Suchergebnisse

The author thematizes the concept of presidentialization of parliamentary democracies, which was developed most systematically in comparative politics by Thomas Poguntke & Paul Webb. The concept of presidentialization designates a process through which parliamentary systems become increasingly presidential in their functional logic & political practice, with no actual alteration of the formal institutional arrangement, ie., of the type of regime. The initial presidentialist processes were observed in British politics of the 1960s, & they were analyzed through a descriptive debate on whether the British Government was prime ministerial or cabinet. The main theoretical rival to the concept of presidentialization is the core executive model, which was expounded in the early 1990s by Dunleavy & Rhodes. According to the core executive model, relations between the principal actors within executive power are determined by dependence, not domination. According to the concept of presidentialization, parliamentary systems are characterized by a shift from collective to individual political might & responsibility. The principal actor is the Prime Minister, who dominates the other actors due to the institutional & personal resources at his disposal. Research into presidentialization can be conducted on the levels of executive power, of political parties & of the electoral process. Adapted from the source document.

The author's starting point is Locke's classical thesis that the rulers & the ruled are subject to universal laws & that their abuses are prevented by the institutional means of power sharing. The rule according to which nobody can be a judge in their own affairs unconditionally applies in all court or administrative proceedings. The problem arises when this legal thinking is applied to parliaments. Namely, in parliamentary work the incompatibility of the mandates of the legislative & the executive branch is annulled since the executive power gains the upper hand in the composition & substance of the legislature. Besides, The basic law (Grundgesetz) provides MPs with indemnity in their voting behavior & guarantees to them immunity from punishment for certain acts that other citizens would not be able to get away with. This relative freedom & independence of MPs is corrected by the rule books on the behavior of MPs that envision the necessity of their ethical conduct. The violations of the rules are sanctioned not so much by moderatorial law as by political means. The author's opinion is that deciding on their own affairs cannot be universally granted to parliaments. Constitutions allow, even call for, certain decisions on one's own affairs to be made. However, due to insufficient outside control, self-control must be increased, which implies legal obedience on the part of MPs so that laws become meaningful for all participants. Besides the ethical & political pressures that force the MPs to behave in a law-abiding manner, laws also exert positive pressure on them to see to it that their decisions serve the public good. Adapted from the source document.

According to Carl Schmitt, liberal parliamentarism & democracy are founded on conflicting principles: the former on the principle of rational deliberation, ie, on the idea that political will in a modern country is formed through rational discussion; & the latter on the use of power as an instrument of political activity, which homogenizes the national majority & eliminates divergent minorities. Schmitt considers that the principle of power is taking over deliberation in modern countries, & thus abandoning the conditions for liberal parliamentarism. On another level, Schmitt argues that the contrast of deliberation & power is repeated in liberal-democratic institutions as the division of powers between the multiparty parliament, which fosters rational discussion, & executive power, which is the instrument of political activity & must be legitimized in parliament. The weakness of liberal democracies is the empowering of those political forces (fascism, communism) that reject political dialogue as a process of competition between various platforms in front of the electorate, & instead see it as a means of imposing a single, self-serving truth. The author concludes that Schmitt has missed the key dimension of liberal democracy, because his critique is based on an outdated, neo-Kantian methodological position. As the analog to Rickert's nomothetic science, Schmitt in his political theory opposes rational generalizations & irrational content. However, the main point is that liberal political science as a constituent part of the political process operates between two political media, speech & action, without destroying the plurality of political positions. Adapted from the source document.

