This article is devoted to investigation of problems of implementation of article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. On the basis of the social research carried out by the author a presumption has been made that the legislative endows certain social privileges, marks officers of statutory institutions out of other social groups, however, does not give enough attention as to their human and civil rights. The article comprehensively analyses officers' right to defence, moral support during disciplinary proceedings, in when imposing of statutory reprimands (sanctions). A distinguishing feature of the 21st century is united and democratic Europe where fundamental democratic values, supremacy of law and human rights, are respected. Due to peculiarities of institution activities officers inevitably encounter restrictions of their civil rights, although provisions of the Convention are supposed to be fully applied towards them and problems of their implementation are to be solved on the basis of legal acts and recommendations of the community law. Thus, when implementing human rights in internal administration of statutory institutions, it is needed to solve controversial questions where unified powers of scientists and experts of public administration are necessary.
This article is devoted to investigation of problems of implementation of article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. On the basis of the social research carried out by the author a presumption has been made that the legislative endows certain social privileges, marks officers of statutory institutions out of other social groups, however, does not give enough attention as to their human and civil rights. The article comprehensively analyses officers' right to defence, moral support during disciplinary proceedings, in when imposing of statutory reprimands (sanctions). A distinguishing feature of the 21st century is united and democratic Europe where fundamental democratic values, supremacy of law and human rights, are respected. Due to peculiarities of institution activities officers inevitably encounter restrictions of their civil rights, although provisions of the Convention are supposed to be fully applied towards them and problems of their implementation are to be solved on the basis of legal acts and recommendations of the community law. Thus, when implementing human rights in internal administration of statutory institutions, it is needed to solve controversial questions where unified powers of scientists and experts of public administration are necessary.
Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights is devoted for the protection and respect of family and private life. Talking about family life, it is important to say that the definition of it have evolved for years creating more and more legal issues. The Court has considered the family to include husband and wife and children who are dependent on them, including illegitimate and adopted children. It seems that de facto family ties can arise where parties are living together outside marriage and children born out of such relationships form part of the family unit from the moment of birth and by the very fact of it. The family ties exist even where the parents are not living together at the time of the child's birth. In some circumstances, relations with grandparents may be protected under Article 8. More remote relationships are generally not close enough to consti¬tute family relationships protected by Article 8. There is, however, some slender evidence to suggest that a broader view is being taken of what constitutes the family. Engagement does not in itself constitute family life, but the relationship between a prisoner and his fiancee falls within private life. The same is true of transsexuals couples. Implementing one of those rights, arise a violation of other rights, embodied in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. The conflict usually is between articles 8 and 10. The freedom of expression is called as the essential foundations of democratic society. The media has a "public watch dog" function, as it mentioned in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Media has a task to import not only information which is favourably received or regarded as inoffensive, but also offend, chocked or disturbed information. Society has a right to obtain information about political matters or about matters of public interest. This freedom includes two components: freedom to receive information and freedom to impart them. These rights must be used in a such way that they do not constitute the violation of private life. Under the Convention, right to respect family or private life embodied in the article 8 and freedom of expression embodied in the Article 10 are not absolute. They state some restrictions and limitations. The interference is legitimate when it is necessary in a democratic society, interest of national security, prevention or disorder of crime and other. This is so called negative obligations. The problems of the protection of human rights can arise when the state fails to take such the obligations, for instance to enact some particular law – so called positive obligations. Thus it could the violation not only when the state fails to take positive obligations, but also when such the law trespasses the limit of the proportionality taking negative obligations. The problems about private life are coming out of its changing concept in XXI century. New technologies have vested the society with new instruments and made individuals' lives more convenient. Evolution of technologies and social life enhanced individuals to access to information and knowledge; thus it inevitably may lead to a situation when members of society recognize the right to know, right to communicate, right to express views and contribute to the society as a more vital and valuable than traditional and straightforward "right to be left alone". Legally speaking, of all the European human rights in the international catalogue, privacy is perhaps the most difficult to define and circumscribe. Nowadays, a person has less control on his personal information, because private life and privacy has become less important as to receive information and freedom to impart it. What's why Europe and all the world confronts with big problems of violation of human rights in context of the protection of personal data The solution of these problems could be self regulation and legislation of various legal acts.
Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights is devoted for the protection and respect of family and private life. Talking about family life, it is important to say that the definition of it have evolved for years creating more and more legal issues. The Court has considered the family to include husband and wife and children who are dependent on them, including illegitimate and adopted children. It seems that de facto family ties can arise where parties are living together outside marriage and children born out of such relationships form part of the family unit from the moment of birth and by the very fact of it. The family ties exist even where the parents are not living together at the time of the child's birth. In some circumstances, relations with grandparents may be protected under Article 8. More remote relationships are generally not close enough to consti¬tute family relationships protected by Article 8. There is, however, some slender evidence to suggest that a broader view is being taken of what constitutes the family. Engagement does not in itself constitute family life, but the relationship between a prisoner and his fiancee falls within private life. The same is true of transsexuals couples. Implementing one of those rights, arise a violation of other rights, embodied in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. The conflict usually is between articles 8 and 10. The freedom of expression is called as the essential foundations of democratic society. The media has a "public watch dog" function, as it mentioned in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Media has a task to import not only information which is favourably received or regarded as inoffensive, but also offend, chocked or disturbed information. Society has a right to obtain information about political matters or about matters of public interest. This freedom includes two components: freedom to receive information and freedom to impart them. These rights must be used in a such way that they do not constitute the violation of private life. Under the Convention, right to respect family or private life embodied in the article 8 and freedom of expression embodied in the Article 10 are not absolute. They state some restrictions and limitations. The interference is legitimate when it is necessary in a democratic society, interest of national security, prevention or disorder of crime and other. This is so called negative obligations. The problems of the protection of human rights can arise when the state fails to take such the obligations, for instance to enact some particular law – so called positive obligations. Thus it could the violation not only when the state fails to take positive obligations, but also when such the law trespasses the limit of the proportionality taking negative obligations. The problems about private life are coming out of its changing concept in XXI century. New technologies have vested the society with new instruments and made individuals' lives more convenient. Evolution of technologies and social life enhanced individuals to access to information and knowledge; thus it inevitably may lead to a situation when members of society recognize the right to know, right to communicate, right to express views and contribute to the society as a more vital and valuable than traditional and straightforward "right to be left alone". Legally speaking, of all the European human rights in the international catalogue, privacy is perhaps the most difficult to define and circumscribe. Nowadays, a person has less control on his personal information, because private life and privacy has become less important as to receive information and freedom to impart it. What's why Europe and all the world confronts with big problems of violation of human rights in context of the protection of personal data The solution of these problems could be self regulation and legislation of various legal acts.
The Master Thesis is devoted to the study of the content of States' obligations stemming from the UN Charter and the ECHR while implementing targeted sanctions imposed by UNSC RESs. The main objectives of the Master Thesis were to analyse the provisions of the UN Charter, the ECHR and the ECtHR's case law and to find out whether it is possible to meet obligations simultaneously under both international legal orders while implementing targeted sanctions; and to establish whether the UN security system and the ECHR have a dialogue or confront each other. The research has shown that Member States to the UN Charter are obliged to implement UNSC RESs concerning targeted sanctions. Moreover, Art. 103 of the UN Charter prioritises «obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter».The ECtHR, while analysing obligations of States' under ECHR when they implemented targeted sanctions in the Al-Jedda, Nada, and Al-Dulimi cases clearly avoided a conflict between legal orders of the UN and the ECHR by using a harmonisation technique. By doing so, the Court created a dialogue between two international legal instruments. However, at the same time, the ECtHR put the burden of balance between the UN Charter and the ECHR on States Parties to the ECHR. Resolutions concerning targeted sanctions usually impose an unconditional obligation on Member States. The actions that States are required to take while implementing UNSC targeted sanctions resolutions are time consuming and de facto States Parties to the ECHR are required to give priority to one of the two legal instruments. Thus, it leads to a confrontation between the ECHR and the UN security system in reality.
