Suchergebnisse

Argues that the executive competence of the European Commission should be expanded, the legislative powers of the European Parliament reinforced, and a senate of the states created to assure the constitutional future of the European Union. Summary in English p. 231.

The European Commission's role seems to have declined in the past few years. However, the autonomy & the influence of the European Commission cannot be properly evaluated by classical integration theories. New European studies are establishing new theoretical models & new conceptual frameworks to correct biases that may result from a statocentric analysis. Integration studies are being replaced by governance studies. This change in focus allows for more pertinent evaluation of the relative weight of European institutions, lamely the European Commission, consolidating its central position in he communitarian system. References. Adapted from the source document.

The relationship between Brazil & the European Union has been hostage to the EU-Mercosul relations & the negotiations on the association agreement between the two regional multilateral institutions. However, the European Commission has recognized that relations with Brazil are especially relevant & thus moved to support the first EU-Brazil summit. This summit, convened by the Portuguese Presidency, has established a strategic partnership with Brazil & also bolstered the bilateral relations between Portugal & Brazil. Adapted from the source document.

All elections have characteristics associated with the context in which they are held. European elections in 2014 do not escape this rule. In relation to European elections that occurred in the past, there are at least two aspects that contribute to the specificity of the event schedule. First, and the first time voters will elect a European Parliament (EP) with enhanced powers, after the entry into force in 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon. The EP will have a greater capacity for intervention in some key areas, such as the free circulation of people, international trade agreements and the reform of the agrarian policy. Besides that, for the first time will also elect 'formally' the president of the European Commission. In this sense, the political majority that will leave the next European elections will have a fundamental weight to influence an important set of policies, including the annual budget and the policies associated with the fiscal compact. Adapted from the source document.

O Mercado Único Digital é "o novo mundo" na União Europeia – sendo perspetivado como um interesse público primário porque é uma das formas que a União encontrou para se tornar financeiramente mais atrativa e chamativa à fixação de inovação. A fim de atingir estes objetivos, várias soluções normativas aparecem como desadequadas ao novo período que a União Europeia está a viver. Especialmente no que diz respeito às comunicações eletrónicas, o seu enquadramento legal e regulatório precisava de ser revisto e a proposta de um novo Código para as Comunicações Eletrónicas foi apresentada pela Comissão Europeia. Entre outras soluções inovadoras, pretende a redefinição do serviço universal europeu, para o atualizar às soluções de conectividade do nosso tempo, e visa a revisão do papel do Organismo dos Reguladores Europeus das Comunicações Eletrónicas conferindo-lhe competências mais amplas no âmbito da resolução transnacional de litígios e de articulação entre as instituições europeias e as autoridades reguladoras nacionais. Estas dimensões repensam o modelo regulatório social e institucional e este texto pretende perceber as suas potencialidades e fragilidades. ; Digital Single Market is the new world in the EU and it is perceived as primary public interest because it was one of the ways the EU found to become more financially attractive and better suited to innovation. To accomplish that, several legal solutions appear to be unsuitable for the present time EU is living in. Concerning electronic communications, its legal and regulatory framework needed to be recasted and a new Electronic Communications Code proposal was made by the European Commission. Among many innovative solutions, it aims at redefining EU universal service, to update it to connectivity solutions of our time, and at revising the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications' role, granting it further competences on crossborder dispute resolution and articulation between European institutions and national regulatory authorities. These dimensions rethink both social and institutional regulatory framework and this text wants to understand what their strengths and weaknesses are.

The aim of the present article is to assess the main aspects of the institutionalization of party politics at the European Union level. The Political Parties at European Level (PPELs) originated outside the European institutions and were basically, before the approval of Regulation 2004‑2003, transnational federations of national political parties. The introduction of public funding from the eu budget to the PPELs aimed to institutionalize and reinforce these organizations. However, the influence of ppels in the European political sphere is still limited. Two institutional and political changes – namely the approval of a new Statute for European Parties and the nomination of candidates for the Presidency of the EU Commission – have been implemented, but their consequences on the consolidation of PPELs still need to be verified empirically.

