Understanding Klaus: The Story of Czech Eurorealism
In: EPIN Working Paper No. 26
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In: EPIN Working Paper No. 26
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Working paper
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 61, Heft S1, S. 90-101
ISSN: 1468-5965
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 60, Heft S1, S. 60-75
ISSN: 1468-5965
In: Parliamentary affairs: a journal of comparative politics, Band 59, Heft 3, S. 385-400
ISSN: 1460-2482
In: Parliamentary affairs: a journal of representative politics, Band 59, Heft 3, S. 385-400
ISSN: 0031-2290
In: European politics and society, Band 24, Heft 5, S. 585-602
ISSN: 2374-5126
After the 2019 European Parliament (EP) election, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) party grouping experienced a major change in its representation and leadership, with the wholescale departure of its core British Conservative MEPs. Yet the ECR remained an important and coherent transnational party federation in Strasbourg, acting as a strong voice for conservatism in Europe as distinct from Christian Democracy and the radical right. With large numbers of MEPs from Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) party within the grouping, there was also much continuity with policies that were opposed to 'ever closer union', in favour of business and the single market and also of the wider role of the USA and NATO in international relations. Often written off as merely a 'Eurosceptic' faction, the start of the 2019-2024 EP session saw the grouping consolidate its influence and profile in EU affairs as a distinctive right-of-centre party in the Hemicycle.
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In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Belgium and the European Union" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: Politique étrangère: revue trimestrielle publiée par l'Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Band 64, Heft 1, S. 35-44
ISSN: 1958-8992
The European Rebound, by Gilles Andréani
Europe appears to have emerged from a long period of depression that started with the Treaty of Maastricht and resulted in public opinion being disillusioned about the building of Europe from 1991 to 1996. Now this trend seems to have been reversed for about two years now in the wake of the successful launch of the euro and the "return of the political aspect" in connection with the consequences of the single currency and the revival of the debate about European defence. If this trend is to be Consolidated at a time when "eurorealism" is tending to become prédominant, the EU should take up the challenges of governmental responsibility and those thrown down by the outside world.
In: Przegląd politologiczny: kwartalnik = Political science review, Heft 3, S. 67-88
ISSN: 1426-8876
The aim of this paper is to reveal the connections between the British version of Euroskepticism (as one variety of this political and intellectual phenomenon) and its Czech variant, personified by the present President of the Czech Republic – Vaclav Klaus. The paper discusses the fundamental elements of the Euroskeptical outlook that are sometimes presented to public opinion in EU states as 'Eurorealism.' The British variety is presented alongside the most important elements of the same concept in France and Denmark. Although Czech Europskepticism refers to numerous significant structural elements of its British predecessor, it has a number of original features. Among others, they result from the geopolitical conditions of Central Europe. The author analyzes the statements of the present Czech president (who once described himself as a Thatcherist) to show his essential influence on the shape of Euroskeptical attitudes on the Vltava. The author also presents the most important foreign policy documents of the former political circles of Vaclav Klaus, i.e. the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), with their Europskeptical overtones. The paper concludes with the author's observations concerning the similarities and discrepancies between British and Czech attitudes.
In: Routledge studies in fascism and the far right
"The Right-Wing Critique of Europe analyses the opposition to the European Union from a variety of right-wing organisations in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. In recent years, opposition to the processes of globalisation and the programme of closer European integration, understood as a threat to the sovereignty of individual member states, has led to an intensification of Eurosceptic sentiments on the Old Continent. The results of the European parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2019, the Brexit referendum and electoral results in different European countries are all testament to the considerable growth of radical populist-nationalist and conservative-souverainist movements and parties. The common idea that binds these groups, both in Western Europe and in Central and Eastern Europe, is a hostile attitude towards the idea of (an ever more integrated) united Europe. These parties reject not only the project of building a European federation, but also the current model of the European Union and the values underlying its attitudes. They are united by their criticism of EU policies, in particular those concerning security, emigration, multiculturalism, gender equality, the rights of minorities, as well as economic liberalism and the common currency. However, this criticism manifests itself with varying degrees of intensity, and not all parties fit the classic definition of Euroscepticism but instead represent its mild form, Eurorealism. The authors bring together reflections on the organic and complex critique of the European Union, its policies and cultural and ideological character. The book provides a comparative analysis of this criticism at the transnational level. This book will be of interest to researchers of European politics, the radical right and Euroscepticism"--
In: Routledge Studies in Fascism and the Far Right
The Right-Wing Critique of Europe analyses the opposition to the European Union from a variety of right-wing organisations in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. In recent years, opposition to the processes of globalisation and the programme of closer European integration, understood as a threat to the sovereignty of individual member states, has led to an intensification of Eurosceptic sentiments on the Old Continent. The results of the European parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2019, the Brexit referendum and electoral results in different European countries are all testament to the considerable growth of radical populist-nationalist and conservative-sovereignist movements and parties. The common idea that binds these groups, both in Western Europe and in Central and Eastern Europe, is a hostile attitude towards the idea of (an ever-more integrated) united Europe. These parties reject not only the project of building a European federation, but also the current model of the European Union and the values underlying its attitudes. They are united by their criticism of EU policies, in particular those concerning security, emigration, multiculturalism, gender equality and the rights of minorities, as well as economic liberalism and the common currency. However, this criticism manifests itself with varying degrees of intensity, and not all parties fit the classic definition of Euroscepticism but instead represent its mild form, Eurorealism. The authors bring together reflections on the organic and complex critique of the European Union, its policies and cultural and ideological character. The book provides a comparative analysis of this criticism at the transnational level. This book will be of interest to researchers of European politics, the radical right and Euroscepticism.
