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This brief synthesises the IECEU project's most essential findings on the effectiveness of European Union (EU) missions in four Africa countries: Libya, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). It describes the main elements and impact of the EU missions in these countries, identifies key strategic and operational shortfalls and offers recommendations on how the EU can improve its effectiveness in future conflict prevention and crisis management missions. The EU missions investigated differ in scale, length, objective, budget, priority and context. However, the EU missions presented in this brief share the main characteristic that they have all been deployed under the union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)2 with the explicit intent of improving the overall security situation and addressing conflicts in Africa. This brief will start by providing a short overview of each case, describing the conflict(s), security situation, mission objectives and obstacles. In this way, it compares the overall effectiveness of EU operational conflict prevention across the four African countries and discusses what lessons can be learned from them. The brief does not include all factors needed to answer thisquestion, but highlights the IECEU project's most significant findings in these cases.

Med fem ulike bidrag fra norske samfunnsforskere setter dette fokusnummeret søkelys på norsk klima- og utenrikspolitikk. Bidragene i fokusnummeret viser at det har skjedd en vesentlig sammenkobling av politikkområder som tidligere har vært atskilt, og at klimapolitikken spiller en stadig større rolle i andre politikkområder, slik som utenriks-, handels- og kraftpolitikken. I tillegg kommer det frem at det internasjonale klimaregimet, til tross for nær universell ratifisering av Parisavtalen, stadig fragmenteres. Norge har reagert på dette med å knytte seg stadig tettere til EU, både når det gjelder klima- og kraftpolitikk. Videre påpeker fokusnummeret at internasjonale omdømmekostnader og økende global etterspørsel etter fornybar energi øker presset på en rask grønn omstilling, også innenlands. I sum fremstår Norges ambisjon om å være en global klimaforkjemper som stadig mer uforenelig med rollen som storskala produsent av olje og gass.
Abstract in English:Norwegian Climate and Foreign Policy: Is the Ambition to Be a Global Climate Leader Compatible with Norway's Role as an Oil Producer?The five contributions in this special issue all focus on various aspects of Norwegian climate and foreign policy. The special issue highlights the interconnectedness of policy areas that previously have been separate in showing how climate policy plays an increasing role in other policy domains, such as foreign, trade and energy politics. Even if the Paris Agreement enjoys near universal ratification, the international climate regime is becoming increasingly fragmented. As a result, Norwegian climate policy is becoming increasingly integrated with the EU in both climate and energy regulation. Moreover, the special issue highlights how international reputational costs and increasing future demand for renewable energy are putting additional pressure on a rapid green transition, also domestically. Taken together, Norway's ambition to be a global climate leader appears more and more incompatible with its role as a large producer of oil and gas.

Den norske klimapolitikken blir stadig tettere knyttet til EUs klimaregelverk. Denne artikkelen analyserer hvordan og hvorfor Norge har koblet klimapolitikken opp mot EU og hvilket handlingsrom samarbeidet med EU gir norske myndigheter. Gjennom EØS-avtalen har det europeiske kvotesystemet (EU ETS) siden 2008 dekket omtrent halvparten av de norske utslippene, i hovedsak fra industri og petroleumsvirksomhet. Siden 2021 er også de ikke-kvotepliktige utslippene fra transport, landbruk, bygg og avfall omfattet av en egen tidsavgrenset avtale med EU, som et tillegg til EØS-avtalen. Dette samarbeidet forplikter Norge til å kutte utslipp hvert år fram til 2030. Avtalen binder også Norge til å følge EUs regelverk for opptak av klimagasser knyttet til skog og annen arealbruk. I praksis er Norge fullt medlem av EUs klimapolitiske samarbeid fram til 2030. Analysen viser at denne tette tilknytningen har økt det politiske presset for å kutte klimagassutslipp innenlands. Samtidig har Norge valgt å holde alle fleksibilitetsmuligheter åpne for å gjennomføre kuttene i EU i stedet. Hvorvidt disse mulighetene vil bli benyttet er i stor grad et politisk spørsmål som trolig vil prege klimadebatten frem mot 2030. Den endelige utformingen og innretningen på EUs grønne giv og Norges tilknytning til denne vil også påvirke handlingsrommet for klimakutt hjemme versus ute.
Abstract in English:Ever Closer Union? Norway's Climate Collaboration with the EUNorwegian climate policy has increasingly become closely linked to EU climate regulations. This article analyzes how and why Norway has linked its climate policy to the EU's and what room for maneuvering the cooperation with the EU gives Norwegian authorities. Through the EEA agreement, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) has covered about half of Norway's emissions, mainly from industry and the petroleum sector, since 2008. Since 2021, non-ETS emissions from transport, agriculture, construction and waste have also been covered by a separate time-limited agreement with the EU, as a supplement to the EEA agreement. This cooperation obliges Norway to cut emissions every year until 2030. The agreement also binds Norway to comply with EU regulations for the emissions and uptake of greenhouse gases related to forests and other land use. In practice, Norway is fully obliged to comply with the EU's climate policy regulations until 2030. The analysis shows that this close connection has increased the political pressure to cut greenhouse gas emissions domestically. At the same time, Norway has chosen to keep all flexibility options open to implement the cuts in the EU instead. Whether these opportunities will be used is largely a political question that probably will shape the climate debate until 2030. The final design and structure of the EU's Green Deal and Norway's connection to it will also affect the maneuvering room for climate cuts at home versus abroad.

