AbstractThis article examines national parliamentarians' approval of the increased budgetary capacity of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in autumn 2011. Following the analysis of vote outcome and plenary debates in 11 euro states, it is found that the financial position of a state (creditors versus debtors) does not explain the patterns of support and opposition. Rather, two other factors account for these differences: Euroscepticism, and the government and opposition cleavage. In particular, whereas Eurosceptic MPs voted and argued against the EFSF, the parliamentary majorities supported it. Surprisingly, although the legal basis of the EFSF draws on solidarity among the European Union Member States, the supporters of the EFSF did not refer to this principle in their speeches but rather to pragmatic considerations such as national economic interests.
In: European political science: EPS ; serving the political science community ; a journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 1, Heft 3, S. 41-46
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, little research has been done in Eastern Europe on European integration. Since then, purely Eastern European research on this topic has been scarce, because of the lack of original research in most Central & Eastern European (CEE) countries & the prevalence of collaboration with Western scholars. Political science departments within universities, centers for European studies, government ministries, & private think-tanks in CEE countries conducting research on integration are identified. In the early 1990s, many conferences & research projects focused on Europeanization & joining the European Union (EU) was thought to be the only political path. As criticism of the EU mounted, other concepts of European integration & EU Eastern enlargement were researched, as well as the emerging Euroscepticism in popular political attitudes. The lack of cooperation between CEE countries in political research is noted. References. M. Pflum
Abstract: "The 2014 European Parliament election saw a relatively large increase in the size of radical-left parties (RLPs), particularly in Western Europe. This article aims to provide new ways of thinking about the dynamics of radical-left voting by analysing the changing role of attitudes towards the European Union in explaining support for RLPs at European Parliament elections during the Great Recession. It is argued that the Europeanisation of economic issues during the financial crisis, together with the particular kind of Euroscepticism advocated by these parties, have enabled them to successfully attract a heterogeneous pool of voters. Using the 2009 and 2014 European Election Studies, it is shown that the effect of negative opinions about the EU on support for RLPs increased significantly during the crisis. In addition, support for RLPs also increased among voters with positive views of the EU who were nevertheless highly dissatisfied with the economic situation." (Seite 316)
Η διατριβή εξετάζει την εφαρμογή μιας διαφοροποιημένης ολοκλήρωσης στον τομέα της πολιτικής της ΕΕ για την παράνομη μετανάστευση. Αναζητά τη σχέση μεταξύ της αύξησης του ευρωσκεπτικισμού και της εφαρμογής των εξαιρέσεων και της ευελιξίας σε αρμοδιότητες του κρατικού πυρήνα, όπως είναι πολιτική μετανάστευσης. Αναλύει την έκταση της διαφοροποιημένης ολοκλήρωσης που ήταν ο κύριος τρόπος ολοκλήρωσης σε αυτόν τον τομέα πολιτικής. Επικεντρώνεται στις περιπτώσεις του Ηνωμένου Βασιλείου και της Δανίας, περιγράφοντας τον τρόπο με τον οποίο η κινητοποίηση αποκλειστικών εθνικών ταυτοτήτων αυξάνει τη ζήτηση και προσφορά της διαφοροποίησης. Επιπλέον, η μελέτη εξηγεί την εισαγωγή της ευελιξίας στις προτάσεις της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής για το Νέο σύμφωνο για τη μετανάστευση του 2020, μέσω του συνολικού επιπέδου πολιτικοποίησης και της αύξησης των ακροδεξιών ευρωσκεπτικιστικών κομμάτων σε πολλά κράτη της ΕΕ μετά τη προσφυγική κρίση του 2015 ; This study examines the implementation of differentiated integration arrangement on the field of EU policy towards irregular migration. It searches the interrelation between the rise of Euroscepticism and the application of opt-outs and flexibility in core state powers, as the migration policy. The research seeks to deepen the conceptual framework of core state powers and the effects of growing politicization as well as the dynamics of differentiation within the EU. It analyzes the extend of differentiated integration which has been the main mode of integration in this policy field. It focuses on the cases of UK and Denmark, outlining the way that the mobilization of exclusive national identities raises the demand for differentiation. The study, however, advances the research by explaining the introduction of flexibility in the Commission's proposals on the 2020 New Pact on Migration, through the lens of the aggregated level of politicization and the rise of right-wing Eurosceptic parties in many states of EU. While the treaty opt-outs have been related with the Euroscepticism since the Maastricht Treaty through the polarization provoked by referendums, the 2015 refugee crisis resulted in the EU institutions' endorsement of flexibility within the Dublin system, a secondary legal rule.
