Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Acknowledgements -- List of Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1 Why Euroscepticism Matters -- Eurosceptics: channels of influence in the EU -- Euroscepticism and the evolution of EU governance: towards a less supranational Union? -- Euroscepticism outside the EU: implications for international relations -- Euroscepticism: a welcome thorn in the EU's side -- Conclusion -- 2 Varieties of Euroscepticism -- Euroscepticism across time: a historical overview -- Utilitarian Euroscepticism -- Political Euroscepticism -- Value-based Euroscepticism -- Cultural anti-Europeanism -- Conclusion -- 3 A Geography of Euroscepticism -- Different countries, different Euroscepticism(s) -- Accession processes and seniority as an EU member -- Collective utilitarian assessment of EU membership -- Degree of fit between the EU and national institutions -- Reference to 'Europe' in nation-building processes -- Strength and sense of national identity -- Euroscepticism at regional level -- Conclusion -- 4 Political Elites -- Elites' conversion to 'Europe': 'limited, short-ranged and tactical' (Haas 1958) -- Explaining party-based Euroscepticism -- Parties of government: a mainstreaming of Euroscepticism? -- Political elites in the European Parliament: enthusiastic Europeans? -- Conclusion -- 5 National Institutions -- The compliance problem: Euroscepticism through the back door? -- Administrations, courts and parliaments: loyal applicants of EU law? -- Member states and the European Court of Justice: towards a more tense relationship -- Conclusion -- 6 Popular Euroscepticism -- Patterns of support before Maastricht: an ambiguous public opinion -- Post-Maastricht Euroscepticism: symptom of a national democratic malaise -- Utilitarian scepticism and concerns over the redistributive consequences of integration.

During the crisis, support for the EU has declined noticeably in many European Union member states. While previous research on European public opinion has mainly focused on the impact of domestic country- and individual-level factors on public attitudes towards the EU, this paper argues that developments in other EU member states can also have a significant impact on domestic euroscepticism. Specifically, deteriorating economic and fiscal conditions in other member states can lead to concerns in domestic publics about possible negative spillovers on the domestic economy and the ability of the EU to deliver positive economic outcomes. This in turn may lead to rising euroscepticism at the domestic level. The analysis of a panel data set for the EU as a whole and the euro area countries lends support to these arguments by showing that higher unemployment rates and government debt levels in other European countries are systematically related to lower levels of trust in the EU domestically.

International audience ; From a rational choice institutionalist perspective, Euroscepticism is little more than a set of preferences by citizens, parties and interest groups about institutional design in Europe. If actors' expect policy outcomes to move closer to their ideal positions as a result of European integration, they will be Euro-enthusiastic (as many centrists are). But, if they feel that policies will move further away from their ideal positions, they will be Eurosceptic (as many extremists are). This simple idea has broad historical and geographical relevance, relating to how actors view the design of multilevel polities, and how these institutional preferences change in response to policy outcomes of the central institutions.

An exploration of what drives party-based Euroscepticism and why some parties are Eurosceptic. This book looks at what makes mainstream opposition parties careful not to appear Eurosceptic and asks whether Euroscepticism is an aberration of politics, an extreme populist ideology, or just politics as usual.

Research on Euroscepticism focuses increasingly on the role of group identities: national identities and attitudes towards multiculturalism. Yet hardly any attention has been paid to the way in which religious intolerance shapes Euroscepticism. We argue that religious intolerance influences not only diffuse Euroscepticism, but also more specifically opposition to enlargement of the European Union with Turkey. To examine the relationship between religious intolerance and Euroscepticism, this article analyses unique data from two representative surveys conducted in Ireland and the Netherlands. Our findings show that religious intolerance is indeed a powerful determinant of attitudes towards the European Union and that it particularly shapes people's attitudes towards future Turkish enlargement. This study therefore contributes to the literature by demonstrating that social identities are strong determinants of Euroscepticism.

Since the late 1990s, much scholarly work has been done in the field of Euroscepticism in terms of mapping and conceptualizing different types of opposition to the process of European integration. But even though studies examining Euroscepticism in the EU are plentiful, the lack of insight into different types of Euroscepticism in non-Member States is striking: there is very little research which considers the extent to which there are different varieties of Euroscepticism in the European states that have chosen non-membership of the Union. What is Euroscepticism in these countries, and why are the Icelanders, Norwegians and Swiss so Eurosceptic? The article looks at how Euroscepticism plays out in Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. It examines what Euroscepticism is and why it occurs in these countries, using a framework for analyzing Euroscepticism based on the concepts of economic, political, post-materialist value-based, right-wing value-based, cultural and rural society Euroscepticism. Adapted from the source document.

The article examines if and, if so, why and how political parties opposing the European Union have thrived. It looks at the role of national parliaments and national media in failing to engage convincingly with the European dimension of politics, and asks why the forces of European federalism have been so relatively ineffective. By analyzing the tensions between national and European political parties especially in the conduct of elections to the European Parliament, the article traces the rise of the nationalist forces within the EP and assesses their impact on the legislative and other work of the institution. It concludes by proposing measures to tackle the nationalist challenge to European unification, including more differentiated forms of integration, more direct democracy, the development of federal political parties and the constitutional settlement of a federal union. Adapted from the source document.