Av historiska, ekonomiska och säkerhetspolitiska orsaker är Finland ett "minst sannolikt fall" (least likely case) vad gäller oro över kinesiska investeringar. Finland har inom EU haft det högsta relativa handelsberoendet av Kina. Sedan år 2016 är Finland även ett av de EU-länder som fått mest investeringar från Kina absolut sett. Finland, som inte är NATO-medlem, har oproblematiska relationer till Kina och en öppen ekonomi, som ännu för några år sedan välkomnade kinesiska investeringar. Landet har också en ovanligt lång obruten tradition av inhemsk lagstiftning om utländska investeringar som sedan 1992 kan betecknas som liberal. Under de senaste två åren har det emellertid bland policyeliten och i den allmänna diskussionen skett en drastisk förändring i synen på kinesiska investeringar som närmast kan betecknas som en gestalt shift. En påföljd av detta är att behovet av en bättre helhetsbild om kinesiska investeringar har identifierats. Informationsutbyte och koordinering mellan olika myndigheter har förbättrats på många sätt. Samtidigt har man även fördjupat nordiskt myndighetssamarbete och informationsutbyte om relevant lagstiftning och praxis inom området. Även om samarbete kring utländska investeringar inte ingick i Stoltenberg-rekommendationerna år 2009, så kan man se det som ett naturligt led i intensifierat nordiskt säkerhetssamarbete.
Abstract in English:The Canary That Fell Silent. Finland's Gestalt Shift on Chinese InvestmentsFor a mixture of historical, economic and security policy reasons Finland can be regarded as a least likely case with regard to apprehensiveness over Chinese investments. Within the EU, Finland has had the highest relative trade dependence on China. Since 2016, Finland is also one of the EU member states that have attracted the most Chinese investment in absolute terms. Finland, which is not a NATO member, has unproblematic relations with China and an open economy that up until a few years ago welcomed Chinese investments. The country also has an unusually long unbroken tradition of domestic legislation regarding foreign investments, which since 1992 can be characterised as liberal. However, during the last two years, there has been a drastic change in views on Chinese investments, both among the policy elite and in the public debate. This change can be regarded as a veritable gestalt shift. As a corollary, a need for a better overview of Chinese investments has been identified. Information exchange and coordination between various governmental departments has been improved in several ways. Simultaneously, cooperation and information exchange between relevant Nordic authorities regarding relevant legislation and praxis has also deepened. Although the 2009 Stoltenberg recommendations did not encompass cooperation on foreign investments, this can be seen as a natural leg in intensified Nordic security cooperation.