A refundação do regulamento n.º 44/2001 pelo regulamento n.º 1215/2012 pautase pela observância, em absoluto, no espaço da União Europeia, dos princípios da confiança recíproca entre Estados-Membros na administração da justiça e do acesso à justiça dos cidadãos que nela residem e circulam. Numa União marcada pelas liberdades fundamentais de circulação e pela existência de um mercado interno, estes princípios justificam que as decisões judiciais proferidas num Estado-Membro sejam automaticamente reconhecidas e executadas, noutro Estado-Membro, exceto em caso de impugnação por parte do demandado. Seria difícil imaginar a prossecução de uma cooperação e uma integração judiciárias sem confiança – esta tem de ser criada entre tribunais de diferentes Estados-Membros, e de ser sentida pelos próprios cidadãos europeus, de modo a que possam ver que a Europa está ativamente à procura de melhorar as suas condições de vida e de trabalho. A Comissão Europeia envidou esforços construtivos para uma supressão do exequatur, querendo que o processo de reconhecimento e de execução ora previsto no regulamento n.º 1215/2012 fosse mais simplificado (até propôs a exclusão da cláusula de ordem pública, o que não foi adotado). É necessário analisar como o Tribunal de Justiça interpreta as regras relativas à recusa de reconhecimento ou de execução de sentenças emanadas noutros Estados-Membros, para perceber se a tutela jurisdicional efetiva é observada pelo regulamento n.º 1215/2012. ; The Brussels I Regulation's re-foundation by the New Brussels I Regulation was thought to secure reciprocal trust on justice administration among Member States and to grant full access to justice for those who inhabit and circulate in its territory. In a Union characterized by circulation freedoms and an internal market existence, those principles justify a situation in which judgments ruled by a Member State's court are automatically recognised and enforced, in other Member-State, except when the defendant evokes the rules on denial of judgments' recognition and enforcement. There would not be judicial cooperation and integration's prosecution without trust – trust must exist among Member States' courts and it must be felt by EU citizens so they can acknowledge that EU is actively seeking to improve their life and working conditions. The European Commission made constructive efforts to promote an exequatur's abolition, making recognition and enforcement proceedings on the New Brussels I Regulation simpler (it even proposed to remove the "public policy" clause, which was not accepted). It is necessary to analyse howthe CJEU applies the rules on denial of judgments' recognition and enforcement to perceive if the principle of an effective judicial protection is fulfilled under New Brussels I Regulation.

Biomedical and biopharmaceutical research : jornal de investigação biomédica e biofarmacêutica ; Face à crise instalada com o deflagrar da pandemia associada ao novo coronavírus SARS-CoV-2, ao nível de propagação do vírus e à escassez de dispositivos médicos necessários ao seu combate, foi estabelecido um regime excecional relativamente aos procedimentos de avaliação da conformidade e de fiscalização do mercado, aplicável a estes dispositivos, através da Recomendação (UE) 2020/403 da Comissão Europeia de13 março, que foi adotada por Portugal através da publicação do Decreto-Lei n.º 14-E/2020 de 13 de abril. É importante que a regular produção de orientações emanadas pelo INFARMED durante a pandemia e a cooperação de outras entidades nacionais (Ministério da Economia, Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Ensino Superior e Indústria Nacional e Direção Geral de Saúde), de apoio aos fabricantes e importadores, se reflitam no desenvolvimento do sistema produtivo português, permitindo promover o reconhecimento internacional da indústria nacional e o fácil acesso a outros mercados. Uma análise detalhada de todas as variáveis que incluí neste artigo de opinião e a apresentação de propostas, na perspetiva da definição de uma visão estratégica nacional, na área do desenvolvimento e produção de dispositivos médicos, de forma a potenciar as ideias e ganhos que resultaram da resposta à crise, será objeto de estudo a publicar oportunamente. Palavras-chave: INFARMED. Legislação Dispositivos Médicos, COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2 ; In view of the scarcity of medical devices necessary to combat the outbreak crisis caused by the new SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic, an exceptional regime regarding applicable device conformity assessment procedures and market surveillance was established through Recommendation (EU) 2020/403 of the European Commission of 13 March. This was adopted by Portugal through the publication of Decree-Law no. 14-E / 2020 of 13 April. Many guidelines were issued during the pandemic by INFARMED and with the cooperation ...

The aim of the present article is to assess the main aspects of the institutionalization of party politics at the European Union level. The Political Parties at European Level (PPELs) originated outside the European institutions and were basically, before the approval of Regulation 2004-2003, transnational federations of national political parties. The introduction of public funding from the EU budget to the PPELs aimed to institutionalize and reinforce these organizations. However, the influence of PPELs in the European political sphere is still limited. Two institutional and political changes - namely the approval of a new Statute for European Parties and the nomination of candidates for the Presidency of the EU Commission - have been implemented, but their consequences on the consolidation of PPELs still need to be verified empirically. Adapted from the source document.

The Lisbon Treaty settled a new balance of power within the EU political process, through the so-called institutional reform. However, the Lisbon balance of power was changed by the Euro crisis, which saw the strengthening of member states' influence within the Union. The greater role taken by the European Council on crisis management went along with a new balance of power between member states, with Germany acting as a hegemonic power, and a group of countries taking political benefits from the crisis. The article also focuses on how the Euro crisis impacted on the role of the Commission and how the institution interacted with the new balance of powers. Adapted from the source document.

The present document contains the texts related to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Executive Council, the Commission and the Permanent Representatives Committee as requested by the Lusaka Summit. These texts are the syn thesis of the outcome of the brainstorming session held on 13 and 14 October and chaired by myself, the informal briefing session of the European and Ethiopian Experts, the internal discussion within the two Sub-Committees were I set up and which were co-chaired by the Assistant-Secretaries General, the deliberations of the meeting of the Coordination Committee which I chaired on 23 and 24 November and in which the Assistant-Secretaries General, the Directors of different Department, the Heads of Division, the Legal Counsel and all the consultants working in the General Secretariat participated. This document is, therefore, the sum total of the successive value added of the above-mentioned meetings. By submitting it for consideration to the representatives of Member States, I am confident that it will be given the greatest attention.