Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Acknowledgements -- List of Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1 Why Euroscepticism Matters -- Eurosceptics: channels of influence in the EU -- Euroscepticism and the evolution of EU governance: towards a less supranational Union? -- Euroscepticism outside the EU: implications for international relations -- Euroscepticism: a welcome thorn in the EU's side -- Conclusion -- 2 Varieties of Euroscepticism -- Euroscepticism across time: a historical overview -- Utilitarian Euroscepticism -- Political Euroscepticism -- Value-based Euroscepticism -- Cultural anti-Europeanism -- Conclusion -- 3 A Geography of Euroscepticism -- Different countries, different Euroscepticism(s) -- Accession processes and seniority as an EU member -- Collective utilitarian assessment of EU membership -- Degree of fit between the EU and national institutions -- Reference to 'Europe' in nation-building processes -- Strength and sense of national identity -- Euroscepticism at regional level -- Conclusion -- 4 Political Elites -- Elites' conversion to 'Europe': 'limited, short-ranged and tactical' (Haas 1958) -- Explaining party-based Euroscepticism -- Parties of government: a mainstreaming of Euroscepticism? -- Political elites in the European Parliament: enthusiastic Europeans? -- Conclusion -- 5 National Institutions -- The compliance problem: Euroscepticism through the back door? -- Administrations, courts and parliaments: loyal applicants of EU law? -- Member states and the European Court of Justice: towards a more tense relationship -- Conclusion -- 6 Popular Euroscepticism -- Patterns of support before Maastricht: an ambiguous public opinion -- Post-Maastricht Euroscepticism: symptom of a national democratic malaise -- Utilitarian scepticism and concerns over the redistributive consequences of integration.

During the crisis, support for the EU has declined noticeably in many European Union member states. While previous research on European public opinion has mainly focused on the impact of domestic country- and individual-level factors on public attitudes towards the EU, this paper argues that developments in other EU member states can also have a significant impact on domestic euroscepticism. Specifically, deteriorating economic and fiscal conditions in other member states can lead to concerns in domestic publics about possible negative spillovers on the domestic economy and the ability of the EU to deliver positive economic outcomes. This in turn may lead to rising euroscepticism at the domestic level. The analysis of a panel data set for the EU as a whole and the euro area countries lends support to these arguments by showing that higher unemployment rates and government debt levels in other European countries are systematically related to lower levels of trust in the EU domestically.

International audience ; Élément-clé des traditions politiques et des modes de mobilisation outre-Manche, l'hostilité à l'Union européenne est l'un des enjeux majeurs du référendum organisé le 23 juin 2016. Réactivant une certaine idée de l'exception britannique, l'euroscepticisme offre aussi un prisme aux luttes d'influence que se livrent les différents partis politiques dans la conquête de leur électorat. Cet essai articule les aspects historiques, sociologiques et politiques de l'euroscepticisme made in Britain.

International audience ; Élément-clé des traditions politiques et des modes de mobilisation outre-Manche, l'hostilité à l'Union européenne est l'un des enjeux majeurs du référendum organisé le 23 juin 2016. Réactivant une certaine idée de l'exception britannique, l'euroscepticisme offre aussi un prisme aux luttes d'influence que se livrent les différents partis politiques dans la conquête de leur électorat. Cet essai articule les aspects historiques, sociologiques et politiques de l'euroscepticisme made in Britain.

International audience ; From a rational choice institutionalist perspective, Euroscepticism is little more than a set of preferences by citizens, parties and interest groups about institutional design in Europe. If actors' expect policy outcomes to move closer to their ideal positions as a result of European integration, they will be Euro-enthusiastic (as many centrists are). But, if they feel that policies will move further away from their ideal positions, they will be Eurosceptic (as many extremists are). This simple idea has broad historical and geographical relevance, relating to how actors view the design of multilevel polities, and how these institutional preferences change in response to policy outcomes of the central institutions.