Suchergebnisse

Large emissions of greenhouse gases are expected to cause major environmental problems in the future. European policy makers have therefore declared that they aim to implement cost-efficient and fair policies to reduce carbon emissions. The purpose of this paper is to assess whether the cost of the EU policies for 2020 can be reduced through the inclusion of carbon sequestration as and abatement option while also equity is improved. The assessment is done by numerical calculations using a chance-constrained partial equilibrium model of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and national effort-sharing targets, where forest sequestration is introduced as an uncertain abatement option. Fairness is evaluated by calculation of Gini-coefficients for six equity criteria to policy outcomes. The estimated Gini-coefficients range between 0.11 and 0.32 for the current policy, between 0.16 and 0.66 if sequestration is included and treated as certain, and between 0.19 and 0.38 when uncertainty about sequestration is taken into account and policy-makers wish to meet targets with at least 90 percent probability. The results show that fairness is reduced when sequestration is included and that the impact is larger when sequestration is treated as certain.

On 1 January 1995 Sweden became member of the European Union. This basic fact is not mentioned in Sweden's fundamental law. Nor does the Swedish constitution have anything to say about the important changes to the practice of public policymaking that have taken place since Sweden joined the EU. At the same time, it is indeed apparent that the basic rules of the political game in Sweden have been transformed dramatically after EU accession. This constitutional change, however has taken place without any substantial changes being made to the wording of the most important of Sweden's four fundamental laws, i.e., the Instrument of Government (regeringsformen). Constitutional change can be brought about in two different ways: Constitutional amendment, or explicit constitutional change, refers to a change of the rules of the game which implies a modified wording of the constitutional text. Constitutional alteration, or implicit constitutional change, means the constitutional document itself remains unaltered while its meaning is changed through judicial interpretation or legislative action. How frequently used are these different methods when it comes to the constitutional changes brought about by EU membership? How can we explain the differences between member states? How can these competing methods for constitutional change be normatively justified? Is one of them to be preferred? The research project "Hur regleras EU-medlemskapet?" seeks to answer these questions in a comparative study on how EU membership regulated in different member states. Adapted from the source document.

Analysis of what Swedish membership in the EU has meant for Swedish policy at the national level. Has its structure and set of priorities changed and if so, how? Compares changes in Swedish policy in the areas of business, agriculture, environmental protection, social life, education, gender equality, asylum and migration, law enforcement, foreign relations and security, communities, and development

Forest management affects the quantity of CO2 emissions in the atmosphere by carbon sequestration in standing biomass, carbon storage in forest products and production of bioenergy that replace fossil fuels. The main question in this paper is whether forest sequestration is worth increasing at the expense of bioenergy and forest products to achieve EU's emission reduction target to 2050 cost-effectively. The assessment is based on numerical calculations using a dynamic, partial equilibrium model of cost-effective solutions, where three abatement methods in the forest sector are included together with abatement in the fossil fuel sector. The results show that forest sequestration in standing biomass is cost-effective compared to bioenergy. When sequestration is taken into account, net present costs for meeting EU carbon targets can be reduced by 18%. This is achieved through an increase in annual carbon sequestration by 30-158 million ton CO2. The overall cost of reaching the 80 per cent carbon reduction target amounts to 2,002 billion Euros when sequestration is included in the policy, but increases to 2,371 billion Euros without sequestration. Results suggest that forests can serve as a cost-efficient carbon sink over the considered time period.

A special regulatory regime applies to products of recombinant nucleic acid modifications. A ruling from the European Court of Justice has interpreted this regulatory regime in a way that it also applies to emerging mutagenesis techniques. Elsewhere regulatory progress is also ongoing. In 2015, Argentina launched a regulatory framework, followed by Chile in 2017 and recently Brazil and Colombia. In March 2018, the USDA announced that it will not regulate genome-edited plants differently if they could have also been developed through traditional breeding. Canada has an altogether different approach with their Plants with Novel Traits regulations. Australia is currently reviewing its Gene Technology Act. This article illustrates the deviation of the European Union's (EU's) approach from the one of most of the other countries studied here. Whereas the EU does not implement a case-by-case approach, this approach is taken by several other jurisdictions. Also, the EU court ruling adheres to a process-based approach while most other countries have a stronger emphasis on the regulation of the resulting product. It is concluded that, unless a functioning identity preservation system for products of directed mutagenesis can be established, the deviation results in a risk of asynchronous approvals and disruptions in international trade.

This study investigates the contribution of forest carbon sequestration to a cost-efficient EU climate policy from 2010 to 2050 under conditions of uncertainty. We note that there is a trade-off between sequestration and alternative uses of forests such as bioenergy and timber production. A dynamic and probabilistic cost-minimization model is developed, which includes fossil fuel use within the EU Emissions Trading System and forest management in the EU-27 countries. The results suggest that if policy makers wish to meet emissions targets with 80% certainty, this goal will be eight times more expensive than when they were unconcerned with uncertainty. Policy makers' risk attitudes affect forest management strategy primarily through the inclusion of wood products, where potential carbon emissions reductions are high but also highly uncertain. Excluding wood products from a climate strategy can be expensive if policy maker are insensitive to uncertainty.