The author devotes the first portion of the article to an analysis of several modern 'two-house' parliamentary systems, & shows the factors influencing their formation in federal & unitary states. An analysis of the relationship between the two houses in some political system leads to the conclusion that this system has considerable influence in federal countries (with the exception of Austria), while there is considerably less influence on unitary states -- where the role of the first house is considerably greater than that of the second in law-making & executive functions. The second portion of the article is an analysis of the relationship between the Representatives' House and House of Counties in the Croatian parliament. Although a two-house system by definition, it lacks equality between the two houses in the law-making process & their stances toward the executive. They each have different powers, their members are elected in different ways, & their relationship with the executive differs. This parliament can be characterized as an asymmetrical two-house parliamentary system. Although the House of Counties can initiate laws, it cannot by law, pass laws. Thus, the House of Counties is seen as an advisory body &, in some degree, a supervisory body with the right of veto, & as a house through which regional interests are articulated & represented. Although the real center of power is in the hands of the state & the president, & not in the parliament -- since the Croatian political system is based on a concept of imbalance favoring the executive -- the new Parliament is the real framework for fundamental & long-term political, economic, & institutional transformation in Croatia, as seen by the intensive legislative, supervisory, & legitimation functions of the past two years. 5 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

The discussion about the character & actual role of the parliament in Croatia does not easily differentiate political & scientific opinions, which is in accord with the experiences of advanced democracies. The author considers a scientific debate possible, however, if it is fundamental in the comparative method, & formulates three comparative starting points for such a debate. First, the historical role of the parliament as a symbol of Croatian statehood must be considered. The author considers that in the second half of the 19th century, the power of the governor (ban) was significantly more important in the preservation of Croatian sovereignty than the parliament. Second, a critical grading of the socialist theories on the rule of representative assembly is necessary. These have considerable influence on policy & theoretical discussion in postsocialist countries. Third, caution must be used in approaching Western-style parliamentarism, where the seat of power is in the executive, & the parliament plays only a minor control function. The author suggests that discussion about the Croatian parliament concentrate on increasing constitutional & functional possibilities & roles; eg, through institutions of parliamentary investigations, interpellations, & ombudsman. Adapted from the source document.

The author's starting assumption is that the state monopoly of force is being deconstructed through the fragmentation of security interests, the privatization of public security, & the executive deficits of the state monopoly of force. It is shown that the privatization of public security is an extremely subtle phenomenon with a huge scope. Namely, the economization of habitats resulting from globalization leads to the mushrooming of private security services. The first consequence of this is the fragmentation of the social sphere & the creation of privately organized protective zones; the second is the partnership of private & polity interests. The author consequently concludes that the state cannot any longer guarantee internal security. The segregationist culture contributes to the diminishing of the state monopoly of force. This is especially noticeable in the Third World countries where force is often not controlled by the state but by various communitarian or commercial organizations. The supranational integrational processes have a similar effect. The author concludes that at work here is the expansion of the security partnerships with which the state surrounds itself; this strikes a rather postmodern note: the system of a once all-powerful Leviathan today is just a notch removed from its natural state. 20 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author considers basic controversies surrounding the constitutional model & reality of Croatian parliamentarism. He contends that all these issues can be summarized in one debatable question: Is it a fair assessment that the Croatian political system & Croatian parliamentarism are marred by the concentration of power wielded by the upper echelon of the government, especially the President of the Republic, while the parliament is powerless & marginalized. The author challenges this assumption by systematically dividing basic characteristics of parliamentary governments & semipresidential systems into specific examples of both foreign policy & majority & consensus decision making; while emphasizing the influence of the party system on constitutional government. He believes that a change from a semipresidential system to a purely parliamentary system would not significantly affect the relationship between the law-making & executive arms of government. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into the position of the Constitutional Court in the light of the proposed Constitutional Law on amendments & modifications of the Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court that would change some powers of the Constitutional Court. A short historical review shows that the Croatian people belong to the European civilizational setting, as evidenced by numerous documents & statutes that have regulated the rule of law in Croatia. According to the Croatian Constitution, the Constitutional Court is assigned a special place outside the system of the division of power into the legislative, the executive, & the judiciary; it is a special constitutional category that cannot be under the scrutiny of law since it scrutinizes laws. The author goes on to enumerate the changes in the jurisdiction & the operation of the Court envisaged in this new proposal of the Constitutional Law. The author concludes that constitutional courts are the very core of Western democracy & that they protect constitutions as a constantly developing living form. 59 References. Adapted from the source document.

