The Italian Presidency of the European Union: An "Abnormal" Semester?
In: Italian politics: a review ; a publication of the Istituto Cattaneo, Band 19, Heft 1
ISSN: 2326-7259
In: Italian politics: a review ; a publication of the Istituto Cattaneo, Band 19, Heft 1
ISSN: 2326-7259
In: Défense nationale et sécurité collective. [Französische Ausgabe], Band 63, Heft 2, S. 11-20
ISSN: 1950-3253, 0336-1489
In: Lusotopie: enjeux contemporains dans les espaces lusophones ; publication annuelle internationale de recherches politiques en science de l'homme, de la société et de l'environnement sur les lieux, pays et communautés d'histoire et de langue officielle ou nationale portugais et luso-créoles ; revue reconnue par le CRNS, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 53-70
ISSN: 1257-0273
In: State of Play, First Semester 2007
World Affairs Online
In: Survey Research Methods, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 45-58
"Recently, there has been growing scientific interest for cross-national survey research. Various scholars have used multilevel techniques to link individual characteristics to aspects of the national context. At first sight, multilevel SEM seems to be a promising tool for this purpose, as it integrates multilevel modeling within a latent variable framework. However, due to the fact that the number of countries in most international surveys does not exceed 30, the application of multilevel SEM in cross-national research is problematic. Taking European Social Survey (ESS) data as a point of departure, this paper uses Monte Carlo studies to assess the estimation accuracy of multilevel SEM with small group sample sizes. The results indicate that a group sample size of 20 - a situation common in cross-national research - does not guarantee accurate estimation at all. Unacceptable amounts of parameter and standard error bias are present for the between-level estimates. Unless the standardized effect is very large (0.75), statistical power for detecting a significant between-level structural effect is seriously lacking. Required group sample sizes depend strongly on the specific interests of the researcher, the expected effect sizes and the complexity of the model. If the between-level model is relatively simple and one is merely interested in the between-level factor structure, a group sample size of 40 could be sufficient. To detect large (more than 0.50) structural effects at the between level, at least 60 groups are required. To have an acceptable probability of detecting smaller effects, more than 100 groups are needed. These guidelines are shown to be quite robust for varying cluster sizes and intra-class correlations (ICCs)." (author's abstract)
Conclusions: This paper argues that an increasingly important aspect of the EU's trade policy is the external impact of internal rules adopted for regulatory rather than trade reasons. The most trade-impeding of these rules tend to cluster where the regulatory differences, particularly with regard to risk management, among the member states are most pronounced. Trade-barriers stemming from such measures are particularly difficult to resolve for two reasons: 1)they may not contravene international rules and 2) there is particularly strong political resistance to policy change. Trade barriers stemming from the EU's regulation of risks may not contravene multilateral rules, because those rules strike a balance between permitting protection and prosecuting protectionism. Such exceptions to free trade are a necessary part of the deal for making extensive behind-the-border liberalisation politically acceptable. In this sense they are an extension of the compromise of 'embedded liberalism' between liberal internationalist orthodoxy and domestic interventionism that permitted the creation of the Bretton Woods System (Ruggie, 1982: 209). This paper, while preliminary and unrepresentative, suggests that both EU and WTO rules favour letting a guilty party go free rather than convicting an innocent. Consequently, governments retain a significant degree of regulatory autonomy despite deeper integration. Even where the EU's measures contravene international rules, the EU has often been resistant to policy change. Although this paper has focused on the EU, such resistance to policy change is not unique to the EU and may be common to more divided systems of government, of which the United States is the other prime example. Political resistance to change and the trade-barriers' roots in profoundly different regulatory approaches mean that negotiated solutions to such trade barriers are highly unlikely. Although governments readily resort to the WTO's binding dispute settlement proceedings in many areas, with respect to such politically sensitive issues they proceed with considerable caution. The related combination of legitimate exceptions to free trade and the cautious prosecution of some regulatory trade barriers by governments mean that a degree of trade friction will be an enduring feature of international trade. Thus 'system friction' would seem to be an inevitable consequence of deeper integration. Arguably, this is not too heavy price to pay for political acceptance of the project of further trade liberalisation.
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In: Est-ovest: rivista di studi sull'integrazione europea, Band 31, Heft 6, S. 17-27
ISSN: 0046-256X
In: Kegan Paul European studies series
This book studies the history of the single, or internal, market of the European Union since its beginnings after the Second World War until the end of 2000. The perspective is multidisciplinary and incorporates several dimensions: historical, political, economic, legal and sociological. Based on several interviews and other sources, the book is the most complete synthesis of one of the major achievements of European integration. In particular, the author asks: What is the single European market (SEM) and how has it evolved over the years? How does the SEM work? Who have been the stakeholde.
