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Equality is a political and moral ideal that refers to some universal condition thought to be shared by human beings. Since this inherent equality is often thought to have been corrupted by a self-interested secular world, this essay shifts the emphasis from equality as a timeless concept to equalization as a historical process.

Best practice Equality @ PoliTo presented into the First Benchmarking Round session within the 2nd face-to-face meeting of the W-STEM ERASMUS + Capacity-building in Higher Education European Project (Ref. 598923-EPP-1-2018-1-ES-EPPKA2-CBHE-JP), which was held in Uninorte, Barranquilla (Colombia), 27-29 November 2019. ; W-STEM (Building the future of Latin America: engaging women into STEM) is a project funded under European Union ERASMUS + Capacity-building in Higher Education Programme. (598923-EPP-1-2018-1-ES-EPPKA2-CBHE-JP) The European Commission support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsi­ble for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

Paul Spicker's book takes the three founding principles of the French Revolution - Liberty, Equality, Fraternity - and examines how they relate to social policy today. The book considers the political and moral dimensions of a wide range of social policies, and offers a different way of thinking about each subject from the way it is usually analysed.

This article follows the development of a European Union gender equality regime through three broad periods: equal treatment policies, positive action measures, and Gender Mainstreaming. The policy-making process entails conflict between competing policy frames; unequal resources behind each secures the dominance of an economic frame. Strategical framing practices have been employed by equality advocates to overcome this disadvantage. This article traces the gradual shifts in meaning within each period until equality goals are integrated into the dominant economic policy frame. It concludes that equality advocates need to engage in deeper analyses of power in order to sustain attention to equality goals over longer periods of time.

This article follows the development of a European Union gender equality regime through three broad periods: equal treatment policies, positive action measures, and Gender Mainstreaming. The policy-making process entails conflict between competing policy frames; unequal resources behind each secures the dominance of an economic frame. Strategical framing practices have been employed by equality advocates to overcome this disadvantage. This article traces the gradual shifts in meaning within each period until equality goals are integrated into the dominant economic policy frame. It concludes that equality advocates need to engage in deeper analyses of power in order to sustain attention to equality goals over longer periods of time. Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v5i1.201

Equality Without Tiers offers a comprehensive analysis of tiered equal protection review and argues that the current framework has outlived its utility and functions in many respects as a barrier to equality. As an alternative to the current ossified test, the article develops and tests a single standard of review aimed to provide a more finely calibrated response to the complexities of discrimination in the 21st century. To support this argument, the article focuses first on tensions in the current tiered framework for equal protection review, pointing to, among others, the Court's variously weak and strong approaches to rational basis review and the largely acontextual approach to affirmative action. Then, after identifying class legislation as the key focus of equal protection analysis, the article distills a single standard from the Court's extant equal protection jurisprudence. With this standard in place, I argue, both theoretically and through application of the standard to the several equal protection cases decided during the past three decades, that a single standard can enable sufficiently careful review to capture prejudice-infested classifications while not becoming excessively rigid. Against this background, the article concludes that the tiers may be understood best as a transitional analytic tool to assist courts in identifying impermissible bias in once-natural classifications. At the same time, I argue that the analysis prompted by the tiers is unduly simplistic and that serious scholarly consideration should be given to the possibilities for equal protection review opened up by a single review standard.

The aim of this research report has been to examine the extent to which international human rights law has affected the enshrinement of LGB rights in Australia. It considers the links between four key areas regarding the historical provision of LGB rights in Australia: • The international human rights regime; • The movement for sexual equality; • The Australian legislative framework; and, • The Australian political and policy context. It is clear from this report that recent decades have witnessed a progressive shift regarding the recognition of LGB rights in Australia. This report identifies three broad categories of sexually law reform: • The repeal of laws prohibiting homosexual sex across the country; • Legislation at both the federal and sub-national level making discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation illegal; and, • The Commonwealth extending legal recognition and the same entitlements as heterosexual defacto couples to same-sex couples and their families. The purpose of this paper is not to campaign for LGB rights but, rather, to review the impact that Australia's international human rights obligations has had on the content of domestic law and policy with respect to LGB people. Due to the scope of the report, it was not possible to evaluate the extent to which Australia has ensured effective and available enforcement mechanisms for the protection of LGB rights.