Na osnovu analize izvornih arhivskih dokumenata i propisa objavljenih u službenim listovima, opisuje se djelokrug, ustroj i sastav Prezidijuma Sabora NRH. Njegovi temelji postavljeni su u radu Zemaljskog antifašističkog vijeća narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske (ZAVNOH), odnosno njegova Predsjedništva, koje je kao uže tijelo plenuma osnovano 9. svibnja 1944. godine. Na Četvrtom zasjedanju održanom 24. i 25. srpnja 1945. u Zagrebu, ZAVNOH je promijenio naziv u Narodni sabor Hrvatske, a njegovo Predsjedništvo od tada djeluje kao Predsjedništvo Narodnog sabora Hrvatske. U razdoblju 1945.–1953. njegovo djelovanje može se podijeliti u četiri mandatna razdoblja: Predsjedništvo Narodnog sabora Hrvatske/Prezidijum Sabora NRH (25. srpnja 1945.–30. studenoga 1946.), Prezidijum Ustavotvornog sabora NRH (30. studenoga 1946.–20. siječnja 1947.), Prezidijum Sabora NRH prvoga saziva (20. siječnja 1947.–4. prosinca 1950.) i Prezidijum Sabora NRH drugoga saziva (4. prosinca 1950.–6. veljače 1953.). U prvom dijelu rada opisuje se osnivanje i prestanak rada Prezidijuma Sabora, u drugom njegov djelokrug, a u trećem ustroj i sastav po mandatnim razdobljima. Njegov ustroj i djelokrug uspoređeni su s ustrojem i djelokrugom Prezidijuma Narodne skupštine FNRJ i prezidijuma drugih jugoslavenskih republika. Rezultati istraživanja prezentirani su kombinacijom tematskog i kronološkog pristupa, a dijelom su sistematizirani u obliku tabelarnih prikaza. ; This paper describes the scope, structure and the composition of the Presidium of Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia (PRC) which was active as a political governmental body in Croatia from 1945 to 1953. According to the Yugoslav constitutional system of government, the same political body existed on the federal level as the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY), as well as in every republic-member of the Yugoslav federation and the scope, organization and composition of the Presidium of Parliament are compared with the scope, organization and composition of those bodies. The foundations of the activities of the Presidium of Parliament, as well as other central governmental institutions in Croatia (namely, Parliament, Government, and Supreme Court) were laid in the work of the State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia (ZAVNOH) i.e. its Presidency, since until the end of the war they together performed the legislative, executive and judiciary government. During the 4th session that took place in Zagreb from 24 to 25 July 1945 ZAVNOH changed is title to the People's Parliament of Croatia and since then its Presidency worked as the Presidency of the People's Parliament of Croatia. In the period from 1945 to 1953 its activity can be divided into four mandate periods: the Presidency of the People's Parliament of Croatia/the Presidium of the Parliament of the PRC (25 July 1945–30 November 1946), the Presidium of the Constituent Parliament of the PRC (30 November 1946–20 January 1947), the Presidium of the 1st Session of the Parliament of the PRC (20 January 1947–4 December 1950) and the Presidium of the 2nd Session of the Parliament of the PRC (4 December 1950–6 February 1953). Its existence in the system of governmental power is the result of taking over the Soviet constitutional solutions about organizing the state and governmental institutions in the 1946 constitution of the FPRY and through it also in the constitutions of each federal unit. It was the main legislative body in the period until the constituting of the Constituent Parliament of the PRC, since the Parliament of the PRC only had a single short five-day session in late August 1946. This is confirmed by the information about 29 laws passed by the Presidium of Parliament in the period from 8 September 1945 to 20 November 1946. Besides legislative, it also performed other functions from the jurisdiction then belonging to the Parliament. The constitution of the PRC from 1946 bestowed upon it performing tasks that are usually given to the president of the state (representing in the country the people's and state sovereignty of the PRC, calling the general elections, granting pardons, awarding medals and recognitions), as well as other executive tasks partly closely linked to the legislative activities. The