The Right-Wing Critique of Europe analyses the opposition to the European Union from a variety of right-wing organisations in Western, Central and Eastern Europe.In recent years, opposition to the processes of globalisation and the programme of closer European integration, understood as a threat to the sovereignty of individual member states, has led to an intensification of Eurosceptic sentiments on the Old Continent. The results of the European parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2019, the Brexit referendum and electoral results in different European countries are all testament to the considerable growth of radical populist-nationalist and conservative-sovereignist movements and parties. The common idea that binds these groups, both in Western Europe and in Central and Eastern Europe, is a hostile attitude towards the idea of (an ever-more integrated) united Europe. These parties reject not only the project of building a European federation, but also the current model of the European Union and the values underlying its attitudes. They are united by their criticism of EU policies, in particular those concerning security, emigration, multiculturalism, gender equality and the rights of minorities, as well as economic liberalism and the common currency. However, this criticism manifests itself with varying degrees of intensity, and not all parties fit the classic definition of Euroscepticism but instead represent its mild form, Eurorealism. The authors bring together reflections on the organic and complex critique of the European Union, its policies and cultural and ideological character. The book provides a comparative analysis of this criticism at the transnational level.This book will be of interest to researchers of European politics, the radical right and Euroscepticism.
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The modern typologies of Euroscepticism, which are developed by researchers, are explored in the article. Among of the researchers are Paul Taggart, Alex Szczerbiak, Sofia Vasilopoulou, Søren Riishøj, Catharina Sørensen, Marcel Lubbers, and Peer Scheepers, Clive H. Church, and Alexandra Gissa. The author focuses on some of the problem aspects of the investigated typologies.For instance, the classic typology of Hard & Soft P. Taggart and A. Szczerbiak is too extensive and is considered to be partially obsolete because does not fully reflect the reality of contemporary Euroscepticism. S. Vasilopoulou admits a collision of the positions of the Eurosceptic parties when she described the "conditional" type of Euroscepticism: on the one hand, they approve of only intergovernmental cooperation at the EU level and do not recognize the supranational functions of its bodies. On the other hand, they are ready to accept the EU in the tighter and deeper form of existence – a confederation that unequivocally implies the presence of supranational bodies, joint defence and so on.The typology of S. Riishøj has no specific framework, according to which the logic of typologization would be understood. The researcher touches upon national societies, identities, geopolitics, political institutions, European institutions, and the notion of functional Eurorealism. As a result, this attempt demonstrates the scale of the reasons for the emergence of Euroscepticism, and then the possible variations of its types, but not vice versa. Similar contradictions exist in other analysed typologies of Euroscepticism.In addition, the author found out that most scholars form the typologies of Euroscepticism, using absolutely different criteria: the degree of opposition of the EU; causes of creation, attitude to the EU and European integration processes; attitude towards the EU membership; aspect of benefit (political/eco- nomic); on the basis of public, party and state discourses, etc.However, as it is stated in the article, in spite of such a variety of typologies and types of Euroscepticism, most of them have common content features: political, economic, and feature of principle.The author also formed two types of Euroscepticism – moderate and radical, based on a preliminary study of supporters of Euroscepticism in the UK, France, and Germany.According to the first type, Eurosceptics criticized and questioned activities of the EU, its institutions, etc., but they are ready to compromise on most of the controversial issues. Therefore, such Euroscepticism is usually constructive at the same time. According to the second type, Eurosceptics is more aggressive and, as a rule, uncompromisingly set against the idea of united Europe, the enlargement of the EU, the existence of a common currency and, in general, the membership of their country in it, and so on.The author concluded that, at present, there is no the only and generally accepted typology, which could be used constantly in exploring the phenomenon under study. The scientific search for the general typology of Euroscepticism continues. ; У статті досліджено сучасні типології євроскептицизму та проаналізовано їх дискусійні аспекти. З'ясовано, що практично всі типології євроскептицизму мають три спільні змістовні риси: політичну, економічну та рису принципової позиції. Також автор пропонує власну типологію євроскептицизму, відповідно до якої він виділяє радикальний і поміркований євроскептицизм.
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