The Bosphorus presumption was formed and explicitly applied for the first time in 2005 by the European Court of Human Rights in order to evaluate whether a Member State of the European Union (the EU), by adopting an act which implements EU law, acts in compliance with the Convention. Such issue arose due to a very specific relation between the EU, which is not a party to the Convention, the Member States, each a party to the Convention, and the Convention system. According to the Bosphorus presumption, when a state implements its obligations arising from the membership in the international organization, the State is presumed acting in compliance with the Convention, provided that protection of human rights in that international organization is equivalent to that provided by the Convention. In 2013, the draft agreement on the EU accession to the Convention was negotiated. And although the EU Court of Justice by its Opinion 2/13 postponed the process of the EU accession to the Convention for an indefinite period, the EU primary law still obliges the EU to accede to the Convention. Thus, the question remains whether the EU accession to the Convention is to change the position of the Strasbourg Court on the level of protection of fundamental rights in the EU and further application of the Bosphorus presumption. The objective of this thesis is to examine this presumption and assess the possible effect of the EU accession to the Convention on the existence and application of the Bosphorus presumption. This dissertation analyses application of such presumption as well as arguments supporting or disproving the need for application of the presumption after the EU accession to the Convention and provides probable scenarios of the Bosphorus presumption.
The Bosphorus presumption was formed and explicitly applied for the first time in 2005 by the European Court of Human Rights in order to evaluate whether a Member State of the European Union (the EU), by adopting an act which implements EU law, acts in compliance with the Convention. Such issue arose due to a very specific relation between the EU, which is not a party to the Convention, the Member States, each a party to the Convention, and the Convention system. According to the Bosphorus presumption, when a state implements its obligations arising from the membership in the international organization, the State is presumed acting in compliance with the Convention, provided that protection of human rights in that international organization is equivalent to that provided by the Convention. In 2013, the draft agreement on the EU accession to the Convention was negotiated. And although the EU Court of Justice by its Opinion 2/13 postponed the process of the EU accession to the Convention for an indefinite period, the EU primary law still obliges the EU to accede to the Convention. Thus, the question remains whether the EU accession to the Convention is to change the position of the Strasbourg Court on the level of protection of fundamental rights in the EU and further application of the Bosphorus presumption. The objective of this thesis is to examine this presumption and assess the possible effect of the EU accession to the Convention on the existence and application of the Bosphorus presumption. This dissertation analyses application of such presumption as well as arguments supporting or disproving the need for application of the presumption after the EU accession to the Convention and provides probable scenarios of the Bosphorus presumption.
The Bosphorus presumption was formed and explicitly applied for the first time in 2005 by the European Court of Human Rights in order to evaluate whether a Member State of the European Union (the EU), by adopting an act which implements EU law, acts in compliance with the Convention. Such issue arose due to a very specific relation between the EU, which is not a party to the Convention, the Member States, each a party to the Convention, and the Convention system. According to the Bosphorus presumption, when a state implements its obligations arising from the membership in the international organization, the State is presumed acting in compliance with the Convention, provided that protection of human rights in that international organization is equivalent to that provided by the Convention. In 2013, the draft agreement on the EU accession to the Convention was negotiated. And although the EU Court of Justice by its Opinion 2/13 postponed the process of the EU accession to the Convention for an indefinite period, the EU primary law still obliges the EU to accede to the Convention. Thus, the question remains whether the EU accession to the Convention is to change the position of the Strasbourg Court on the level of protection of fundamental rights in the EU and further application of the Bosphorus presumption. The objective of this thesis is to examine this presumption and assess the possible effect of the EU accession to the Convention on the existence and application of the Bosphorus presumption. This dissertation analyses application of such presumption as well as arguments supporting or disproving the need for application of the presumption after the EU accession to the Convention and provides probable scenarios of the Bosphorus presumption.