special function pertained to supervising the people's committees. The important difference in the scope in relation to the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the FPRY was that it did not have the authority in the area of foreign affairs. Even though the constitution of the PRC from January 1947 lists it together with the Parliament in the chapter on the highest bodies of the governmental power in Croatia, the sources and constitutional-legal texts of the time, in accordance with the principle of unity of power, define it as a body which "stems from the Parliament" and is subordinated to it. Also, despite being formally constitutionally defined as one of the highest bodies of governmental power in Croatia, in reality it was the Party's transmission, since the actual power and monopoly in decisionmaking was in the hands of the bodies of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia/the League of Communists of Yugoslavia i.e. the Communist Party of Croatia/the League of Communists of Croatia. It was a collegiate body comprised of members of the Parliament. The decision of its composition was formally passed by the Parliament, but based on the conclusions reached during sessions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia. It was elected for the same term as the Parliament, but it continued to perform its duties after the dissolution of the Parliament, until the election of the new Presidium of Parliament. From 1945 to 1953 the total of 45 MPs were included in its activities. 13 of them were members during all four mandate terms, 11 during two and 14 during only one. The structure and the way of work were determined by the Rulebook dated from 7 August 1947. They were the exact copy of the structure and the way of work of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the FPRY, with differences deriving from different jurisdictions (federal, republic) of these two bodies.

Mixed government, which is commonly regarded as a distinctly medieval form of government, is relevant also to contemporary constitutional states. It is the best form of government, since the aristocratic element is a continuous source of virtue, especially of justice, & a check not only on the executive, as the monarchical element which is the seat of political power, & the legislature, as the democratic element which expresses the will of the majority, but also groups & institutions that have the might & will to impose themselves as oligarchies. Mixed government is also the form of government that is practiced by most developed contemporary constitutional states: US, UK, France, Switzerland, Germany, etc. European nobility is the original aristocratic institution, by virtue of the fact that it was a system for the transfer of both virtue & general conditions of life. Three institutions that emerged in the late Middle Ages assumed structures & functions of the nobility. The first is the clergy. When, as a result of the differentiation of feudal society ethical & intellectual virtues of the nobility could no longer maintain general conditions of life, the clergy, by virtue of their abstract knowledge that ranged from philosophy & theology to law & medicine, became a class of new experts in generalities & thereby a new aristocracy. The second modern aristocratic institution is the judiciary, which has a structure & function similar to earlier aristocracies. The task of judges is to establish the highest virtue of constitutionalism. It is justice by law, which regulates general conditions of life in the state & society. What qualifies judges for the task is expertise in the new generality. The expertise includes not only education & experience in law but also impeccable private life & demonstrated professional ethics. The third modern aristocratic institution is the profession, whose most important instance is the legal profession. It shares its structure & function partly with the judiciary & partly with other professions. It seems that modern professions are degenerating. In the key area of data processing, due to rapid changes of technology, professions as systems of the transfer of virtue do not even seem to be possible. Professional aristocracies are replaced increasingly by oligarchies of capitalists & technocrats. Adapted from the source document.

