The Danish foreign policy tradition and the European context
In: CORE working paper 1999,1
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In: CORE working paper 1999,1
In: Working papers / European Parliament, Directorate General for Research. Social affairs series W-11
In: CORE working paper 1996,2
In: Højstrup Christensen , G , Kammel , A , Nervanto , E , Ruohomäki , J & Rodt , A P 2018 ' Successes and Shortfalls of European Union Common Security and Defence Policy Missions in Africa : Libya, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic ' Royal Danish Defence College , Copenhagen .
This brief synthesises the IECEU project's most essential findings on the effectiveness of European Union (EU) missions in four Africa countries: Libya, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). It describes the main elements and impact of the EU missions in these countries, identifies key strategic and operational shortfalls and offers recommendations on how the EU can improve its effectiveness in future conflict prevention and crisis management missions. The EU missions investigated differ in scale, length, objective, budget, priority and context. However, the EU missions presented in this brief share the main characteristic that they have all been deployed under the union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)2 with the explicit intent of improving the overall security situation and addressing conflicts in Africa. This brief will start by providing a short overview of each case, describing the conflict(s), security situation, mission objectives and obstacles. In this way, it compares the overall effectiveness of EU operational conflict prevention across the four African countries and discusses what lessons can be learned from them. The brief does not include all factors needed to answer thisquestion, but highlights the IECEU project's most significant findings in these cases.
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In: Jacobsen , M 2019 , ' Arktis : Grønlands strategiske arena for større udenrigspolitisk suverænitet ' , Politica , bind 51 , nr. 4 , 5 , s. 485-506 .
Grønlands udenrigspolitiske repræsentanter benytter den store internationale interesse for Arktis til at positionere Grønland som en mere selvstændig udenrigspolitisk aktør. Det er muligt, da Danmark er afhængig af Grønland for at opretholde sin status som "arktisk stat", og fordi Grønlands udenrigspolitiske kompetence er åben for fortolkning. Denne artikel analyserer, hvordan repræsentanter for skiftende grønlandske regeringer har udvidet det udenrigspolitiske handlerum ved i diskurs og praksis at styrke Grønlands position i en arktisk kontekst. Det er blandt andet opnået ved 1) højlydt at italesætte utilfredshed i Arktisk Råd, 2) stiltiende symbolske handlinger ved Ilulissat-erklæringens tiårs jubilæum, og 3) ved at mime suverænitet ved Arctic Circle konferencen, der pga. sin mere uformelle struktur er særligt nyttig til at styrke bilaterale internationale relationer. ; Greenland's foreign policy representatives use the great international attention to the Arctic to appear and act as a more sovereign foreign policy actor. This is possible due to Denmark's dependence on Greenland to maintain its "Arctic state" status and because Greenland's foreign policy competence is open to interpretation. The article analyzes how representatives of shifting Greenlandic governments have expanded the foreign policy room for manoeuvre in discourse and praxis to strengthen Greenland's position at Arctic-related events. This has been achieved by, among other things, 1) outspoken discontent in the Arctic Council, 2) tacit gestures at the Ilulissat Declaration's 10-year anniversary, and 3) by mimicking full sovereignty at the Arctic Circle conference serving as a particularly useful platform for enhancing bilateral international relations due to its more informal setup.
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In: Fremads debatbøger
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 80, Heft 1
ISSN: 1891-1757
Den norske klimapolitikken blir stadig tettere knyttet til EUs klimaregelverk. Denne artikkelen analyserer hvordan og hvorfor Norge har koblet klimapolitikken opp mot EU og hvilket handlingsrom samarbeidet med EU gir norske myndigheter. Gjennom EØS-avtalen har det europeiske kvotesystemet (EU ETS) siden 2008 dekket omtrent halvparten av de norske utslippene, i hovedsak fra industri og petroleumsvirksomhet. Siden 2021 er også de ikke-kvotepliktige utslippene fra transport, landbruk, bygg og avfall omfattet av en egen tidsavgrenset avtale med EU, som et tillegg til EØS-avtalen. Dette samarbeidet forplikter Norge til å kutte utslipp hvert år fram til 2030. Avtalen binder også Norge til å følge EUs regelverk for opptak av klimagasser knyttet til skog og annen arealbruk. I praksis er Norge fullt medlem av EUs klimapolitiske samarbeid fram til 2030. Analysen viser at denne tette tilknytningen har økt det politiske presset for å kutte klimagassutslipp innenlands. Samtidig har Norge valgt å holde alle fleksibilitetsmuligheter åpne for å gjennomføre kuttene i EU i stedet. Hvorvidt disse mulighetene vil bli benyttet er i stor grad et politisk spørsmål som trolig vil prege klimadebatten frem mot 2030. Den endelige utformingen og innretningen på EUs grønne giv og Norges tilknytning til denne vil også påvirke handlingsrommet for klimakutt hjemme versus ute.
Abstract in English:Ever Closer Union? Norway's Climate Collaboration with the EUNorwegian climate policy has increasingly become closely linked to EU climate regulations. This article analyzes how and why Norway has linked its climate policy to the EU's and what room for maneuvering the cooperation with the EU gives Norwegian authorities. Through the EEA agreement, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) has covered about half of Norway's emissions, mainly from industry and the petroleum sector, since 2008. Since 2021, non-ETS emissions from transport, agriculture, construction and waste have also been covered by a separate time-limited agreement with the EU, as a supplement to the EEA agreement. This cooperation obliges Norway to cut emissions every year until 2030. The agreement also binds Norway to comply with EU regulations for the emissions and uptake of greenhouse gases related to forests and other land use. In practice, Norway is fully obliged to comply with the EU's climate policy regulations until 2030. The analysis shows that this close connection has increased the political pressure to cut greenhouse gas emissions domestically. At the same time, Norway has chosen to keep all flexibility options open to implement the cuts in the EU instead. Whether these opportunities will be used is largely a political question that probably will shape the climate debate until 2030. The final design and structure of the EU's Green Deal and Norway's connection to it will also affect the maneuvering room for climate cuts at home versus abroad.
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World Affairs Online
In: NUPI Utenrikspolitisk serie
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 67, Heft 4, S. 585-609
ISSN: 0020-577X
In the coming decade, Denmark will initiate replacement of its current fleet of F-16 fighters. In the spring Of 2009, most indicators suggest that politicians will have a choice of one of three options: the American F-35 joint Strike Fighter (JSF) & F-18 Super Hornet, produced by Lockheed Martin & Boeing, respectively, & the Swedish Saab JAS 39 Gripen. Denmark is thus on the verge of taking the first step in a process broadly similar to the one preceding the purchase of the F-16 in 1975. Also back then there was a choice between three candidates: the American F-16, the Swedish Saab 37E Viggen & the European Dassault Mirage FiE (of French origin). The purpose of the present article is to analyze the foreign policy considerations preceding the purchase of the F-16 in 1975 & to discuss their relevance in regard to the present pending decision. Adapted from the source document.