Norge har samarbeidet tett med EU om utenriks-, sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikk siden slutten av 1990-tallet. Det er naturlig å se på dette samarbeidet som supplement til – eller spin-off av – EØS-avtalen. Når dette feltet nå er i endring med nye ambisiøse initiativer, samt at EUs forhold til tredjeland generelt vil revurderes som følge av brexit, vil dette få konsekvenser for Norges tilknytning til EU på dette området. Blant annet ser vi antydninger til det vi her kaller en mulig «EØS-ifisering» av dette feltet. Fokusbidraget analyserer tre utviklingstrekk og mulige konsekvenser av disse for Norge. Det første omhandler EUs beslutninger om det som skjer innenfor EU, nemlig PESCO og beslutningen om å styrke det felles europeiske forsvarsmarkedet. Det andre omhandler initiativer utenfor EU, som det franske europeiske intervensjonsinitiativet (EI2), som må ses i sammenheng med det første. Det tredje er brexit, som etter planen skal ta Storbritannia inn i «tredjelandsklubben», der Norge er en sentral aktør i dag. Hvilke konsekvenser får de nye initiativene tatt innenfor og utenfor EU, for Norge, og hva gjør brexit med Norges handlingsrom som utenriks-, sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitisk samarbeidspartner med EU?
Abstract in English:Spin-off of the EEA? Norway and the European Foreign, Security and Defense PolicyNorway has cooperated closely with the EU on foreign, security and defense policy since the late 1990s. It seems fitting to look at this cooperation as a supplement to – or spin-off of – the EEA agreement. As this field is now changing, with new ambitious initiatives, and that the EU's relations with third countries will generally be reassessed as a result of Brexit, this will have consequences for Norway's relations with the EU in this area. Among other things, we see trends towards what we label a possible "EEA-isation" of this field. This focus article analyses three developments and potential consequences for Norway. The first concerns EU decisions on what is happening within the EU, namely PESCO and the decision to strengthen the common European defense market. The second concerns initiatives outside of the EU, such as the French European Intervention Initiative (EI2), which must be seen in relation to the first. The third is Brexit, which is an attempt to take the UK into the "third country club" where Norway so far has been the key player. What are the consequences of the new initiatives taken within and outside the EU for Norway, and what does Brexit do to Norway's agency as a partner to the EU in the area of foreign, security and defense policy?

This article analyzes Sweden's foreign policy 2011–2018. The article is part of a special issue on how the Nordic countries have responded to recent geopolitical change. The international context in which Sweden finds itself has in a number of ways changed drastically during the time of analysis. The foundations of Sweden's foreign policy, however, have seen less change. The Swedish policy adjustments we see are rather the effects of radical change taking place in the previous two decades: the EU membership, the partnership with NATO, and the abandonment of the policy of neutrality. Sweden is thus learning how to adapt to this transformation of its international orientation during a turbulent time in global politics. The article includes an overview of Swedish foreign policy and the literature on the topic. We discuss the major actors, institutions, tools and frameworks in the foreign policy making process. A detailed analysis of the Foreign Minister's Statement of Government Policy provides a temporal comparison over the last decade.

Artikkelen diskuterer EUs nye forsvarspakke med særlig vekt på CARD (Coordinated Annual Review on Defence), PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) og EDF (European Defence Fund). Formålet er å styrke EU som sikkerhetspolitisk aktør og legge grunnlaget for europeisk strategisk autonomi. Forsvarspakken utfordrer norsk sikkerhets-, forsvars- og forsvarsindustripolitikk. Problemstillingene artikkelen besvarer er: Hvilke konsekvenser får de nyere EU-initiativene for norsk forsvarsindustri- og forsvarsforskningspolitikk? Hvordan opptrer myndighetene (Forsvarsdepartementet; FD) slik at Norge er i stand til å opprettholde en nasjonal forsvarsindustri? Vi legger instrumentelle og institusjonelle teorier og perspektiver til grunn for analysen. Instrumentelle teorier forteller at aktørene handler formålsrasjonelt etter en konsekvenslogikk. Institusjonelle teorier forteller at aktørene søker legitimitet, og handler i tråd med etablert kultur og forventninger i omgivelsene. EU får en økende betydning der unionens sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikk blir likere EUs andre politikkområder. Et flernivåperspektiv blir derfor relevant for et område som tidligere var forbeholdt medlemsstatene. Våre intervjuer med representanter for norske myndigheter og forsvarsindustri forteller at de har fragmentert kunnskap om og forventninger til betydningen av EUs forsvarspakke. Vi konkluderer at aktørene har en instrumentell tilnærming, men at manglende helhetlig forståelse gjør det vanskelig å svare formålsrasjonelt. Aktørene handler derfor også i tråd med et kulturperspektiv.
Abstract in English:What Now, Norwegian Defence Industry? Instrumental and Institutional Answers to the EU's New Security and Defence PoliciesThe article discusses the EU's new defence package with emphasis on CARD (Coordinated Annual Review on Defence), PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) and EDF (European Defence Fund). The aim is to strengthen the EU as a security actor and encourage strategic autonomy. This package challenges Norwegian security-, defence-, and defence industrial policies. The research questions are: What consequences will these EU-initiatives have for Norwegian defence industry- and defence research policy? How will the authorities (Ministry of Defence; MoD) act to maintain a national defence industry? We apply instrumental and institutional theories. Instrumental theories expect rational actions in accordance with logic of consequences. Institutional theories expect appropriate actions in line with established culture and expectations in their surroundings. The EU's security and defence policy becomes more similar with other fields of EU policies. Therefore, a multilevel governance approach is relevant. Our interviews with representatives for Norwegian authorities and defence industry tell that they have fragmented knowledge and expectations about the significance of the defence package. We conclude that the authorities act instrumentally, but lack of a comprehensive understanding makes it difficult to answer rationally. The authorities therefore also act according to a cultural perspective.