Način funkcioniranja i prilagodba nacionalnog sustava upravljanja i provedbe instrumenata kohezijske (u nastavku: regionalne) politike Europske unije (u nastavku: EU) te, posljedično, učinkovitost toga sustava, ima presudan utjecaj na dinamiku i svrsishodnost povlačenja sredstava fondova regionalne politike EU. Uzimajući u obzir aktualnost te teme uslijed završetka proračunskog razdoblja EU, 2014. - 2020. i perspektivu novog proračunskog razdoblja EU (2021. - 2027.), doktorska disertacija izdiže se iznad vremenskih ograničenja proračunskih razdoblja jer analizira problematiku korištenja sredstava regionalne politike EU u kontekstu znanstvenog doprinosa predlaganju modela institucionalnog okruženja sustava upravljanja instrumentima (fondovima) regionalne politike EU u Hrvatskoj. U tom kontekstu, jedan od najvećih problema i izazova je činjenica da je Hrvatska zadnja država koja je postala članica EU te istovremeno i jedina koja koristi fondove regionalne politike EU samo jednu proračunsku perspektivu. Stoga je i dodatni izazov prikupiti dostatne empirijske i ekonometrijske spoznaje o funkcioniranju sustava upravljanja fondovima regionalne politike u odabranim državama EU, a da bi zaključci bili primjenjivi na Hrvatsku. Posebna pozornost posvećena je prikazu sustava upravljanja fondovima regionalne politike EU u državama sličnih usporednih karakteristika kao i Hrvatska, putem empirijskih spoznaja i zakonitosti, suvremenih pristupa i teorija koje pridonose rješavanju aktualnih, kompleksnih, teorijskih i praktičnih problema, a koji do sada nisu dovoljno istraženi niti prisutni u nacionalnom istraživačkom području. Rezultati organizacijske analize te analize učinkovitosti sustava upravljanja fondovima EU u odabranim državama u fokusu je istraživanja provedenog u okviru ove doktorske disertacije. Znanstveno istraživanje temelj je za davanje smjernica pri definiranju optimalnog modela sustava upravljanja fondovima regionalne politike EU u Hrvatskoj koji, do trenutka izrade doktorske disertacije, zbog svoje nedovoljne učinkovitosti, kompleksnosti sustava donošenja odluka i svojevrsne "isprepletenosti" institucija u procesu pripreme i implementacije, negativno utječe na maksimiziranje iskorištavanja sredstava fondova regionalne politike EU. Kako bi se iz postojećih sustava upravljanja odabranih država EU empirijski mogli utvrditi ključni institucionalni čimbenici apsorpcije fondova EU, uzimaju se u obzir postojeći sustavi upravljanja. Znanstvenim istraživanjem i komparativnom analizom sustava upravljanja fondovima regionalne politike EU u devet država središnje i istočne Europe te iskustvima funkcioniranja hrvatskog sustava, nastoji se formulirati optimalni okvir nacionalnog sustava upravljanja fondovima regionalne politike EU koji bi mogao omogućiti donošenje kvalitetnijih strateških odluka izvršnoj vlasti kako bi se isti, u što je moguće većoj mjeri, odrazio na gospodarski rast putem učinkovitosti korištenja sredstava fondova regionalne politike EU. Rezultati provedene ekonometrijske analize doprinose zaključcima koji potvrđuju da su primljene bespovratne pomoći EU dovele do povećanja gospodarskog razvoja država EU. Međutim, sama alokacija sredstava pomoći nije nužno dovela do povećanja kvalitete institucionalnog okvira te konkurentnosti analiziranih zemalja. Stoga se potvrđuje važnost uspostavljanja institucionalnog okvira upravljanja fondovima EU koji, ne samo da će dovesti do povećanja apsorpcije fondova EU, nego će unaprijediti opću djelotvornost javnog sektora te konkurentnost države. Stoga je, temeljem sustavnog i sveobuhvatnog znanstvenog istraživanja u ovoj doktorskoj disertaciji, predložen i argumentiran model institucionalnog sustava za upravljanje i provedbu instrumenata (fondova) regionalne politike EU u Hrvatskoj, a primjenjiv je u kratkom i dugom roku. ; The national system of management and implementation of the European Union (hereinafter: EU) cohesion (hereinafter: regional) policy, its manner of functioning, its adjustment and, consequently, the effectiveness of this system, has a decisive influence on the dynamics and expediency of drawing from EU regional policy funds. Considering the relevance of this topic due to the end of the European budgetary period 2014-2020, and the perspective of the new budgetary period (2021-2027), this doctoral thesis rises above the time limits of budget periods because it analyses the use of EU regional policy funds in the context of scientific contribution to a draft model of the institutional framework for managing EU regional policy instruments (funds) in Croatia. In this context, one of the biggest problems and challenges is the fact that Croatia was the last to become an EU member country and at the same time the only one that uses EU regional policy funds for only one budgetary period. Therefore, it is an additional challenge to gather enough empirical and econometric knowledge about the functioning of the EU regional policy funds