The Bosphorus presumption was formed and explicitly applied for the first time in 2005 by the European Court of Human Rights in order to evaluate whether a Member State of the European Union (the EU), by adopting an act which implements EU law, acts in compliance with the Convention. Such issue arose due to a very specific relation between the EU, which is not a party to the Convention, the Member States, each a party to the Convention, and the Convention system. According to the Bosphorus presumption, when a state implements its obligations arising from the membership in the international organization, the State is presumed acting in compliance with the Convention, provided that protection of human rights in that international organization is equivalent to that provided by the Convention. In 2013, the draft agreement on the EU accession to the Convention was negotiated. And although the EU Court of Justice by its Opinion 2/13 postponed the process of the EU accession to the Convention for an indefinite period, the EU primary law still obliges the EU to accede to the Convention. Thus, the question remains whether the EU accession to the Convention is to change the position of the Strasbourg Court on the level of protection of fundamental rights in the EU and further application of the Bosphorus presumption. The objective of this thesis is to examine this presumption and assess the possible effect of the EU accession to the Convention on the existence and application of the Bosphorus presumption. This dissertation analyses application of such presumption as well as arguments supporting or disproving the need for application of the presumption after the EU accession to the Convention and provides probable scenarios of the Bosphorus presumption.
The Bosphorus presumption was formed and explicitly applied for the first time in 2005 by the European Court of Human Rights in order to evaluate whether a Member State of the European Union (the EU), by adopting an act which implements EU law, acts in compliance with the Convention. Such issue arose due to a very specific relation between the EU, which is not a party to the Convention, the Member States, each a party to the Convention, and the Convention system. According to the Bosphorus presumption, when a state implements its obligations arising from the membership in the international organization, the State is presumed acting in compliance with the Convention, provided that protection of human rights in that international organization is equivalent to that provided by the Convention. In 2013, the draft agreement on the EU accession to the Convention was negotiated. And although the EU Court of Justice by its Opinion 2/13 postponed the process of the EU accession to the Convention for an indefinite period, the EU primary law still obliges the EU to accede to the Convention. Thus, the question remains whether the EU accession to the Convention is to change the position of the Strasbourg Court on the level of protection of fundamental rights in the EU and further application of the Bosphorus presumption. The objective of this thesis is to examine this presumption and assess the possible effect of the EU accession to the Convention on the existence and application of the Bosphorus presumption. This dissertation analyses application of such presumption as well as arguments supporting or disproving the need for application of the presumption after the EU accession to the Convention and provides probable scenarios of the Bosphorus presumption.
The Bosphorus presumption was formed and explicitly applied for the first time in 2005 by the European Court of Human Rights in order to evaluate whether a Member State of the European Union (the EU), by adopting an act which implements EU law, acts in compliance with the Convention. Such issue arose due to a very specific relation between the EU, which is not a party to the Convention, the Member States, each a party to the Convention, and the Convention system. According to the Bosphorus presumption, when a state implements its obligations arising from the membership in the international organization, the State is presumed acting in compliance with the Convention, provided that protection of human rights in that international organization is equivalent to that provided by the Convention. In 2013, the draft agreement on the EU accession to the Convention was negotiated. And although the EU Court of Justice by its Opinion 2/13 postponed the process of the EU accession to the Convention for an indefinite period, the EU primary law still obliges the EU to accede to the Convention. Thus, the question remains whether the EU accession to the Convention is to change the position of the Strasbourg Court on the level of protection of fundamental rights in the EU and further application of the Bosphorus presumption. The objective of this thesis is to examine this presumption and assess the possible effect of the EU accession to the Convention on the existence and application of the Bosphorus presumption. This dissertation analyses application of such presumption as well as arguments supporting or disproving the need for application of the presumption after the EU accession to the Convention and provides probable scenarios of the Bosphorus presumption.
The Bosphorus presumption was formed and explicitly applied for the first time in 2005 by the European Court of Human Rights in order to evaluate whether a Member State of the European Union (the EU), by adopting an act which implements EU law, acts in compliance with the Convention. Such issue arose due to a very specific relation between the EU, which is not a party to the Convention, the Member States, each a party to the Convention, and the Convention system. According to the Bosphorus presumption, when a state implements its obligations arising from the membership in the international organization, the State is presumed acting in compliance with the Convention, provided that protection of human rights in that international organization is equivalent to that provided by the Convention. In 2013, the draft agreement on the EU accession to the Convention was negotiated. And although the EU Court of Justice by its Opinion 2/13 postponed the process of the EU accession to the Convention for an indefinite period, the EU primary law still obliges the EU to accede to the Convention. Thus, the question remains whether the EU accession to the Convention is to change the position of the Strasbourg Court on the level of protection of fundamental rights in the EU and further application of the Bosphorus presumption. The objective of this thesis is to examine this presumption and assess the possible effect of the EU accession to the Convention on the existence and application of the Bosphorus presumption. This dissertation analyses application of such presumption as well as arguments supporting or disproving the need for application of the presumption after the EU accession to the Convention and provides probable scenarios of the Bosphorus presumption.
