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EGYPT: Presidential Vote
In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Band 60, Heft 12
ISSN: 1467-825X
EGYPT: Poll Punishment
In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Band 61, Heft 2
ISSN: 1467-825X
Will Egypt suspend the Camp David Accords?
Blog: Responsible Statecraft
Since October, Egypt has joined most of the international community in calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. With Egypt being the only Arab country to border Gaza, Cairo's stakes are high. The longer Israel's war on the besieged enclave continues, the threats to Egypt's economy, national security, and political stability will become more serious.Located along the Gaza-Egypt border is Rafah, a 25-square-mile city that until recently was home to 300,000 Palestinians. Now approximately 1.4 million Palestinians are sheltering in Rafah because of the Israeli military's wanton destruction of Gaza City, Khan Younis, and other parts of the Strip. Having asserted that four Hamas battalions are now in Rafah, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared that deploying Israeli forces to this Palestinian city is necessary for his country to defeat Hamas amid this war. As of writing, Israel's military is preparing to launch a campaign for Rafah.Officials in Cairo fear that Israeli military operations in Rafah could result in a large number of Palestinians entering the Sinai. "An Israeli offensive on Rafah would lead to an unspeakable humanitarian catastrophe and grave tensions with Egypt," said European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell on February 10.Not only could such a scenario fuel massive amounts of friction between Cairo and Tel Aviv, but it could also severely heighten tensions between the Egyptian public and President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi's government. It's easy to imagine a mass expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza into Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, which would amount to essentially a "Nakba 2.0," triggering widespread unrest in Egypt if the government in Cairo is widely seen by Egyptians as playing a role in permitting, if not facilitating, such an ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Gaza. Along with economic considerations, this is one of the main reasons why Cairo has articulated that Israel depopulating Gaza of Palestinians and forcing them into Egypt is a red line that Tel Aviv must not cross."The biggest concern for Cairo is related to the fate of the [Palestinians in Gaza] forcibly evacuated by the Israelis and who might find a 'safe haven' in Sinai. An uncontrolled influx of Palestinians into the [Sinai] Peninsula would be an enormous burden on Egypt, which would have to manage a problematic situation from a political and security point of view, as well as having to justify internally to its own public opinion an imposition that came from outside," Giuseppe Dentice, head of the Middle East and North Africa Desk at the Italian Center for International Studies, told RS."It is no coincidence that Cairo has reinforced the border with Gaza, closed the Rafah crossing, and warned Israel that any unilateral action involving a forced exodus of the Strip's inhabitants to Egyptian territory could jeopardize not only bilateral relations, but the preconditions for peace and stability guaranteed in the [Camp David Accords]," added Dentice.On February 15, Maxar Technologies, a Colorado-headquartered space technology company, captured satellite images showing Egypt's construction of a wall roughly two miles west of the Egypt-Gaza border. The following day, the London-based Sinai Foundation for Human Rights said that this construction "is intended to create a high-security gated and isolated area near the borders with the Gaza Strip, in preparation for the reception of Palestinian refugees in the case of [a] mass exodus."What might happen to the Camp David Accords?On February 11, two Egyptian officials and one Western diplomat told the Associated Press that Cairo might suspend the 1979 Camp David Accords if Israeli troops wage an incursion into Rafah. A day later, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry denied such reports about his government's plans to freeze the peace treaty with Israel, yet he emphasized that Egypt's continued adherence to the 1979 deal would depend on Tel Aviv reciprocating. Alarming to Egyptian officials were Netanyahu's statements late last year about the Israeli military taking control of the Philadelphi Corridor (a nine-mile-long demilitarized buffer zone between Gaza and Egypt which was established in accordance with Egypt and Israel's peace treaty) because such a move on Israel's part would be a breach of the Camp David Accords.Are Egyptian officials serious about possibly freezing the historic peace deal? Or does such talk amount to empty threats issued for political purposes at home, as well as pursuing certain Egyptian aims vis-à-vis Washington and Tel Aviv? Mouin Rabbani, a political analyst and co-editor of Jadaliyya, told RS that if these statements from anonymous Egyptian officials are geared toward a domestic audience but Cairo doesn't follow through, Sisi's government could have a "potentially serious problem on its hands."Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow with the Chatham House and a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council, doubts that Egypt would go as far as suspending the Camp David Accords. "In the end, Egypt is unlikely to take the first step to tear the treaty up unilaterally," he said.But what Egypt is doing is embracing "discursive strategic posturing" whereby Cairo uses "rhetorical escalation" and directs messages at three audiences, Aboudouh told RS. First is the domestic audience to say that Cairo is standing up for Egypt's core security interests as well as the Palestinian cause. The second is Washington to relay the Egyptian government's anger at the Biden administration for not stopping Israeli actions that threaten to displace Palestinians into the Sinai. Third is to Netanyahu, generals in the Israeli Defense Forces, and the Israeli intelligence community.Gordon Gray, a former U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia, also discounts recent suggestions that Cairo would suspend its peace treaty with Israel for three main reasons. "First, Egypt does not seek military confrontation — even an inadvertent one — with Israel. Second, Egypt does not want to risk losing U.S. military assistance ($1.3 billion annually), which was granted as a direct result of the Camp David Accords. Finally, while Egypt abhors the Israeli military campaign in Gaza, it shares Israel's views about the threat Hamas poses," said Gray in an interview with RS.What would come from Egypt freezing the treaty?Despite many experts believing that Egypt would not freeze the Camp David Accords, that potential scenario should be considered. There are important questions to raise about what it could lead to in terms of region-wide ramifications, as well as Cairo's relationships with Western capitals. But it's difficult to predict how events would unfold if Egypt took that step because there would be so many unknown variables in play.Egypt could act in different ways after suspending the peace treaty with Israel. Rabbani asked, "Would it simply declare the peace treaty suspended and leave it at that or would it stop implementing provisions of that treaty?"Regardless, any freezing of the Camp David Accords by Egypt would inevitably bring a layer of instability to Egyptian-Israeli relations never seen since Jimmy Carter's administration, which — with help from Iran, Morocco, and Romania — brought Egypt's then-President Anwar Sadat and Israel's then-Prime Minister Menachim Begin together in northern Maryland's Catoctin Mountains to sign the peace treaty in September 1978. The response from Washington would likely be extreme, particularly given how central Egyptian-Israeli peace has been to U.S. foreign policy agendas in the Middle East for almost half a century while surviving a host of regional crises, including Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and all the previous Gaza wars."The U.S. is certain to act true to form and retaliate against Egypt without holding Israel in any way accountable for producing this crisis, and Washington may well cease foreign assistance to Egypt, which is a direct function of its peace treaty with Israel. The EU will probably announce it is launching an investigation of the Egyptian school curriculum or some other nonsensical initiative," Rabbani told RS.Irrespective of how Egypt approaches its relationship with Israel, the fact that officials in Cairo are suggesting a potential freeze of the Camp David Accords speaks volumes about the Gaza war's impact on Israel's diplomatic standing in the Arab world. With the probability of more Arab countries joining the Abraham Accords in the foreseeable future having essentially dropped to zero, the pressing question is not which Arab government might be next to normalize with Tel Aviv. The focus has shifted to questions about how Arab countries already in the normalization camp, such as Egypt, will manage their formalized relationships with Israel at a time in which Israeli behavior in Gaza is widely seen across the Arab-Islamic world as genocidal.
What are the main drivers of private saving in Egypt?
In: Review of economics and political science: REPS
ISSN: 2631-3561
PurposeThis study aims to investigate the main drivers of private saving in Egypt (2005–2020).Design/methodology/approachIt employs an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach for quarterly data on private saving, lagged private saving, real gross domestic product (GDP) growth, public saving, inflation, real interest rate, money supply, current account deficit and unemployment.FindingsPrivate saving in Egypt displays persistency and public saving depresses private saving in the short run and long run. Real interest rate, inflation and unemployment have negative and statistically significant impacts on private saving in the short run and long run. The current account deficit displays a negative effect on private saving but is significant only in the short run. Other incorporated variables, like real GDP and money supply, are not statistically significant. This could be attributed to the high consumption rather than saving motive of the Egyptian population and their tendency to rely more on other informal saving channels.Research limitations/implicationsFindings are of policy relevance as unleashing the determinants of private saving guides policymakers in formulating the appropriate sustainable development policies. It also assists in identifying the main obstacles hindering the promotion of private saving and hence major areas for policy intervention, like financial inclusion, poverty eradication, employment generation and structural reforms.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the literature: (1) it tackles private saving figure rather than aggregate saving figure that is covered by similar studies due to lack of consistent data, (2) given the relatively low quality, unavailability and inconsistency of data on private saving in developing countries, investigating the determinants of private saving should be carried out on an individual country basis which is done by this study, (3) this study fulfills the gap in literature related to the lack of up-to-date studies on private saving in Egypt and (4) it relies on quarterly data that could produce more reliable results.
