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Whether we talk about human learning and unlearning, securitization, or political economy, the forces and mechanisms generating both globalization and disintegration are causally efficacious across the world. Thus, the processes that led to the victory of the 'Leave' campaign in the June 2016 referendum on UK European Union membership are not simply confined to the United Kingdom, or even Europe. Similarly, conflict in Ukraine and the presidency of Donald Trump hold implications for a stage much wider than EU-Russia or the United States alone. Patomäki explores the world-historical mechanisms and processes that have created the conditions for the world's current predicaments and, arguably, involve potential for better futures. Operationally, he relies on the philosophy of dialectical critical realism and on the methods of contemporary social sciences, exploring how crises, learning and politics are interwoven through uneven wealth-accumulation and problematical growth-dynamics. Seeking to illuminate the causes of the currently prevailing tendencies towards disintegration, antagonism and – ultimately – war, he also shows how these developments are in fact embedded in deeper processes of human learning. The book embraces a Wellsian warning about the increasingly likely possibility of a military disaster, but its central objective is to further enlightenment and holoreflexivity within the current world-historical conjuncture. This work will be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, peace research, security studies and international political economy.

This study introduces a population-ecological approach to the entry and exit of political parties. A primary proposition of population ecology is that organizational entry and exit depends on the number of organizations already present: that is, density. We propose that political parties mainly experience competition from parties in the same ideological niche (left, centre, right). Pooled time-series analyses of 410 parties, 263 elections and 18 West-European countries largely support our expectations. We find that political parties are more likely to exit when density within their niche increases. Also there is competition between adjacent ideological niches, i.e. between centrist and right-wing niches. In contrast to our expectations, neither density nor institutional rules impact party entry. This raises important questions about the rationale of prospective entrants.

The 2007-2009 financial crisis was caused by financial markets' greed and instability. The crisis led public debts and deficits to rise substantially in developed countries. Financial markets and international institutions claim for a "fiscal exit strategy" through rapid reductions in public deficits and substantial falls in public debts owing to large public spending cuts (especially social expenditure). The article shows that the state of public finances was generally satisfactory before the crisis; the rise in deficits was needed for macroeconomic stabilisation purposes and does not signal higher future interest rates or inflation. 'Crisis exit strategies' should keep interest rates at low levels and government deficits, as long as they are necessary to support activity; they should question financial globalisation and macroeconomic strategies in neo-mercantilist and in liberal countries. The crisis should not be an opportunity for leading classes and European technocracies to cut social spending. Strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact would be dangerous if it deprived Member States of policy tools that were helpful in the crisis. The euro area should fight against speculation on public debts by ensuring that public debts are collectively guaranteed by the ECB and the Member States. World economic stability is not threatened by public finances imbalances, but by growing speculative financial activity.

The 2007-2009 financial crisis was caused by financial markets' greed and instability. The crisis led public debts and deficits to rise substantially in developed countries. Financial markets and international institutions claim for a "fiscal exit strategy" through rapid reductions in public deficits and substantial falls in public debts owing to large public spending cuts (especially social expenditure). The article shows that the state of public finances was generally satisfactory before the crisis; the rise in deficits was needed for macroeconomic stabilisation purposes and does not signal higher future interest rates or inflation. 'Crisis exit strategies' should keep interest rates at low levels and government deficits, as long as they are necessary to support activity; they should question financial globalisation and macroeconomic strategies in neo-mercantilist and in liberal countries. The crisis should not be an opportunity for leading classes and European technocracies to cut social spending. Strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact would be dangerous if it deprived Member States of policy tools that were helpful in the crisis. The euro area should fight against speculation on public debts by ensuring that public debts are collectively guaranteed by the ECB and the Member States. World economic stability is not threatened by public finances imbalances, but by growing speculative financial activity.

Although Europe is not a superpower, but it is a great world power, at least in the economic dimension and it has a decisive effect on many international issues. Means it has much to say in relation to trade, the environment, drug control, natural disasters, and serious illnesses and so on. But in the field of policy passing the restrictive measures that puts on its agenda, in the major and basic issues it inevitably should cooperate with US and follow it. Europe on these types of subjects, considers inevitably a complementary role of America for itself at least for some time. So a sense that at the time was applied in Germany is also true about the current Union: European Union is an economic giant and a political dwarf that lacks the characteristics of a great and perfect power. It seems that no issue had been raised as the importance of exit of Britain from the European Union and the effects that it will leave from the end of the Second World War up to now means more than 70 years. Location and history of Britain add to the importance of this issue. The exit of Britain apart from the business and economic consequences can create a political and psychological shock in European developments. As entering of Great Britain took place loudly within a decade (Eventually, in 1973), leaving this country is associated with a lot of coverage in 4 recent years. This issue has been become one of the concerns of circles of Britain and Europe. America and Canada have also repeatedly warned about the negative consequences of this exit that we will discuss it in this paper.

The relationship between the European Union's (EU) free movement regime and welfare has received ample scholarly attention. However, this has almost exclusively been from the perspective of destination countries. We know surprisingly little about the "other side" of the migration phenomenon, i.e., the welfare-related implications of large-scale emigration, which predominantly takes place from peripheral EU member states toward the core. In this paper, we break new ground using an original survey fielded in 15 EU member states in 2021. We ask how worries about immigration and emigration shape people's attitudes about social spending in their country of origin and whether they are associated with preferences for EU involvement in social policy. We show that, on average, immigration is salient across the board, but more so in core states (West and North), while emigration is a more salient issue in peripheral states (East and West). In terms of policy preferences, regression analyses indicate that worries about emigration versus immigration are linked in an inverted manner to social policy. Indeed, a preoccupation with incoming migration increases opposition to higher government social spending, while it is irrelevant for support for a stronger EU role in social matters; by contrast, a preoccupation with emigration increases support for both higher government social spending and a stronger EU role in social matters.

The vote for Brexit is not an isolated event, but part of a wave of populist, anti-elite revolts: a new 'anti-system' politics Western democracies are experiencing, shaking the existing consensus around economic integration, free markets and liberal values. This wave takes a variety of forms, but has in common a robust, even violent, rejection of the mainstream political elites and their values, and a demand for governments to act on the sources of social and economic distress and inequality. This article views Brexit as a part of this new anti-system politics, a reaction to the decline in ideological competition in democracies and the increasing impotence of politicians to address the upheavals wrought by global free market capitalism. This reaction has become particularly acute after the financial crisis of the late 2000s, which affected Britain disproportionately, and the failure of austerity policies to revive growth, crystallising the ineffectiveness of existing policies to deal with economic stagnation and cultural change. This policy failure is compounded by a perceived refusal of politicians to engage with the broader public and a lack of real choice between the mainstream political parties. The article will present evidence that a failed policy consensus, a rise in inequality and a decline in the representativeness of political elites, rather than a resurgence of intolerance or xenophobia, are the principal causes of the Brexit vote.