The region of Southeast Asia is faced with a complex set of challenges stemming from political, economic and religious developments at the national, regional and global level. This paper sets out to examine trade-, foreign- and security policy implications of the issues confronting the region. In ASEAN, the Southeast Asian countries are continuing their ambitious attempts at further integration. Plans outlining deeper security and economic communities have been adopted. However, huge differences in political systems, economic development and ethnic/religious structures are hampering prospects of closer cooperation. The highly controversial conflict case of Burma/Myanmar is testing the much adhered-to principle of non-interference and at the same time complicating relations with external powers. Among these, the United States and China are dramatically strengthening their interests in the region. American influence is not least manifesting itself in light of the war against terrorism, which the region is adapting to in different ways and at different speeds. By contrast, the European Union does not seem to answer Southeast Asian calls for further engagement. A flurry of bilateral and regional trade agreements is another prominent feature of the economic landscape of the region. This is to a certain degree a reflex ion of impatience with trade liberalization in the WTO and within ASEAN itself. Structures of economic cooperation are under rapid alteration in Southeast Asia. The paper analyses the above-mentioned developments with a view to assessing the prospects of future stability, economic development and integration in and among ASEAN countries. It is concluded that although the scope for increased economic benefit and political harmonization through ASEAN integration alone is limited, the organization could still prove useful as a common regional point of reference in tackling more important policy determinants at national and global level.

Igennem de sidste to år (2018–2019) er den førte danske politik i forhold til Kina blevet mere ambivalent. Særligt når det gælder kinesiske investeringer, er Danmark blevet mere forsigtig. Denne artikel undersøger hvilke faktorer, der har haft betydning for Danmarks skiftende politik i forhold til kinesiske investeringer, gennem to større case-studier: Kinesiske investeringer i Grønland og Huawei i Danmark. Kort fortalt udpeges her tre faktorer, der er afgørende for Danmarks politik i forhold til kinesiske investeringer: for det første landets langvarige økonomiske ideologi som en lille, åben økonomi, svarende til øvrige nordiske lande og som medlem af EU, med et pragmatisk behov for udenlandske markeder; for det andet en stærk, national tro på demokrati og statens forsvarsalliance med USA, herunder dets dedikerede medlemskab af NATO; og for det tredje opkomsten af fremmedfjendske og nationalistiske politiske partier, der udfordrer den tidligere mere afbalancerede og pragmatiske tilgang kendetegnende for større partier samt går ind for et mere anti-kinesisk standpunkt.
Abstract in English:Denmark's Policy on Chinese Investments: Pragmatism Balancing with Increasing Threat PerspectivesDuring the past two years (2018–2019), Denmark's policy towards China has become more ambivalent. In particular, Denmark has become more cautious about inward Chinese investments. This article examines the factors that have affected Denmark's changing policy on Chinese investment, with two major case studies: Chinese investments in Greenland, and Huawei in Denmark. In a nutshell, it points out three decisive factors: first, the country's long-term ideology as a small, open economy, similar to other Nordic countries and as a member of the EU, with a pragmatic need for foreign markets; second, a strong national belief in democracy and the state's defense alliance with the United States, including its dedicated NATO membership; and third, the rise of xenophobic and nationalist political parties, challenging the earlier more balanced and pragmatic approach characteristic of larger parties as well as advocating a more anti-Chinese stance.