Relevance of research topic. More than 10 years after Bulgaria's accession to the EU, there has been considerable "euroscepticism" among Bulgarian citizens. The study of attitudes towards Bulgarian membership in EU as well as the reasons determining these attitudes could be useful not only for Bulgaria but also for countries that are going to join the EU, including Ukraine. Setting the task, the purpose of the study: to clarify the public attitudes (in Bulgaria) towards the Bulgarian membership in European Union and to outline useful guidelines and conclusions that could help Ukrainian representatives in the process of negotiating (for joining EU). Method or methodology for conducting research. Stratified quota sample based on major socio-demographic attributes, face-to-face standardized interview in respondents' homes. Results of work. The report analyzes the advantages as well as the challenges that Bulgarian people face more than 10 years later after joining European Union (EU). The analysis is based on the attitudes of Bulgarian citizens. Data is gathered by representative samples on the territory of Bulgaria. The authors try to make a logical parallel between Bulgaria and Ukraine and to formulate conclusions and practical guidelines that could help Ukraine to take better decisions in the process of negotiations for joining EU. Conclusions according to the article. Obviously, ten years is not enough time for the Bulgaria's full integration into the EU. However, there is a very high degree of unanimity that EU-future is the most optimistic scenario for Bulgaria. The following lines outline some important reasons for possible "euroscepticism" concerning Ukraine's future EU membership: nationalist movements and parties, fundamental differences of cultural values, the different nature of academic and educational systems, the unwillingness or inability to break the language barrier, non-adaptability of Ukraine's production technologies with those of developed European countries, the striking discrepancy between types of agricultural produce, different types/technology of agricultural production, predatory use of the country's raw material base, ecological degradation, double standards of products.
29 cm ; The European Union (EU) territorial development and cohesion have been supported by European institutions for decades, but they currently face a critical moment: the COVID-19 pandemic and European coordination gaps have to be added to previously-existing difficulties, such as the growing climate-related and demographic challenges, and the wave of Euroscepticism, nationalism and populism. Viruses do not recognise borders, but the EU is still divided between those thinking that the economy should prevail over politics and those thinking otherwise. European citizens living in border areas know very well that we need a common approach (and a stronger commitment) to the preservation of our values and rights, as well as to the definitive positioning of the EU as a global player. Integration starts at the bottom and moves across borders. The legacy of cohesion and territorial stability that the EU leaves for future generations will depend on how it protects and strengthens cross-border cooperation at this stage. ; 29 cm ; Każdy numer posiada własny tytuł. ; The European Union (EU) territorial development and cohesion have been supported by European institutions for decades, but they currently face a critical moment: the COVID-19 pandemic and European coordination gaps have to be added to previously-existing difficulties, such as the growing climate-related and demographic challenges, and the wave of Euroscepticism, nationalism and populism. Viruses do not recognise borders, but the EU is still divided between those thinking that the economy should prevail over politics and those thinking otherwise. European citizens living in border areas know very well that we need a common approach (and a stronger commitment) to the preservation of our values and rights, as well as to the definitive positioning of the EU as a global player. Integration starts at the bottom and moves across borders. The legacy of cohesion and territorial stability that the EU leaves for future generations will depend on how it protects and strengthens cross-border cooperation at this stage.
International audience ; The present research study explores the extent to which the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union may negatively affect the efforts to lead in particular young people to have a positive attitude towards this integration group, enhance a feeling of belonging to it or a certain sense of common European citizenship. The main aim of the paper was to identify those selected circumstances of Brexit and its campaigns that could evoke strong Eurosceptic sentiments and, on the contrary, look for ways to eliminate these negative tendencies. The authors discuss how a populist, emotionally focused and often misleading campaign has significantly contributed to the vote of Brexit in a referendum, which is a precedent that may under certain circumstances be repeated in other member countries. The paper also discusses the media dimension of the topic. Especially the question of spreading misinformation, hoaxes, conspiracy or propaganda in alternative media that can strengthen Euroscepticism in many EU countries, including the Slovak Republic.