management system in selected EU countries, for the conclusions to apply to Croatia. Special attention was paid to the presentation of the EU regional policy funds management systems in countries with similar characteristics comparative to Croatia, through empirical knowledge and laws, modern approaches and theories that contribute to solving current, complex, theoretical and practical problems, which have not been sufficiently researched or present in the national research area. The results of the organizational and efficiency analyses of the EU funds management system in selected countries are the focus of the research conducted within this doctoral thesis. Scientific research served as the basis for providing guidelines for defining the optimal model of the EU regional policy funds management system in Croatia, which, by the time of this analysis, due to its low efficiency, the complexity of the decision-making system and a kind of "intertwining" of institutions in the process of preparation and implementation, has failed to maximize the utilization of EU regional policy funds. To be able to empirically determine the key institutional factors for the EU funds absorption from the existing management systems of selected EU countries, the existing management systems are considered. Through scientific research and comparative analysis of the EU regional funds management system in nine Central and Eastern European countries, along with the experiences of the Croatian system, this paper aims to determine an optimal framework for a national EU regional policy fund management system that would enable the executive power to adopt better strategic decisions. The abovementioned framework should, to the greatest extent possible, stimulate economic growth through the efficient use of EU regional policy funds. The results of the conducted econometric analysis contribute to the conclusions confirming that the received EU grants have led to an increase in the economic development of EU countries. However, the allocation of funds alone did not necessarily lead to an increase in the quality of the institutional environment and the competitiveness of the countries analysed. Furthermore, it is confirmed that an institutional framework for the management of EU funds should be established, which will not only increase the absorption of EU funds but will also improve the overall efficiency of the public sector and the competitiveness of the state. Therefore, this doctoral thesis, based on systematic and comprehensive scientific research, proposes and asserts a model of an institutional system for management and implementation of instruments (funds) of EU regional policy in Croatia that is applicable in the short and long term.

Djelovanje Hrvatskog sabora u komunističkom razdoblju (1945.-1990.) nije cjelovito obrađena tema. Ovim člankom daje se prilog poznavanju njegove organizacije u razdoblju od 1963. do 1974. godine. Detaljno je opisana razgranata struktura i aktivnost njegovih pet vijeća (Republičko, Privredno, Prosvjetno-kulturno, Socijalnozdravstveno i Organizaciono-političko) i radnih tijela, koju ilustrira i broj održanih sjednica. Između ostalog, to je trebalo pokazivati položaj Sabora kao formalno najvišeg tijela vlasti, odnosno centra u kojem se donose najvažnije političke odluke o svim područjima života u Hrvatskoj. U vezi s tim, naznačena je potreba za detaljnom analizom odnosa između formalnog (de iure) i stvarnog (de facto) položaja Sabora u tadašnjem političkom sustavu vlasti, kako bi se odgovorilo na pitanje je li, na koji način i u kojoj mjeri taj položaj bio oslabljen u odnosu na druga državna politička tijela (ponajprije Izvršno vijeće Sabora), odnosno instrumentaliziran od strane središnjih tijela Saveza komunista Jugoslavije/Hrvatske. Rezultati istraživanja prezentirani su kombinacijom tematskog i kronološkog pristupa, a na kraju članka sistematizirani su u obliku tabličnog prikaza. ; The organisation and the activities of the Croatian Parliament in the communist period (1945-1990) is not a fully researched topic. The paper gives a contribution to the knowledge of its organisation in the period from 1963 to 1974. Its branched structure and the activities of its councils and working bodies are described in detail, which is also illustrated by the number of held sessions. By the Yugoslavian constitution adopted in April 1963, also called "the charter of selfmanagement", the name of the state was changed from People's to Socialist, its socialist attributes were emphasized, and selfmanagement was introduced in all segments of the society. By the new republican constitutions, such changes were also carried out in all then-existing Yugoslavian republics, including Croatia. In the forefront were placed »the sovereign rights of the working people and the Yugoslavian nations which they exercise«, inter alia, as representatives of the working people in councils of federal and republican