Will Taiwan's Economy be Marginalized by China? A Macro-economic Policy Coordination Approach
In: Global economic review, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 77-99
ISSN: 1744-3873
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In: Global economic review, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 77-99
ISSN: 1744-3873
In: Journal of European integration, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 41-59
ISSN: 0703-6337
In: EUI working papers / Robert Schuman Centre, 99,26
World Affairs Online
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 37, Heft 4, S. 431-458
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
In: LPF-WEL Working Paper No. 5
SSRN
Working paper
In: International Studies Quarterly, Band 37, Heft 4, S. 431
In: Journal of economic policy reform, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 219-235
ISSN: 1748-7889
In: CEPS Working Document No. 381
SSRN
In: Libros de la CEPAL 82
In: United Nations publication
In: The European journal of the history of economic thought, Band 20, Heft 6, S. 1101-1121
ISSN: 1469-5936
In: Economic bulletin, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 3-10
ISSN: 1438-261X
In: Public choice, Band 163, Heft 3-4, S. 389-391
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Comparative European politics, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 18-35
ISSN: 1740-388X
With a large-scale econometric world model we derive policy multipliers and the parameters for the utility functions for 10 EMU countries and for the ECB. The gains from cooperation are calculated by comparing two equilibria, a Nash and a cooperative equilibrium. The cooperative equilibrium is the result of the maximization of a weighted utility function for Euroland as a whole with the targets output gap and inflation. In the case of a "full" cooperation, where the 10 EMU countries coordinate their fiscal policy with the monetary policy of the ECB the welfare gains are very large for the whole Euro zone. However the strong fiscal and monetary policy impulses as a result of this optimization procedure lead, firstly, to a violation of the fiscal targets (budget deficit, public debt) of the Stability and Growth Pact which limits the room for manoeuvre of fiscal policy of the EMU member states in stage III of EMU. Secondly, we find that not in all countries cooperation leads to welfare gains, a result which is not Pareto efficient. Therefore, by considering these two constraints (Pareto optimality and SGP objectives) the constrained optimization results in a solution in case of "full" cooperation which drives most countries back to the Nash position of the baseline. In addition, a "partial" cooperation in which the ECB stays aside and only the fiscal policies of the EMU member countries are taking part, leads to a very small welfare improvement and violates again (only to minor degree the Pareto optimality condition). The optimal fiscal policy impulses are very modest.
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In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 53, Heft 6, S. 1392-1393
ISSN: 1468-5965