The current state of development of European integration processes can be characterized as a state of crisis, which was caused by a number of political, social, economic and cultural factors, according to researchers and experts. At the moment, this group of factors manifests in the migration crisis, the identity crisis of individual members of the association, the problems of political cooperation. In our opinion, today the most "crucial" factor is the strengthening of the factor of nationalism and the weakening of integration processes within the organization, which has a direct impact on the internal situation in the EU and on the place of association in the modern system of relations.In these conditions, it is important to understand the deep-seated problems of the crisis in order to find a more effective strategy to overcome them. In the current study, the authors emphasize on several key aspects in the context of this issue: understanding the basic "Idea of a united Europe", and its relationship with the trend of Euroscepticism and nationalism, which have a growing tendency to strengthen in the context of preservation European identity. ; Сучасний стан розвитку євроінтеграційних процесів можна охарактеризувати як такий, що знаходиться в стані кризи, яка, на думку дослідників та експертів, була викликана низкою політичних, соціальних, економічних та культурних факторів. Наразі, ця група факторів проявляється в міграційній кризі, кризах ідентичності окремих учасників об'єднання, проблемах політичного співробітництва тощо. Найбільш «критичним», на нашу думку, сьогодні виступає підсилення фактора націоналізму та послаблення інтеграційних процесів у середині організації, що має безпосередній вплив і на внутрішню ситуацію в ЄС, і на місце об'єднання в сучасній системі відносин.За таких умов важливим вбачається розуміння глибинних проблем кризи задля знаходження більш ефективної стратегії їх подолання. В цьому дослідженні автори акцентують увагу на кількох ключових питаннях в контексті зазначеної проблематики: розуміння базової «Ідеї об'єднаної Європи», а також його взаємозв'язок із тенденцією євроскептицизму та націоналізму, які мають зростаючу тенденцію підсилення в контексті збереження європейської ідентичності.
This paper takes a qualitative, rhetorical and historical approach with a view to analyzing the Portuguese Communist Party's (PCP) long-term, oppositional stance and tactics towards European integration (EI) by briefly covering early opposition, while focusing on 1990s onward stages. The economic crises (Euro Crisis 2008/2009 and Pandemic) Portugal faces, and the rigid, neo-liberal solutions imposed by the European Union, have led the PCP to feel its constant criticisms of increased federalism have been justified. At its XXI Congress in 2020, the PCP used the same rhetorical arguments as it had in the past, including that the only solution is to break with the right's pro-EU policies. ; El presente trabajo adopta un enfoque cualitativo, retórico e histórico con el fin de analizar la postura y las tácticas de oposición, a largo plazo, del Partido Comunista Portugués (PCP) hacia la integración europea (UE), cubriendo brevemente la oposición temprana para centrarse a continuación en las etapas posteriores de la década de 1990. Las crisis económicas (Euro Crisis 2008-2009 y Pandemia) a las que se enfrenta Portugal, y las rígidas soluciones neoliberales impuestas por la Unión Europea, han llevado al PCP a sentir que sus constantes críticas al creciente federalismo están justificadas. En su XXI Congreso de 2020, el PCP utilizó los mismos argumentos retóricos que tenía en el pasado, manteniendo que la única solución es romper con las políticas pro-UE de la derecha.