Gender Equality has not yet been achieved in many western countries. Switzerland in particular has failed as a forerunner in integrating women in politics and economy. Taking Switzerland as a case study, the authors critically reflect the state of gender equality in different policy areas such as education, family and labour. The collection of articles reveals how gender policies and cultural contexts interact with social practices of gender (in)equality. They also outline the gender(ed) effects of recent changes and reform strategies for scientists, politicians and practitioners.

This paper was presented as the Seventh Annual Anthony Kennedy lecture at the Lewis & Clark School of Law on September 23, 2015. My topic was Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in the recent Obergefell case, recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. In the first part of my lecture, I placed the Obergefell opinion in context, taking into account Justice Kennedy's place on the current Court, and his past jurisprudence. In particular, I noted that while Justice Kennedy is undoubtedly the co-called "swing Justice" on the Roberts Court, he is quite different from past swing Justices such as Sandra Day O'Connor and Lewis Powell. The latter were considered to be moderate pragmatists, lacking strong judicial philosophies. Not so for Justice Kennedy. From his first years on the Court, his jurisprudence has been notable for a passionate commitment to Liberty in all of its aspect, and his firm belief that protection for Liberty is intrinsically tied to protection of individual Dignity. This commitment appears in his privacy jurisprudence of course (culminating in Obergefell), but also in other areas including notably free. Moreover, unlike his colleagues, Justice Kennedy's commitment to liberty transcends political boundaries, encompassing such "liberal" Liberty claims as abortion and the free speech rights of pornographers, and such "conservative" claims as property rights and commercial speech. I then raised some doubts about the reasoning in Obergefell. I noted that the plaintiffs in the case had raised both Due Process (i.e., Liberty), and Equal Protection (i.e., Equality) claims, and the Court's formulation of the questions presented preserved both. Yet Kennedy's opinion is almost all Liberty, with a tiny dollop of Equality. I suggested that this emphasis is probably a product of Kennedy's own preferences and comfort levels. While Justice Kennedy has always been a strong advocate of Liberty claims, his relationship to Equality is more ambivalent. He unquestionably is firmly committed to nondiscrimination principles, and even (unlike his conservative colleagues) committed to racial integration. However, he has demonstrated -- notably in the Parents Involved decision -- grave discomfort with policies that classify individuals based on qualities such as race. Indeed, this discomfort ties into his commitment to Dignity, because he sees such typecasting as itself in consistent with individual Dignity. As a consequence, Liberty must have seemed the easier path to take. Ultimately, however, I do believe this choice was a mistake, for several reasons. First, I think that jurisprudentially, Equality is the stronger argument. The Court's entire substantive due process jurisprudence, which was the basis of the Due Process holding in Obergefell, rests on somewhat shaky foundations, given its lack of textual grounding. Equal Protection, on the other hand, is a well-established, textually based doctrine; and the argument for extending heightened scrutiny to discrimination against LGBT individuals strikes me as extremely powerful, under existing precedent. Second, an Equality based holding would have been broader, granting more protections to sexual minorities than a narrow decision focused on marriage. Third, it is possible that an Equality based holding would have generated less intense opposition than a holding that redefines marriage (though this is admittedly speculative). Finally, I also believe that Justice Jackson was correct in his argument, in the Railway Express case, that in a democracy, equality-based constitutional decisions are generally preferable to liberty-based ones, because they interfere less with legislative authority.

Paternalistic interventions restrict individuals' liberty or autonomy so as to guide their decisions towards options that are more beneficial for them than the ones they would choose in the absence of such interventions. Although some philosophers have emphasised that there is a case for justifiable paternalism in certain circumstances, much of contemporary moral and political philosophy works from a strong presumption against paternalistic interventions. However, Richard Arneson has argued that there are egalitarian reasons that support the case for paternalism: paternalistic interventions can protect poor decision-makers from making 'bad' choices, thus preventing inequalities between them and those with better decision-making skills. This paper seeks to clarify and advance our understanding of the egalitarian argument for paternalism. Arneson's argument adds an important and often neglected dimension to the debate about paternalism but also raises a number of questions about equality, paternalism and the relationship between the two.