Egypt – Israel: New Militant Group
In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Band 61, Heft 1
ISSN: 1467-825X
Counter revolutionary Egypt: from the Midan to the neighbourhood
In: Routledge studies in Middle Eastern democratization and government
"Focusing on the 25 January 2011 Egyptian revolution, this book traces its affective and emotional dynamics into the local realties and everyday politics of the urban subaltern, exploring the impact of revolutionary participation on protestors' engagement in street politics. As well as investigating the affective dynamics of the revolution, the author analyses the spatiality of affect in the context of the Maspero Triangle neighbourhood, highlighting the disruption of the revolutionary moment and the evolution of informal political practices. In addition, the book focuses on state efforts to counter revolutionary street politics by co-opting and dismantling politicized local practices. It is argued that the appropriation by the state of the notion of the baltagi helped create narratives around 'thuggery' to undermine the politics of the urban poor. Based on empirical fieldwork, the book ultimately shows how the revolutionary moment informed subsequent local activism, illustrating that it was both disruptive and productive in terms of contentious street politics. Combining literature on affect and emotion, intersectional gender and everyday politics, the book yields innovative and renewed insights within the fields of political science and Middle East studies, and will prove valuable reading for anyone interested in the Egyptian revolution and its aftermath"--
Economic Study for Maize Yield in Egypt
In: Alexandria science exchange journal: an international quarterly journal of science and agricultural environments, Band 45, Heft 1, S. 131-155
ISSN: 2536-9784
Development Challenges in Egypt: Constraints, Practices, and Opportunities
In: Journal of politics and law: JPL, Band 17, Heft 2, S. 1
ISSN: 1913-9055
This paper analyzes the constraints, practices, and opportunities of Egypt’s development. Egypt experienced economic stagnation under the regime of President Hosni Mubarak which was exacerbated by the political situation that resulted from its end. Egypt’s economic efforts stalled and it was not until the end of the power struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Army, during the counterrevolutionary period, that political normalcy returned to the extent needed to focus on improvements of the domestic economic situation. This phase resulted in the election of President Abdel Fatah El-Sisi whose policies fought back against terrorism and initiated successful developmental efforts to address developmental constraints. These initiatives range from diplomatic efforts to solve the Nile River dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia, building roads and bridges, encouraging foreign investment, and increasing the supply of electricity. There is still a long way to go in terms of building various industries, increasing exports, lowering unemployment rates, and encouraging tourism as an important source of income and also a vital means of obtaining foreign currency. Successful development efforts in Egypt will allow for increased levels of self-sufficiency regarding agriculture and water as well as broader levels of prosperity across other sectors of production.