The Spanish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, during the first semester of 2002, came at a singular time for the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Despite the important progress achieved by previous presidencies, numerous challenges remained, and the work towards the achievement of the Helsinki Headline Goal by 2003 was obviously the most notable one. The declaration of the European Council at Laeken in December 2001, making ESDP operational, immediately encouraged some member states to put forward the need to commit in the shortest term the EU's crisis management capabilities in the Balkans. But the disagreement of some countries on the issue of the participation of NATO's European allies in ESDP continues to hinder progress in this direction. Nevertheless, Spain has conducted a very fruitful Presidency, achieving very substantial progress in many aspects and launching initiatives that complement the mandate received in Laeken. In order to have a clear picture of the achievements of the Spanish Presidency in the field of ESDP, it is important to begin with a very brief description of the situation at the end of the Belgian Presidency.
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EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (4A. ED.) -- PÁGINA LEGAL -- BRIEF CONTENTS -- DETAILED CONTENTS -- CONTRIBUTORS -- PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION -- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS -- ABBREVIATIONS -- INTRODUCTION. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT (...) -- INTRODUCTION -- WHAT IS THE EUROPEAN UNION? -- THE EUROPEAN UNITY MOVEMENT -- THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION -- THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION -- THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN (...) -- THE MAIN CHALLENGES FACING THE EUROPEAN (...) -- DEMOCRATIC DE CIT -- POLITICAL UNION -- CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES -- FURTHER READING -- PART 1. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN (...) -- CHAPTER 1. MARKET INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN (...) -- INTRODUCTION -- DE NING ECONOMIC INTEGRATION -- TYPES OF SINGLE MARKETS -- TRANSACTION COSTS AND SINGLE MARKETS -- CUSTOMS UNION -- THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET -- THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ESTABLISHING FREE (...) -- PROBLEMS WITH EMPIRICAL STUDIES -- EMPIRICAL STUDIES -- THE 1996 REVIEW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN (...) -- EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF THE SEM SINCE (...) -- PLANS TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE (...) -- CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER 2. MACROECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION -- INTRODUCTION -- POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES -- THE CASE FOR POLICY COORDINATION -- MONETARY POLICY COORDINATION THROUGH MANAGED (...) -- EU MACROECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION SINCE (...) -- CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER 3. ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION -- INTRODUCTION -- WHAT IS EMU? -- THE MAASTRICHT TREATY AND THE ROAD TO EMU -- THE THEORETICAL BENE TS AND COSTS OF EMU -- THE PERFORMANCE OF THE EURO SINCE 1999 -- CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER 4. THE BUDGET OF THE EUROPEAN UNION -- INTRODUCTION -- THE BUDGET: MAIN CONCEPTS, STRUCTURE AND (...) -- THE REVENUE SIDE: WHERE THE MONEY COMES (...) -- THE EXPENDITURE SIDE: HOW THE MONEY IS (...)
In: Business and politics: B&P, Band 5, Heft 2, S. 175-192
ISSN: 1469-3569
This paper examines the development of EU regulations in the car distribution sector. In the span of approximately fifteen years, the sector has shifted from being regarded by its critics as being one of the most protected havens of European industry to one faced with open competition. The paper claims that the inability of the car industry to resist liberalization in this sector is related to several factors. First, there was declining support from member states for their national producers, in part explained by global shifts in ownership and production which rendered concepts of "national producer" problematic. Second, technological changes combined with the impact of globalization on in the industry undermined the case for a link between sales and service of cars. Third, DG competition, led by Mario Monti, wished to push through the ability of consumers to make cross-border purchases of cars. Fourth, a more general logic embedded in the Single European Market programme (SEM) had led to several decisions to prosecute EU car producers for infringing SEM rules and thereby undermining the ability of EU member states to protect their "national producers." This has implications more broadly: will increasing globalization of industrial ownership further undermine the state-firm nexus in the EU, thus reducing the propensity of national industries to resist liberalization? In this context, will member states be prepared to give the EU Commission a freer hand in forcing through liberalization in the remaining sectors that remain problematic?
In: South European society & politics, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 147-164
ISSN: 1360-8746