The Ambivalence of Executive Power in Canada
In: The Executive and Public LawPower and Accountability in Comparative Perspective, S. 52-88
In: The Executive and Public LawPower and Accountability in Comparative Perspective, S. 52-88
In: The Constitution of the Russian Federation : A Contextual Analysis
In: Jepson studies in leadership
In: Jepson Studies in Leadership Ser.
In: Arizona State Law Journal, Forthcoming
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In: Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2021-20
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In: Dennis Patterson, Anna Soderstern (eds.), A Companion to European Union Law and International Law (Wiley Blackwell)
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In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 673-674
ISSN: 1537-5927
In: Executive Power of the European Union, S. 28-47
In: The review of politics, Band 70, Heft 3, S. 473-476
ISSN: 0034-6705
In: Presidential studies quarterly, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 540-547
ISSN: 0360-4918
In: Reshaping the British Constitution, S. 79-101
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 181, Heft 1, S. 59-73
ISSN: 1552-3349
In: UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1703014
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Working paper
Latin America is experiencing the longest democratic period in its history, yet power is still heavily concentrated in the executive. In fact, presidents are exercising power to extend their terms and enhance control over elections, often through completely democratic means. This phenomenon challenges our understanding of the relationship between democracy and the rule of law. This dissertation combines institutional and agency approaches to ask why and when presidents gained and exercised power over elections, arguably the most critical component of democracy. I focus on Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, three Andean countries that share certain historic and cultural contexts, yet vary greatly in their democratic development. First, I conceptualize, measure, and analyze the transformation of executive power over elections in formal law, or "institutionalized executive power" (IEP), since transition to democracy (1979 – 2013). Colombia witnessed consistent decline in IEP, Ecuador's trend was mixed, and Venezuela demonstrated an overall increase. Based on qualitative analysis of an original dataset, I argue that institutional factors are the key causal components explaining variation in formal executive powers over elections: configuration (government entities with authority over electoral management, which can be centralized or decentralized); and constraints (restrictions on changing electoral law, which can be weak or strong).The logical next question is how and when presidents exercised their powers. I developed a measure of "exercised executive power" (EEP) over elections and traced presidents' actions over two decades (1993 – 2013). I found that EEP increased over time in all three countries. This was driven largely by political factors, but within the institutional context. I argue that presidents with strong mandates – particularly a majority in the legislature – most often exercised power over elections (and succeeded in their efforts) because of their ability to overcome institutional configuration and constraints. Despite decades of democratization, weak institutions continue to facilitate actions of strong presidents, compromising democratic quality. However, insights from Colombia demonstrate that balance of power among government entities and legal safeguards can temper even the most popular presidents. These findings inform our theoretical understanding of processes that contribute to democratic strength or decline.
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In: Studies in American political development: SAPD, Band 6, Heft 1, S. 217-221
ISSN: 1469-8692
To be taken seriously is the hope of a serious author, next to which being agreed with is a petty affair. If this sentiment sounds inhuman, and too good to be true, it is because it abstracts from the desire for recognition, which can take the form of desire for political power. Sheldon Wolin takes my bookTaming the Prince1seriously as—as if it were!—an important political influence. He flatters the all-too-human side of my soul by fastening on the book's conclusion and working backwards from that.