Ich habe in meiner Dissertation die Frage gestellt, ob Euroskeptizismus in Folge der Staats-schulden- und Finanzkrise in Europa zugenommen hat. Weiterhin habe ich gefragt, ob Euros-keptizismus als Antwort auf die Krisenpolitik der EU verstanden werden kann oder ob es sich um ein persistentes Phänomen handelt. Ich habe argumentiert, dass die Krise als externes Schockereignis, die Menschen wirtschaftlich verunsichert hat. Insbesondere in den Staaten, die aufgrund der Krise beispielsweise Pensionen kürzen mussten oder in denen die Arbeitslosigkeit anstieg. Aber auch in den Ländern, die nicht direkt von der Krise betroffen waren, da zumin-dest zeitweise die Gefahr eines Spillover bestand. Neben dieser wirtschaftlichen Verunsiche-rung habe ich argumentiert, dass die Krise den Europäern in bisher einmaliger Weise die Inter-dependenzen zwischen den Staaten aufgezeigt hat. Denn die Krise konnte von den Staaten, in denen sie die stärksten Auswirkungen hatte weder alleine gelöst werden, noch konnten sich die übrigen Mitgliedsländer aus der Verantwortung ziehen, indem sie sich nicht z. B. finanziell soli-darisch zeigten. Als Reaktion auf die Krisenpolitik, die in den Medien oft als undemokratisch dargestellt wurde, können Menschen mit Kritik an der EU reagieren und eine Kursänderung der europäischen Politik, sowie die Beschränkung des Einflusses der EU auf den Nationalstaat, fordern. Ein niederschwelliger und rationaler Weg dies zu tun, ist über die Wahl einer euroskep-tischen Partei bei einer nationalen Wahl. Zusammenfassend komme ich zu folgenden Ergebnissen: Euroskeptizismus hat in der Folge der Staatsschulden- und Finanzkrise in Europa zu-genommen, kann allerdings nicht als Antwort auf die Krisenpolitik der EU verstanden werden, zumindest nicht in den von der Krise betroffenen Staaten, sondern vielmehr in den Geberlän-dern. Das spricht dafür, dass die Krisenpolitik in den betroffenen Staaten, trotz der rigiden Sparauflagen, nicht als politisch übergriffig eingeschätzt wurde, sondern, dass das Gefühl vom solidarischen Europa profitiert zu haben überwiegt. Gleichzeitig können die Ergebnisse ein Hinweis auf eine negative Berichterstattung zu Lasten der Nehmerländer in den Geberländern sein, in denen als Reaktion euroskeptisches Wahlverhalten ansteigt. Die Trendanalyse zeigte allerdings auch, dass Euroskeptizismus kein neues Phänomen ist, sondern, dass die Anteile eu-roskeptischer Wähler im gesamten Beobachtungszeitraum, das bedeutet seit 2002, relativ hoch sind. Es schließt sich deswegen die Frage an, ob Euroskeptizismus in den Nach-Krisen-Jahren eine andere Qualität hat, als davor. Eine Frage, die mit dieser Untersuchung nicht geklärt wer-den konnte. Durch die Fallstudienartige Analyse der Länder nach Beitrittszeitpunkt konnte ich jedoch Variationen in den Ursachen finden und diese auf die jeweiligen Parteienlandschaften beziehen. So begünstigen große nicht euroskeptische Volksparteien möglicherweise die Bildung von kleinen euroskeptischen Parteien. Insbesondere in Ländern, die eine hohe Anzahl Regio-nalparteien haben, adaptieren diese europakritische Themen um Wähler für sich zu gewinnen. Dieses Ergebnis lässt zwei Lesarten zu: Entweder besetzen die kleinen Parteien das Thema aus strategischen Gründen, als Antipol zu den Großparteien oder Euroskeptizismus ist für die grö-ßeren Parteien (noch) nicht salonfähig. Auch hier müssen zukünftige Untersuchungen weitere Erkenntnisse bringen.
Autor razmatra politički profil Alternative za Njemačku kako bi pridonio razumijevanju njezine pojave u političkom životu Njemačke. Analizom izbornih programa provjerava njezin položaj na osi lijevo-desno te stavove o europskim integracijama, nacionalizmu i multikulturalizmu, te o ekonomskoj politici i demokraciji. Multivarijantnom regresijskom analizom ispituje prediktivnu snagu konfesionalnih, dobnih, obrazovnih, migracijskih i ekonomskih obilježja izbornih okruga u objašnjenju varijacije u postotku glasova. Istraživanjem biografskih obilježja članova vodstva stranke testira se pretpostavljena zajednička demografska i ideološka pozadina stranačke elite. Pokazalo se da Alternativa za Njemačku odudara od stavova drugih stranaka u gledanjima na Europsku uniju, nacionalizam, multikulturalizam i ekonomsku politiku, ali ne odskače značajno na osi lijevo-desno, kao ni prema stavovima o demokraciji. Za predikciju glasovanja za tu stranku najvažnijima su se pokazala regionalna (rascjep istok-zapad), dobna i ekonomska obilježja izbornih okruga. Biografska analiza stranačke elita otkriva visok postotak bivših članova njemačkih demokršćanskih stranaka, te prevlast starijih visokoobrazovanih muškaraca u njoj. ; This paper analyzes the political profile of the Alternative for Germany to contribute to the understanding of its emergence in the German political life. An analysis of electoral manifestos tests the party's left-right position, stances on European integration, nationalism, and multiculturalism as well as on economic policy and democracy. A multiple regression analysis examines the predictive power of religion, age, education, migration, and economic status as characteristics of electoral districts explaining the variation in the party's vote percentage. An assessment of biographies of the party's leadership tests the presumed common demographic and ideologic background of the party elite. The article shows that new party differs from other German parties regarding the EU, nationalism, and multiculturalism, and economic policy, yet does not represent an outlier on the left-right scale, nor in its stance on democracy. The study of predictors of the vote for the Alternative for Germany has shown that regional (East/West cleavage), age and economic characteristics of electoral districts hold most importance. The biographic analysis of the party elite reveals a high percentage of previous CDU/CSU members and a dominance of elderly, well-educated men.
