The policy formation of investment adjustment for economic stabilization
In: The State and Industry in South Korea
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In: The State and Industry in South Korea
In: Managing to the New Regulatory Reality, S. 1-15
In: Dynamic Games in Economic Analysis; Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, S. 221-230
Examines the 1993/94 demonetization of the Russian economy, arguing that it was rooted in basic institutional & political asymmetries between central & local authorities. Analysis focuses on how institutional & political differences between national & local authorities of the electric power & heat sector affected the national drive to move to a money-driven economy. Ethnographic data collected from three regional economies show that the expansion of barter relations was a result of the monetization of the economy. Price liberalization & privatization were followed in 1993 by stabilization involving higher interest rates & taxes that depleted bank accounts, forcing managers to turn to barter relations. It is argued that while barter represented affluence in the socialist state, it now denotes bankruptcy. The political factors involved in the willingness of local authorities to push costs onto the electric power sector are discussed, & the entire process is reexamined in terms of Karl Polanyi's (1965) theory of the "double movement.". 1 Table, 5 Figures, 36 References. J. Lindroth
Laffan illuminates the European Union (EU)'s governance by describing its budget-making process & politics. The primary functions of budgets are listed along with the EU's budget amounts, 1973-1998. There is a brief review of the budget of the EU's predecessor, the European Coal & Steel Community, 1952-1969, budgetary crises & conflicts, 1970-1986, & the institutionalization of the budget, 1987-1999. Data on budget creation & management are enriched by information on macronegotiations, the annual budget cycle, 1990's expansion, auditing, the discharge procedure, & means of addressing fraud. Future budgetary planning & conflicts are revealed by details of Agenda 2000, proposal formatting, & negotiations within the EU's councils. Ways in which the budgeting process embodies EU's goals of integration & representation are explored. The need for stabilization, accountability, & flexibility is addressed. 4 Tables, 1 Figure, 2 References. M. C. Leary
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Serbia and the European Union" published on by Oxford University Press.
Spain accomplished financial liberalization, a regulatory shift to the market spurred by the state elite & the Bank of Spain, in a highly protracted manner during its transition to democracy, from the 1970s to the early 1990s. A network of reforms addressed a dual challenge: the preempting of political opposition to the neoliberal agenda, & the need for financial solvency during the lengthy macroeconomic stabilization process. The first episode of change, 1978-1985, involved a large number of smaller industrial banks; the second stage involved the failure of the Banco Espanol de Credito, one of Spain's largest commercial banks. Both crises had only moderate impacts on the economy due to the nature & stability of the financial sector as a whole & the incremental & slow approach to liberalization. Much of the burden of economic adjustment in the financial sector was passed on to other sectors of the economy through the slow pace of disintermediation. The process could be termed a relative success, but with social costs in other sectors. L. A. Hoffman
Explores the growth of anti-Western sentiment in Russia, brought on, in part, due to the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance & objections to the NATO air strikes in Serbia. An understanding of the foreign policy process in Russia is presented through the study of complex relationships between public opinion, opinion leaders, the nation's political struggles, as well as other cultural & ideological factors within Russian society. The goals of reconstruction & stabilization provided motivation to end the Cold War, avoid tensions with the West, & seek the West's economic assistance. Public attitudes toward the West & Western policies shifted from neutral & favorable at the collapse of the USSR to suspicion & hostility at the end of the millennium. Russia's hopes of "becoming the West" were replaced with the reality that radical "shock therapy" was aggravating deep systemic failures. At the same time, Russia's attempt to play "the good citizen role" in Bosnia demonstrated the West's unwillingness to treat Russia as an equal partner. Russia's current situation, however, is more likely to improve if politicians do not pursue the anti-Western course of public opinion. L. A. Hoffman
In: Europas Sicherheitsarchitektur im Wandel, S. 373-389
"Today, Western thinking about the use of force is determined by geopolitical change, the financial crisis and bad memories from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This contribution argues that geopolitical change requires Europe to consider the consequences of multipolarity and the tendency for rising powers to want unrestricted access to raw materials and energy to support economic growth. In addition, America's rebalancing to the East, a policy of retrenchment and the concept of leading from behind, all indicate that Europe must be able to defend its vital interests without American support. Consequently, Europe needs a full-spectrum force, which can only be sustained when nations move from defense cooperation to defense integration. Local and regional conflicts could require crisis response operations to relieve humanitarian suffering or to defend less critical European interests. But bad memories of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will have a considerable impact on future operations. Only when Europe's vital interests are at stake are states willing to carry out large-scale stabilization operations. When lesser interests are at stake, Europe will abstain or limit its response to an enabling rote, supporting response operations carried out by local or regional forces. The core message of this contribution is that Europe needs a fall spectrum force that can be deployed without U.S. support; that Europe should therefore move from defense cooperation to defense integration; and that when it comes to the actual deployment of its forces, Europe must better balance political objectives and military means." (author's abstract)