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This book studies the international coordination of monetary and fiscal policies in the world economy. It carefully discusses the process of policy competition and the structure of policy cooperation. As to policy competition, the focus is on monetary and fiscal competition between Europe and America. Similarly, as to policy cooperation, the focus is on monetary and fiscal cooperation between Europe and America. The spillover effects of monetary policy are negative while the spillover effects of fiscal policy are positive. The policy targets are price stability and full employment. The policy makers follow either cold-turkey or gradualist strategies. Policy expectations are adaptive or rational. The world economy consists of two, three or more regions.

László Csaba ; Mit dt. Zsfassung ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- 4 Z 68.247-1984,31/38

There are differing views about the need for economic policy coordination in the EU and about the adequacy of the system that has evolved under EMU. This article examines the case for such policy coordination, then describes and assesses the current arrangements for both 'hard' coordination — epitomised by the much-maligned Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) — and the 'soft' forms of coordination that have evolved in the EU to complement formal rules. Although the system achieves more than is sometimes recognised, it is shown to have weaknesses. Options for reforming the SGP and other facets of the system are discussed.

This dissertation asks three interrelated questions about economic policy coordination: (1) Why do we see persistent macroeconomic imbalances that make international coordination necessary? (2) What kind of economic policies does the European Union promote in its member states via its coordination framework, the European Semester? (3) What determines whether governments implement recommendations issued under the Semester? The first paper argues that economic ideas, and their emphasis in media reporting, help secure public support for policies that result in external imbalances. It finds that the dominant interpretations of current account balances in Australia and Germany concur with distinct perspectives: external surpluses are seen as evidence of competitiveness in Germany, while external deficits are interpreted as evidence of attractiveness for investments in Australia. Survey experiments in both countries suggest that exposure to these diverging interpretations of the current account has a causal effect on citizens' support for their country's economic strategy. The second and third papers analyse policy recommendations under the European Semester, arguably the most ambitious example of economic policy coordination worldwide. The findings show that the European Union does not use the Semester to promote a single economic model across all member states. Recommendations do not uniformly recommend more reliance on the market or the state. Rather, they tend to suggest fiscal restraint and less protection for labour market insiders, while simultaneously promoting measures that benefit vulnerable groups in society. During the second decade of EMU, recommendations have gradually become more favourable of state intervention. The fourth paper investigates possible reasons for (non-)compliance with the Semester. It argues that recommendations are more likely to be implemented when their policy direction is in line with national governments' economic ideology. The analysis shows that recommendations advocating less ...

Successive EMU roadmaps have presented the expansion of EU controls over Member States' economic policies as an integral part of monetary union, vital to its survival. Possible alternatives have been hardly discussed. In this contribution we trace the evolution of the EU economic policy coordination framework from a relatively narrow, rules-based exercise into a largely discretionary process that reaches even the most politically salient areas of the Member States' economic policies. We then discuss how the extensive coercive powers the EU formally possesses have turned out to be difficult to use in practice. This reflects the fundamental limits of the EU's legitimate use of power over its Member States, set by its current level of political and cultural integration. To have a chance of success, further designs EMU need to respect these limits. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.

The launch of European Monetary Union (EMU) marked the beginning of a new era, and its establishment has proved an impressive success at the technical, legal, and procedural level. After all, EMU has accelerated economic and political integration in the European Union and tied the economies of the Member States closer together. However, the performance of the euro, high unemployment rates, uneven output and investment growth, and the issue of structural reforms that have yet to be tackled have raised questions about the performance of EMU in practice. There is a general consensus on the justification for economic policy coordination. The existing literature on economic policy coordination, however, seems far from able to provide robust conclusions about how to organize the necessary interaction of institutions and policies. Therefore, there seems to be a case for re-examining the subject under the new framework set by EMU. The objective of such a reassessment is to enhance the understanding of what type of coordination and what institutional setting for policy coordination can be expected to be most favorable. Challenges for Economic Policy Coordination within European Monetary Union provides an intellectually stimulating contribution to the ongoing debate