This article analyses the relationship between EU security, integration and associated members using insights from security studies and the literature on Europeanization. While much of the recent literature emphasizes either the EU's insignificance as a security actor or its importance as a normative and global actor, I investigate its role as a security actor in its own region, arguing that the EU is primarily a regional security actor. I make two general claims: (1) it is the development of common rules and values in various policy areas that constitutes the basis for the EU as a security actor; and (2) it is the successful projection of these rules and values beyond EU borders that will determine the impact of the EU as a security actor. The aim is therefore to show how the EU promotes security and stability through the externalization of rules and values through various processes, association agreements and neighbourhood policies. Adapted from the source document.

The EU Renewable Energy Strategy (RES) Directive requires that each member state obtain 20% of its energy supply from renewable sources by 2020. If fully implemented, this implies major changes in institutions, infrastructure, land use, and natural resource flows. This study applies a political geography perspective to explore the transition to renewable energy use in the heating and cooling segment of the Swedish energy system, 1980–2010. The Nordic welfare model, which developed mainly after the Second World War, required relatively uniform, standardized local and regional authorities functioning as implementation agents for national politics. Since 1980, the welfare orientation has gradually been complemented by competition politics promoting technological change, innovation, and entrepreneurship. This combination of welfare state organization and competition politics provided the dynamics necessary for energy transition, which occurred in a semi-public sphere of actors at various geographical scales. However, our analysis, suggest that this was partly an unintended policy outcome, since it was based on a welfare model with no significant energy aims. Our case study suggests that state organization plays a significant role, and that the EU RES Directive implementation will be uneven across Europe, reflecting various welfare models with different institutional pre-requisites for energy transition.

After decoupling of European Union income support, the current Swedish systems for suckle cow-based beef production will be unable to pay the costs of new investments and the market wage for labour. In a Delphi study, production systems able to achieve full cost coverage were identified as being "Organic with high environmental grants and a premium price for beef" and "Conventional with outdoor wintering of cows". Both systems require large areas of semi-natural pasture per cow and larger herds than currently common in Sweden. To test the results from the Delphi study, different models of suckle beef production were calculated for different regions of Sweden. The ambition was to identify production models with sufficient profitability to pay at least stipulated farm workers wage and a return on investment of 5% under Swedish conditions. In the calculations, the income from weaned calves, culled cows and European Union support was reduced by operating costs excluding labour. The result was divided by hours spent on labour requirement for animal husbandry and pasture management, which resulted in a return to labour per hour. Calculations for varying future scenarios with a changing Common Agricultural Policy showed that organic production models generated a higher return to labour than conventional production models. The main reason for this was the environmental areal payment for organic farming in combination with the higher acreage requirements in organic production. This resulting in higher environmental payments and other European Union supports per suckle cow. The most profitable production models were spring calving, heavy beef cow breeds and winter feed based on grass-clover silage. Some organic production models gave a return to labour above stipulated farm workers wage. However, if the Single Farm Payment scheme is phased out and not replaced by increased environmental payments, the return to labour will be at best half the stipulated farm workers wage. A complementary telephone survey of 20 farmers with above-average herd size showed that the theoretical calculated profitability did not accurately reflect some of the real costs. One example was the opportunity cost of land, which was more expensive than calculated, because the areal payments are slowly moving from animal farmers towards passive retired farmers and landowners. The interviews indicated that the results of the Delphi study and profitability calculations are reliable and valid for costefficient future suckle beef operations, but overestimate the average profitability of current Swedish suckle herds.

This paper applies the replacement cost method for calculating the value of stochastic carbon sink in the EU climate policy for mitigating carbon dioxide emissions. Minimum costs with and without carbon sinks are then derived with a safety-first approach in a chance constrained framework for current system with an emission trading system and national allocation plans and a hypothetical system where all sectors trade. The theoretical results show that i) the value of carbon sink approaches zero for high enough risk discount, ii) relatively low abatement cost in the trading sector curbs supply of permits on the ETS market, and iii) large abatement costs in the trading sector create values from carbon sink for meeting national targets. The empirical application to the EU commitment of 20% reduction in carbon dioxides shows large variation in carbon sink value depending on risk discount and on institutional set up. Under no uncertainty, the value can correspond to approximately 0.45% of total GDP in EU under current policy system, but it is reduced to one third if all sectors are allowed to trade. The values are unevenly allocated among countries, but in different ways depending on EU policy; under current system countries make gains from reduced costs of meeting national targets, under a sector wide trading scheme buyers of permits gain from reductions in permit price and sellers make associated losses.

The European Union (EU) has for a long time had ambitions to achieve some form of 'Strategic Autonomy', often understood as a capability to conduct security pol- icy independent of the United States. With the EU's Global Strategy (EUGS) from 2016, this objective, albeit without a clear definition, is part of the public EU strat- egy. This new level of ambition places high demands on the independent intelli- gence capacities for the member states as well as for the EU at the collective level. at national level as well as for the EU at the collective level. As the world moves towards multipolarity and the geopolitization of the economic sphere, the ambi- tion for strategic autonomy has a broader meaning, such as the ability to conduct an independent trade policy or to choose a supplier of 5G infrastructure. In light of this, this article aims to analyse strategic autonomy as a security policy objective and the various intelligence needs it raises. We analyse autonomy in three different functions, or areas of application: political autonomy, operational autonomy and industrial and digital autonomy. We will then make an overview of how these needs currently are meet and how additional intelligence capacity could be created.