Suchergebnisse

Introduction: welcome to France -- Fear of the police -- Identity comes and goes -- Disintegration -- I exists -- We are stronger than you -- Equal opportunities -- Counting origins -- Conclusion: get moving!

L'objet de cet article est d'offrir un tour d'horizon pour non-spécialistes sur la façon dont les économistes ont progressivement appréhendé le concept d'égalité des chances. L'idée clé est que l'égalité des chances ne se préoccupe pas seulement d'égalité ex-ante , quelque chose que le nom même de l'égalité des chances suggère, mais aussi d'égalité ex-post , ce qui rend l'analyse vraiment différente de celle des capabilités. L'article est structuré en trois parties. La première partie s'intéresse aux principaux débats théoriques concernant l'égalité des chances. Nous enchaînons sur des questions touchant aux problèmes de mesure de l'inégalité des chances avant de présenter quelques résultats empiriques. Enfin nous terminons par les défis auxquels sont confrontés les politiques visant à promouvoir l'égalité des chances.

Labour law entertains an ambiguous relationship with the value "Equality" because in its name labour law creates inequalities - Le droit du travail entretient un rapport ambigu avec la valeur Egalité car il crée en son nom des inégalités ; Peer reviewed

Are rights to privacy consistent with sexual equality? In a brief, but influential, article Catherine MacKinnon trenchantly laid out feminist criticisms of the right to privacy. In "Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade" she linked familiar objections to the right to privacy and connected them to the fate of abortion rights in the U.S.A. (MacKinnon, 1983, 93-102). For many feminists, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) had suggested that, notwithstanding a dubious past, legal rights to privacy might serve feminist objectives, and prove consistent with sexual equality. By arguing that Roe's privacy justification of abortion rights was directly responsible for the weakness and vulnerability of abortion rights in America, MacKinnon took aim at feminist hopes for the right to privacy at their strongest point. Maintaining that Roe's privacy justification of abortion is intimately, and not contingently, related to the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Harris v. McRae, (1980) MacKinnon concluded that privacy rights cannot be reconciled with the freedom and equality of women, and so can have no place in a democracy.In Harris, the Supreme Court held that the State need not provide Medicaid coverage for abortions that are necessary to preserve the health, but not the life, of a pregnant woman, effectively depriving poor women of almost all state aid for abortions.2 Moreover, the Court's subsequent decision in Bowers v . Hardwick (1986) appeared to confirm the truth of MacKinnon's observation – though this case concerned gay rights, rather than abortion rights, and occurred several years after MacKinnon's condemnation of Harris. [First paragraph]

Are rights to privacy consistent with sexual equality? In a brief, but influential, article Catherine MacKinnon trenchantly laid out feminist criticisms of the right to privacy. In "Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade" she linked familiar objections to the right to privacy and connected them to the fate of abortion rights in the U.S.A. (MacKinnon, 1983, 93-102). For many feminists, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) had suggested that, notwithstanding a dubious past, legal rights to privacy might serve feminist objectives, and prove consistent with sexual equality. By arguing that Roe's privacy justification of abortion rights was directly responsible for the weakness and vulnerability of abortion rights in America, MacKinnon took aim at feminist hopes for the right to privacy at their strongest point. Maintaining that Roe's privacy justification of abortion is intimately, and not contingently, related to the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Harris v. McRae, (1980) MacKinnon concluded that privacy rights cannot be reconciled with the freedom and equality of women, and so can have no place in a democracy.In Harris, the Supreme Court held that the State need not provide Medicaid coverage for abortions that are necessary to preserve the health, but not the life, of a pregnant woman, effectively depriving poor women of almost all state aid for abortions.2 Moreover, the Court's subsequent decision in Bowers v . Hardwick (1986) appeared to confirm the truth of MacKinnon's observation – though this case concerned gay rights, rather than abortion rights, and occurred several years after MacKinnon's condemnation of Harris. [First paragraph]

Roemer's' 1998 seminal work on equality of opportunity has contributed to the emergence of a theory of justice that is modern, conceptually clear and easy to mobilize in policy design. In this paper,we apply Roemer's theory to education policy. We first analyze the reallocations of educational expenditure required to equalize opportunities (taken to be test scores close to the end of compulsoryeducation). Using Brazilian data, we find that implementing an equal-opportunity policy across pupils of different socio-economic background, by using per-pupil spending as the instrument, andensuring that nobody receives less that 1/3 of the current national average, requires multiplying by 8.6 the current level of spending on the lowest achieving pupils. This result is driven by the extremely lowelasticity of scores to per-pupil spending. As such, it implies large reallocations that are probably politically unacceptable. By exploiting our knowledge of the education production function we then identifyways of reducing financial reallocations needed to achieve equality of opportunity. We show that the simultaneous redistribution of monetary and nonmonetary inputs, like peer group quality (i.e.,desegregation) and school effectiveness (i.e., equalizing access to the best-run schools), considerably reduces – by almost 50% – themagnitude of financial redistribution needed. Implementing an EOp policy would not come at any particular cost (or benefit) in terms of efficiency.

Focus sur la ou les notions d'"égalité" en droit européen et en droit luxembourgeois des sociétés