dedicated instrument that separates CBSD activities from funding for civilian conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts.
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In: Third world quarterly, Band 31, Heft 1, S. 159-168
ISSN: 1360-2241
The European Union (EU) is one of the world´s leading donors in official development assistance (ODA) to give it a strong weight in the relationship with recipient partner countries, in particular with those that are more dependent on it. Besides the material weight of its funding, the EU has retained historical ties and influence in diplomatic, political and economic terms in many of its ODA recipient partner countries (particular in Sub-Saharan Africa). Since the 2000s, the EU development policy has not only undergone major structural changes in its institutional framework but it has also started to face a new international aid scenario. The paper explores why a normative-based EU development policy is being challenged by reformed EU institutions and a new global order and how the EU is attempting to respond to this context in face of the EU deepest recession since the end of the Second World War. ; Apoio da FCT
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This paper looks into the issue of how European Union (EU) development policy can respond to a changing development landscape that is characterised by a different geography of power and wealth and a changing geography of global poverty. The question of how to differentiate its partnerships and how to best engage with middle-income countries (MICs) has been among the most discussed issues in the ongoing process of modernising EU development policy. The analysis in this paper puts the question of aid to MICs in the context of two interlinked challenges: (i) the need to reconceptualise dominant approaches to global poverty reduction that prioritise national income as a key guiding criterion to classify countries, and (ii) the growing range of global challenges that require development policy to diversify its objectives. With regards to the implications for EU development policy, the paper draws two main conclusions. First, tackling global poverty needs a better coordinated cross-country division of labour at the EU level to avoid marginalising countries that have become wealthier in per capita terms but that continue to experience internal development challenges. Second, addressing challenges related to complex global public goods requires EU development policy to continue its engagement with emerging economies and other increasingly powerful developing countries. Such diversification of objectives, however, will increase the coordination challenges of EU development policy and other European external policies substantially.
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The need to better adapt EU development policy to the varying levels of development of partner countries ("differentiation") and the extent to which middle-income countries (MICs) should continue to receive EU aid have become contentious issues of the EU's new development policy agenda as well as in the negotiations on the next multi-annual financial framework. Due to the EU's mandate to ensure its global presence in all developing countries, development cooperation with MICs is more a question of how such cooperation should be framed rather than withdrawing from these countries. The Commission's proposal foresees ending bilateral aid allocations to 19 developing countries but continuing cooperation under thematic and regional programmes. Ongoing discussions between the Commission, Member States and the European Parliament have so far focussed mainly on the "right" criteria for such graduation and the extent to which specific countries should be exempt from the rule. So far, the EU has not presented a clear strategy of how exactly it aims to change its development programmes with this group of advanced developing countries, and has thus created some ambiguity on the actual implications of a differentiated approach. What are the strategic priorities and policy objectives of these new forms of cooperation? Will the EU continue to focus on poverty reduction or will the cooperation objectives shift to addressing regional and global development challenges? The debate on differentiation needs to be placed in the context of two interlinked challenges – both being of fundamental importance for the future direction of EU development policy: the phenomenon of continued poverty and rising inequality in countries that have generated fast economic growth; and the growing range of global challenges and the strategically important role of many MICs in securing global commons. With regards to the implications for EU developmentpolicy, there are two main conclusions: Tackling global poverty needs both better "technical" solutions for classifying countries and, on the political level, a better coordinated cross-country division of labour and joint EU strategy towards advanced developing countries; The EU needs to address the mismatch between partner country portfolio and development objectives. Due to its global presence, the EU is ideally placed to adopt a global rationale of development policy, in particular in its cooperation with MICs. This global outlook on development will increase the coordination challenges of EU development policy and other European external policies substantially. The EU's instrument framework – and in particular the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) – needs to be designed to allow for the continued funding of poverty reduction and social cohesion programmes in graduating countries. At the same time, it should make sufficient resources for the proposed "Global Public Goods" programme available to demonstrate a clear shift towards a global rationale of development policy.
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In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 59, Heft 1, S. 143-160
ISSN: 1468-5965
World Affairs Online
In: European foreign affairs review, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 395-415
ISSN: 1384-6299
World Affairs Online
The new EU development agenda is an adaptation of an old mismatch in development policy, which is the effort to join, on the one hand, donor-driven demand for good governance and democracy, and on the other hand, a commitment to the ownership of development strategies by the recipient countries. This is an ambiguity because the two approaches oppose each other. We recommend to dissolve this mismatch by promoting a new global partnership with a specific emphasis on ownership. This entails context-sensitive analyses of the political and economic environment of the transition process in partner countries.
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