Support for European integration is a function no longer only of `hard' economic and utilitarian predictors but also of `soft' predictors such as feelings of identity and attitudes towards immigrants. Focusing on the issue of the potential membership of Turkey in the European Union (EU), this study demonstrates that the importance of `soft' predictors outweighs the role of `hard' predictors in understanding public opinion about Turkish membership. The study draws on survey data (N = 1630) and applies a series of regression models and structural equation modelling to show in addition how the effects of utilitarian considerations are mediated through `soft' indicators, further accentuating the importance of identity considerations and anti-immigration sentiments. The findings are discussed in the light of public support for and the legitimacy of further European enlargement.
In 2010, the reverberations of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis had created a whole new crisis in Europe. Five Eurozone countries, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Cyprus all had requested financial aid packages, unable to repay their national debt. The crisis is ongoing in Europe ever since, becoming the greatest challenge presented to the Eurozone since the monetary union was formed. The intent of this thesis is to explore the effects of the Eurozone crisis on the political systems of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. This thesis will study the effects utilizing the most prominent perspectives in political economy: neoliberalism, neomercantilism, and structuralism. This thesis also attempts to explain the recent rise in Euroscepticism in each country, whilst seeking an explanation in the rise in three Eurosceptic parties: Alternative fur Deutschland from Germany, National Front from France, and the United Kingdom Independence Party. Lastly, this thesis conducts a comparative analysis to find the common elements in each case study, as well as the areas in which the studies diverge. ; 2015-12-01 ; B.A. ; Sciences, Dept. of Political Science ; Bachelors ; This record was generated from author submitted information.
This book takes stock of Belgium's exceptional and – for some foreign observers –schizophrenic position in the political world and explains its idiosyncrasy to a non-Belgian audience. Offering a broad and comprehensive analysis of Belgian politics, the guiding questions throughout each of the chapters of this book are: Is Belgium a political enigma, and why? Along which axes is Belgium "exceptional" compared to other countries? And what insights does a comparative study of Belgian politics have to offer? The book therefore provides a critical assessment of how Belgian politics "stands out" internationally, both in good and bad ways – including consociationalism, federalism, democratic innovations, Euroscepticism, government formation, gender equality, among others – and which factors can explain Belgium's exceptional position. Based on cutting-edge research findings, the book will be of wide interest to scholars and students of Belgian politics, European Politics and Comparative politics.
This book takes stock of Belgium's exceptional and – for some foreign observers –schizophrenic position in the political world and explains its idiosyncrasy to a non-Belgian audience. Offering a broad and comprehensive analysis of Belgian politics, the guiding questions throughout each of the chapters of this book are: Is Belgium a political enigma, and why? Along which axes is Belgium "exceptional" compared to other countries? And what insights does a comparative study of Belgian politics have to offer? The book therefore provides a critical assessment of how Belgian politics "stands out" internationally, both in good and bad ways – including consociationalism, federalism, democratic innovations, Euroscepticism, government formation, gender equality, among others – and which factors can explain Belgium's exceptional position. Based on cutting-edge research findings, the book will be of wide interest to scholars and students of Belgian politics, European Politics and Comparative politics.