The Bosphorus presumption was formed and explicitly applied for the first time in 2005 by the European Court of Human Rights in order to evaluate whether a Member State of the European Union (the EU), by adopting an act which implements EU law, acts in compliance with the Convention. Such issue arose due to a very specific relation between the EU, which is not a party to the Convention, the Member States, each a party to the Convention, and the Convention system. According to the Bosphorus presumption, when a state implements its obligations arising from the membership in the international organization, the State is presumed acting in compliance with the Convention, provided that protection of human rights in that international organization is equivalent to that provided by the Convention. In 2013, the draft agreement on the EU accession to the Convention was negotiated. And although the EU Court of Justice by its Opinion 2/13 postponed the process of the EU accession to the Convention for an indefinite period, the EU primary law still obliges the EU to accede to the Convention. Thus, the question remains whether the EU accession to the Convention is to change the position of the Strasbourg Court on the level of protection of fundamental rights in the EU and further application of the Bosphorus presumption. The objective of this thesis is to examine this presumption and assess the possible effect of the EU accession to the Convention on the existence and application of the Bosphorus presumption. This dissertation analyses application of such presumption as well as arguments supporting or disproving the need for application of the presumption after the EU accession to the Convention and provides probable scenarios of the Bosphorus presumption.
The advancement of new technologies is radically changing the world. Nowadays society is a transparent society. In recent years, the use of video surveillance cameras (also called Closed Circuit Television, or CCTV) throughout the world has grown to unprecedented levels. And there we find out many problems, concerning protection of an individuals private life. The work discusses the issue of right to private life protection in a context of video surveillance. The right to private life is quite young in world's legitimate system and especially in Lithuanian law system. Personal data protection as a part of privacy right is an aspect of human rights. This proposition is universally accepted. As long ago as 1948, privacy was given recognition in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 1950, privacy was implemented in European Convention of Human Rights. This work is divided into three parts. One of them is talking about a conception of a privacy, separates data protection conception from right to private law, the second one is talking about video surveillance systems in general, their technical capacity, the last one is talking about European Convention of Human Rights and its article 8 as the main principle which is a sound base for European Union and Lithuanian regulation of video surveillance, analysis Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Union, Constitution of Lithuania, Lithuanian Data Protection Law in the context of video surveillance. As the studies of right to privacy (and personal data as a part of it) protection in the context of video surveillance are only making their first steps in Lithuania, these thesis was aiming to explore and define the right to privacy (personal data protection problem) in oder to give firm grounds for the scientific investigations of this field in the future.
The advancement of new technologies is radically changing the world. Nowadays society is a transparent society. In recent years, the use of video surveillance cameras (also called Closed Circuit Television, or CCTV) throughout the world has grown to unprecedented levels. And there we find out many problems, concerning protection of an individuals private life. The work discusses the issue of right to private life protection in a context of video surveillance. The right to private life is quite young in world's legitimate system and especially in Lithuanian law system. Personal data protection as a part of privacy right is an aspect of human rights. This proposition is universally accepted. As long ago as 1948, privacy was given recognition in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 1950, privacy was implemented in European Convention of Human Rights. This work is divided into three parts. One of them is talking about a conception of a privacy, separates data protection conception from right to private law, the second one is talking about video surveillance systems in general, their technical capacity, the last one is talking about European Convention of Human Rights and its article 8 as the main principle which is a sound base for European Union and Lithuanian regulation of video surveillance, analysis Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Union, Constitution of Lithuania, Lithuanian Data Protection Law in the context of video surveillance. As the studies of right to privacy (and personal data as a part of it) protection in the context of video surveillance are only making their first steps in Lithuania, these thesis was aiming to explore and define the right to privacy (personal data protection problem) in oder to give firm grounds for the scientific investigations of this field in the future.