Why Egypt can't and won't open the floodgates from Gaza
Blog: Responsible Statecraft
Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is vowing to launch an invasion of Rafah, a city located along the Gaza-Egypt border where more than 1.5 million Palestinians currently shelter.Egypt's stakes are extremely high given how much spillover from Gaza into the Sinai Peninsula could be destabilizing. Cairo understandably wants this war to be over immediately.A massive refugee influx into the Sinai from Gaza could result in Palestinians waging an armed resistance against Israel from Egyptian soil — a nightmarish scenario from Cairo's perspective. Egypt also does not want to be seen as accepting Palestinian refugees in exchange for money from the U.S., which would contribute to perceptions on the "Arab Street" that President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi's government is complicit in a "Nakba 2.0."Understanding Egypt's vulnerability to spillover from Gaza requires considering Cairo's other foreign policy challenges too. The Gaza war's spread into the Red Sea has harmed Egypt's economy in the form of lost Suez Canal revenue with ships rerouting to avoid the body of water altogether. Additionally, Rafah isn't the only border security crisis concerning Egyptian officials. "They've got Sudan in the south, which is a mess. To the west, Libya is a mess. So basically, everywhere Egypt looks now is a problem. There's also the issue of the Renaissance Dam," noted Kenneth Katzman, a Senior Fellow at the Soufan Center, in an interview with RS.The U.S. RoleSince October, Egyptian diplomacy has been key to efforts aimed at implementing a ceasefire, negotiating hostage-prisoner swaps, and delivering Gaza humanitarian assistance. As a result, the Biden administration perceives Egypt to be more indispensable than ever. Notably, Biden and his team haven't recently criticized the Sisi government's human rights record — a major contrast to Biden's rhetoric as a presidential candidate.The White House understands Cairo's concerns and Biden's public position is that Israel should not wage a full-scale assault on Rafah without ensuring the safety of Palestinians sheltering there. But Egypt continues to be frustrated with Biden's refusal to deploy Washington's leverage to pressure Israel into actually changing its conduct on the ground."Washington's support [for Egypt on this front has been] confined to making clear its opposition to any full-scale transfer of refugees, forced, unforced, permanent, or temporary," Charles Dunne, a former U.S. diplomat who served in Cairo and Jerusalem, told RS. "It is pushing back on talk in Israel — so far unofficial — that a mass population transfer could be part of the solution to Israel's Gaza problem," he added."My personal conclusion is that [U.S. officials] probably made the point [to their Egyptian counterparts] that some of the Gazans would inevitably be needed to be let into Egypt in order to prevent a greater humanitarian catastrophe as the Israelis move military operations closer to Rafah," Dave DesRoches, an assistant professor at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, told RS. "My guess is the Egyptians are concerned both that the Gazan presence would become permanent as well as that Egypt would be seen as abetting the Israeli military operations," he added.If Israel wages an all-out assault on Rafah and there is a massive displacement of Palestinians into Egypt, Washington would probably financially assist Cairo. But Katzman belives the White House is likely more focused on trying to prevent that from happening. "My impression is that [the Biden] administration is not really tackling the idea of what if there is a flood of refugees into the Sinai, while I think [its] strategy is to make sure that doesn't happen in the first place," he told RS.Katzman added, "The U.S. is encouraging Israel to coordinate with Egypt to the extent possible, which I think is happening. But beyond that, I don't think the administration has done any planning because they don't expect that worst case scenario to happen.""Cairo worries that even entertaining the idea for emergency planning purposes could be seen as a green light to the IDF. That appears to be where we are for now, and Cairo has focused on building a fortified buffer zone along the border with Gaza to prevent a refugee crisis," said Dunne.Red Sea CrisisAnother important aspect of U.S.-Egypt relations amid the Gaza war and its regionalization is the Red Sea security crisis. Since November, the Houthis have been launching missiles and drones at ships off Yemen's coast, claiming to support Gaza by targeting vessels linked to Israel, the U.S., and the UK. As of last month, Egypt's Suez Canal revenue had decreased by 40 to 50 percent throughout the crisis, according to Sisi.Gordon Gray, the former U.S. ambassador to Tunisia, told RS that there is "strong incentive for Egypt to assist the U.S. efforts to guarantee freedom of the seas" given what is at stake for Egypt in terms of Suez Canal fees amid Houthi maritime attacks.But despite economic setbacks from the Red Sea security crisis, Egypt did not join Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) and Cairo has played no official role in the Washington-led bombing campaign against the Houthis that began almost two months ago. This is not because Cairo doesn't share the West's concerns about the Houthi attacks on vessels. To the contrary, Egypt and the U.S. strongly agree that no Yemeni group should be allowed to disrupt maritime shipping in the region. In fact, when Saudi Arabia launched Operation Decisive Storm in March 2015, Egypt committed its naval forces to provide security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. At that time, Sisi referred to the Red Sea as an "Arab lake" and identified the Bab al-Mandab as important to "Egyptian and Arab national security."Public opinion at home mostly explains Cairo not joining OPG nor formally supporting the U.S.-UK strikes. Many Egyptians would now see their government overtly aligning with Washington and London against the Houthis as Cairo facilitating Israel's war on Gaza."Egypt has refused to join [OPG] and, while it's possible that Egypt is making some behind-the-scenes contribution, any such contribution is pretty much invisible to the naked eye at the moment. If anything, it's the very least they can get away with doing," according to Dunne.DesRoches believes that the Egyptians have probably been allowing London to use Egyptian airspace for bombing Houthi targets in Yemen. "Extrapolating, I'm confident that U.S. support, intelligence, and resupply flights are probably transiting Egyptian airspace," he told RS. "I have a slightly lower degree of confidence that the Egyptians share intelligence and the common operating picture from their various assets to locate missile tracks and launch sites. This is probably limited more by the lack of Egyptian capacity than by any policy decision to not cooperate." Ultimately, the U.S.-Egypt alliance remains strong. But Cairo must approach this relationship with more caution given Washington's role in Gaza's destruction and its growing isolation in the Arab-Islamic world.
