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"March 5,2001"--P. iii. ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 19-21). ; Photocopy. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This article summarizes research on ethnic conflict in the former USSR. Various appealing but unsatisfactory typologies have been proposed, focusing on the subjects of the conflict (actors, goals, motivations); on the environment of the conflict (territory, language, socio-economy, environment, & resources), or on characteristics of the conflict (scale, length, form of fighting, losses, aftermath). Most conflict typologies reflect better the thinking & political agenda of the typologists than the actual social panorama. Conflict theories & data presentations contain strong prescriptive elements & may even generate new conflict. For the conflicts in the former USSR, existing typologies fail to grasp several major factors, such as the strategies & behavior of individuals, social & political disorder, power & status aspirations, elite manipulations, & outside interventions. This article discusses data on human & material losses in nine violent conflicts: Karabakh, Fergana, Osh, South Ossetia, Transdniestria, Tajik, Abkhazia, Ingush-Ossetian, & Chechen. In conclusion, a plea is made for writing between theory & data, without sacrificing sensitive & self-reflective narration, in order to produce new insights & new knowledge. 2 Tables, 61 References. Adapted from the source document.

Though both joumalists and the academic literature on ethnic conflict give the opposite impression, peaceful and even cooperative relations between ethnic groups are far more common than is large-scale violence. We seek to explain this norm of interethnic peace and how it occasionally breaks down, arguing that formal and informal institutions usually work to contain or "cauterize" disputes between individual members of different groups. Using a social matching game model, we show that local-level interethnic cooperation can be supported in essentially two ways. In spiral equilibria, disputes between individuals are correctly expected, to spiral rapidly beyond the two parties, and fear of this induces cooperation "on the equilibrium path". In in-group policing equilibria, individuals ignore transgressions by members of the other group, correctly expecting that the culprits will be identified and sanctioned by their own ethnic brethren. A range of examples suggests that both equilibria occur empirically and have properties expected from the theoretical analysis. (American Political Science Review / FUB)