This article examines how electronic funds transfers and electronic benefit transfers have become integral components of digital government. These technologies have forwarded many of the principles of the Winter Commission, including the development of lean, responsive government. The greater efficiency and cost savings for the federal and most state governments have not been achieved without encountering and dealing with serious matters related to customer service, contracting, collaboration, management, and implementation. These issues arise in the normal daily use of electronic payment technologies, but they are magnified in crisis situations, as demonstrated by disaster relief operations during Hurricane Katrina.
Abstract A uniform carbon tax and Citizen Carbon Fund are proposed as a zero-sum system of transfers that can increase equilibrium participation and result in a positive carbon check for each citizen covered by the agreement. The carbon tax results in efficient abatement, generates tax revenue and finances transfers that increase equilibrium participation in a climate agreement. A single carbon price is easier to negotiate than many different abatement requirements, but mirrors the results of a cap-and-trade agreement. An example using the four largest carbon emitters illustrates the set of stable agreements, the transfers required for stability and the resulting carbon checks.
The European Union budget is distributed primarily in the form of intergovernmental grants to sub-state governments, which invest the grants in local projects. Transfers are allocated under the auspices of the European structural funds. This article assesses the causal links between electoral incentives on the recipient side, European funding goals, and local grant allocation. Tobit regressions of the allocation patterns in 419 local districts in Germany for the period 2000–6 suggest the following: although recipient sub-state governments enjoy substantial discretion in selecting projects, their distributive choices are largely in accord with European goals. As theoretically predicted, however, there is robust evidence that sub-state governments' electoral concerns distort the local allocation of structural funds.