The nurturing that produces love, care, and solidarity constitutes a discrete social system of affective relations. Affective relations are not social derivatives, subordinate to economic, political, or cultural relations in matters of social justice. Rather, they are productive, materialist human relations that constitute people mentally, emotionally, physically, and socially. As love laboring is highly gendered, and is a form of work that is both inalienable and noncommodifiable, affective relations are therefore sites of political import for social justice. We argue that it is impossible to have gender justice without relational justice in loving and caring. Moreover, if love is to thrive as a valued social practice, public policies need to be directed by norms of love, care, and solidarity rather than norms of capital accumulation. To promote equality in the affective domains of loving and caring, we argue for a four-dimensional rather than a three-dimensional model of social justice as proposed by Nancy Fraser (2008). Such a model would align relational justice, especially in love laboring, with the equalization of resources, respect, and representation.

The immediate impact of Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger is nothing short of momentous. Not only do the Supreme Court's most recent affirmative action decisions settle the deeply contested question of whether race may be considered in higher education admissions, but they also, more broadly, envision permissible and impermissible uses of racial classifications in that context, and surface new, challenging questions about the official use of affirmative action. Yet Grutter and Gratz are also momentous for what they tell us about the long-term struggle over the structure of equal protection doctrine. This struggle, which has been under way for decades, will affect the future of equality analyses far beyond affirmative action. Specifically, two interrelated developments have shaken the foundations of the Court's three-tiered equal protection framework. First, as evidenced in Grutter and Gratz, the categorical application of rigorous review to suspect classifications has become its own battleground, complete with disputes over whether context should affect the strictness of strict scrutiny. Second, at the other end of the equal protection spectrum, the Court's rational basis jurisprudence wavers between its typical deference to government decisionmaking and the occasional insistence on meaningful review, without a unifying theory for meshing the two seemingly distinct approaches.

This contribution to the Constance Baker Motley Symposium examines the future of civil rights reform at a time in which longstanding limitations of the antidiscrimination law framework, as well as newer pressures such as the rise of economic populism, are placing stress on the traditional antidiscrimination project. This Essay explores the openings that nevertheless remain in public law for confronting persistent forms of exclusion and makes the case for greater pluralism in equality law frameworks. In particular, this Essay examines innovations that widen the range of regulatory levers for promoting inclusion, such as competitive grants, tax incentives, contests for labor agreements and licenses, requirements attached to land-use development, and scoring systems for public contracts that reward entities for pursuing equity goals. Relying on these types of regulatory incentives and levers expands the mechanisms typically employed to advance integration and equity and builds on tools available not just at the federal level but also at the state and local level. Even in the present political environment, this Essay argues there is utility in advancing new regulatory regimes that move beyond the formalist, liberalist assumptions of traditional civil rights regimes and that seek to link questions of identity inclusion to economic inequality and the distribution of public goods.

Gender equality is a vital aspect of the European integration process. Although specific legislation concerning gender issues was included in the establishing Treaties, in the Charter of fundamental rights and in a dozen other directives, non-discriminatory principle has also been strengthened by the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union which formed a judgment in more than 200 cases. Nowadays, the EU equality legislation has moved far beyond basic gender issues, and this is also discussed in the article. It focuses not only on the fundamentals of EU legislation concerning gender equality but also on the level of its implementation and its most important limitations. Such considerations are broadened by a discussion on the EU actions which may be also treated as the implementation of non-discriminatory legislation.

The aim of this paper is to outline the cornerstones of a macroeconomic model to analyse the various channels through which gender equality can influence growth and employment outcomes. The paper first introduces the basic Post-Keynesian/neo-Kaleckian demand-led growth model, and contrasts this with the mainstream neoclassical growth model. Then we present the main features of an extended model that incorporates gender relevant categories in the behavioural functions that determine private aggregate demand (consumption, investment), and the role of the government in a model with endogenous changes in productivity and employment. The paper concludes by a discussion of the policy implications.