Revolution squared: Tahrir, political possibilities, and counterrevolution in Egypt
"In Revolution Squared Atef Shahat Said examines the 2011 Egyptian Revolution to trace the expansive range of liberatory possibilities and containment at the heart of every revolution. Drawing on historical analysis and his own participation in the revolution, Said outlines the importance of Tahrir Square and other physical spaces as well as the role of social media and digital spaces. He develops the notion of lived contingency-the ways revolutionary actors practice and experience the revolution in terms of the actions they do or do not take-to show how Egyptians made sense of what was possible during the revolution. Said charts the lived contingencies of Egyptian revolutionaries from the decade prior to the revolution's outbreak to its peak and the so-called transition to democracy to the 2013 military coup into to the present. Contrary to retrospective accounts and counterrevolutionary thought, Said argues that the Egyptian Revolution was not doomed to defeat. Rather, he demonstrates that Egyptians did not fully grasp their immense clout and that limited reformist demands reduced the revolution's potential for transformation" --
World Affairs Online
How Pharaohs Became Media Stars: Ancient Egypt and Popular Culture
The appearance of new media and its enormous diffusion in the last decades of the 20th century and up to the present has greatly increased and diversified the reception of Egyptian themes and motifs and Egyptian influence in various cultural spheres. So-called 'popular' or 'pop' culture (cinema, genre fiction, TV-series, comics, graffiti, computer and video games, rock and heavy music, radio serials, among others) often makes use of narratives and motifs drawn from the observation and study of ancient Egypt, updated and reinterpreted in various ways, and which is now the subject of study by scholars of Egyptology. The present monograph seeks to provide new evidence of this interdisciplinarity between Egyptology and popular culture. It explores the conscious reinterpretation of the past in the work of contemporary authors, who shape an image of the Egyptian reality that in each case is determined by their own circumstances and contexts.
Externalising Migration Controls through Development Programs in Egypt
In: Geopolitics, S. 1-24
ISSN: 1557-3028
Counterterrorism, political anxiety and legitimacy in postcolonial India and Egypt
In: Critical studies on terrorism, S. 1-25
ISSN: 1753-9161
Shariʿa and Governance in Ottoman Egypt: The Waqf Controversy in the Mid-Sixteenth Century
In: International journal of Middle East studies: IJMES, S. 1-20
ISSN: 1471-6380
Abstract
In the mid-16th century, the Ottoman government sought to expand its tax revenue from Egypt through a controversial initiative to levy taxes on endowments (waqf). The controversy produced a diverse range of responses from Ottoman scholar-bureaucrats, such as Ebussuud Efendi, who supported the initiative; Egyptian scholars, including Ibn Nujaym and al-Ghayti, who opposed it; and the Ottoman governor, who worked to resolve it. Despite the opposing positions of the diverse actors, shariʿa served as the common medium for the articulation and negotiation of their opinions and helped produce a compromise that became foundational for the Ottoman tax regime in Egypt. In this episode, shariʿa constituted an instrument of governance. Such a role for shariʿa differs from its conception as an autonomous field of scholarly interpretation, or the understanding of it as an inclusive normative system encompassing rules emerging from both the interpretative activities of scholars and the definitive edicts and orders of rulers. Shariʿa did not constitute the endpoint of rulemaking; rather, it provided the shared language of terms and concepts through which different actors participated in the process of formulating rules.