Suchergebnisse

Abstract The Malaysian society, one of the successful and managed multi-ethnic societies, is replete of imbalances and there still underlie the racial and ethnic disproportions in geographical dwellings, educational and professional fields, and economic and political roles. The modern racial relation in Malaysia is the legacy of pre-colonial and colonial period of history dating back to fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The unstable demographic balance, the unrestricted immigration policy or the policy of divide and rule by the colonial masters contributed besides other reasons toward the troubled relations between ethnic communities of Malaysia- Malays, Chinese, Indians, and others. But the way the respective Malaysian governments have managed such sour relationship in their socio-economic and political spheres is the lesson that all multiethnic states can learn from.

This article examines how the relationship between ethnic polarization and civil war could be moderated by different degrees of ethnic salience. Using an agent-based computational model, we analyze the polarization-conflict relationship when ethnic salience is "fixed"-high for every member of two nominally rival ethnic groups- and "variable"-permitted to vary across individuals as a function of relative income. We find that (1) when salience is fixed, conflict onset is twice as high at low levels of polarization compared to when salience is permitted to vary, with the difference decreasing at high levels of polarization; (2) the relationship between conflict onset and the range over which we calculate variable salience is positive and robust for low and moderate levels of polarization; (3) the relationship between polarization and conflict onset is robust even under minority domination, if one holds salience fixed; and (4) holding ethnic salience fixed effectively amplifies the negative effect of polarization on economic performance. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright.]

AbstractPeru, in contrast to neighbouring Bolivia and Ecuador, has neither an important indigenous party nor a strong indigenous movement. Nevertheless, in recent years a growing gap has emerged in the voting patterns of indigenous and non-indigenous areas. This article maintains that this gap has developed because some Peruvian politicians, including Alberto Fujimori, Alejandro Toledo and Ollanta Humala, successfully wooed indigenous voters with a combination of ethnic and populist appeals. Like traditional populist leaders, they denounced the political elites, focused their campaigns on the poor and presented themselves as the saviours of Peru, but also forged ties to indigenous leaders, invoked indigenous symbols and embraced some ethnic demands. Although neither Fujimori, nor Toledo, nor Humala self-identified as indigenous, they successfully presented themselves as more ethnically proximate to the indigenous population than their main competitors, who represented the white Lima elite.

This article makes theoretical and empirical contributions towards understanding the form and function of ethnic quotas that are applied in various countries around the world. It advances a classification scheme for sorting through the broad variation in these electoral mechanisms. Initial exploration suggests that variation among ethnic quota schemes corresponds more with regime type, and less with differences in ethnic demography. Nevertheless, particular rules do operate differently in relation to ethnic diversity and inter-group conflict. Different rules also appear to have an impact on representational dynamics, including the capacity of minority ethnic representatives to exercise legislative influence on matters of concern to their community.

This article examines how the relationship between ethnic polarization and civil war could be moderated by different degrees of ethnic salience. Using an agent-based computational model, we analyze the polarization—conflict relationship when ethnic salience is ``fixed''—high for every member of two nominally rival ethnic groups— and ``variable''—permitted to vary across individuals as a function of relative income. We find that (1) when salience is fixed, conflict onset is twice as high at low levels of polarization compared to when salience is permitted to vary, with the difference decreasing at high levels of polarization; (2) the relationship between conflict onset and the range over which we calculate variable salience is positive and robust for low and moderate levels of polarization; (3) the relationship between polarization and conflict onset is robust even under minority domination, if one holds salience fixed; and (4) holding ethnic salience fixed effectively amplifies the negative effect of polarization on economic performance.