In: International political science review: the journal of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) = Revue internationale de science politique, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 12-26
This article makes theoretical and empirical contributions towards understanding the form and function of ethnic quotas that are applied in various countries around the world. It advances a classification scheme for sorting through the broad variation in these electoral mechanisms. Initial exploration suggests that variation among ethnic quota schemes corresponds more with regime type, and less with differences in ethnic demography. Nevertheless, particular rules do operate differently in relation to ethnic diversity and inter-group conflict. Different rules also appear to have an impact on representational dynamics, including the capacity of minority ethnic representatives to exercise legislative influence on matters of concern to their community.
A question that has puzzled students of ethnic politics can be stated as follows: in the face of increasing assimilation why do ethnics continue to vote as ethnics with about the same frequency as in earlier decades? On the basis of his New Haven study, Robert Dahl observes that "… in spite of growing assimilation, ethnic factors continued to make themselves felt with astonishing tenacity." Nevertheless, he asserts, "the strength of ethnic ties as a factor in local politics surely must recede." Dahl sets up a "three-stage" model to describe how political assimilation will follow a more general social assimilation. However, one of his co-researchers, Raymond Wolfinger, demonstrates in a recent article in this Review that ethnic voting patterns persist into the second and third generations, and that "at least in New Haven, all the social changes of the 1940's and 1950's do not seem to have reduced the political importance of national origins." The same observation can be made of religious-ethnic identities, for as Wolfinger notes, citing data from the Elmira study, social mobility in no way diminishes the religious factor as a determinant of voting behavior; in fact, in the case of upper and middle class Catholics and Protestants, religion seems to assume a heightened importance as a voting determinant. Wolfinger marshals evidence to support the arresting proposition that, melting pot or not, ethnic voting may be with us for a long time to come, a finding which craves explanation.Part of the reason for the persistence of ethnic voting may rest in the political system itself. Rather than being a purely dependent variable, the political system, i.e., party, precinct workers, candidates, elections, patronage, etc., continues to rely upon ethnic strategies such as those extended to accommodate the claims of newly-arrived ethnic middle-class leadership; as a mediator and mobilizer of minority symbols and interests, the political system must be taken into account.
This article examines how the relationship between ethnic polarization and civil war could be moderated by different degrees of ethnic salience. Using an agent-based computational model, we analyze the polarization-conflict relationship when ethnic salience is "fixed"-high for every member of two nominally rival ethnic groups- and "variable"-permitted to vary across individuals as a function of relative income. We find that (1) when salience is fixed, conflict onset is twice as high at low levels of polarization compared to when salience is permitted to vary, with the difference decreasing at high levels of polarization; (2) the relationship between conflict onset and the range over which we calculate variable salience is positive and robust for low and moderate levels of polarization; (3) the relationship between polarization and conflict onset is robust even under minority domination, if one holds salience fixed; and (4) holding ethnic salience fixed effectively amplifies the negative effect of polarization on economic performance. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright.]