assemblies. It had affected the organisation of the highest formal political institutions of the government, including federal and republican assemblies, which were declared as »the highest state and self-government authorities, under the law and obligations« of federation, i.e. the republic. The declarative constitutional concept on the assemblies as the highest state and self-government authorities implied the shift in their organisation and activities from the traditional legislative bodies and »law factories« towards »the responsible policy holders«. In other words, »becoming the working selfgovernment bodies«, assemblies were meant to become the centres in which »the whole social practice and harmonised politics is gathered«. Thus, for example, by the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia from April 1963, it was declared that the Parliament (Sabor) can discuss and adopt declarations and resolutions »on all issues of common interest for the Republic [.] laying down values on politics in certain area and the means of its achievement«. The Croatian Parliament's Rules of Procedure from 1965 provided the possibility of convening a General Croatian Conference (Opći sabor Hrvatske), i.e. joint sessions »on all issues of the common interest for the Republic« of all of Parliament's councils with the Central Committee of the Socialist League of Working People of Croatia and the Republican Committee for Croatia of the Association of Trade Unions in Yugoslavia. The main characteristic of the organisation of the Croatian Parliament in the period from 1963 to 1974 was its complex structure. In order to express its working character and central role in the political decision-making process in all spheres of life in Croatia, it was organised as a five-cameral institution. It was the highest number of its chambers in the whole socialist period: until 1953 it was unicameral, in the period 1953-1963 bicameral, and in the period 1974-1990 a three-cameral institution. Those five chambers were: the Republican Council, the Economic Council, the Educational and Cultural Council, the Social and Health Council and the Organisational and Political Council. The Republican Council had 120 representatives, directly elected by the municipal assemblies and citizens. The other four councils had 80 representatives each, elected by the municipal assemblies among the workers across the working areas within the competence of each council. Except the Presidency of Parliament and its five councils, during the whole period 110 different permanent or temporary working bodies were established. Of that total, there were 27 joint working bodies of Parliament as a whole; the Republican Council had 20, the Economic Council 14, the Educational and Cultural Council 15, the Social and Health Council 18, and the Organisational and Political Council 16 permanent or temporary working bodies. The Parliament's councils and working bodies held in total 3 960 sessions, i.e. 360 per year. By comparison, in the period 1947-1953 during which it was organised as a unicameral body, the Parliament and its working bodies held in total 220 sessions (around 30 per year). In the period 1953- 1963 during which it was organised as a bicameral body, the Parliament and its working bodies held in total 1224 sessions, i.e. around 120 per year. More detailed data on the number of sessions held in the analysed period are listed in the table at the end of this paper. The table also includes a systematic overview of all working bodies which were described earlier in this paper, llustrating at the same time the dynamics of changes in their establishment and elimination. Some authors describe the Parliamentary institutions in the communist states with the metaphor rubber stamp legislatures, meaning the institutions with small practical power in the political decisionmaking process, which automatically put a stamp on the legislative proposals of their governments, i.e. communist parties as the real owners of the political power. Some of the researches singled out as exceptions the Polish Sejm and the Yugoslavian Federal Assembly (in the frame of the political system established by the Yugoslavian constitution from 1974). That opens a new research topic about whether the Croatian Parliament in the period 1963-1974 was also "a paradoxical institution" or an exception. In other words, the relation between the formal (de iure) and the real (de facto) position of Croatian Parliament in the political system of that time should be more closely researched, as well as to find whether its position was weakened, in what way and to what extent by the comparison with other state political institutions (notably the Executive Council of Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Croatia), i.e. instrumentalized by the central bodies of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia/Croatia.

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.