Suchergebnisse

Introduction: the difference that doesn't make a difference -- The promise machine: between "techno-failure" and market failure -- Creative destruction and the new socialities -- Failure, forgotten: on buffering, latency, and the monetization of waiting -- Too big to fail: banks, derivatives, and market collapse -- Conclusion: failure, remembered.

Arguments that state intervention in the economy is superior to a policy of laissez‐faire are usually based on the misperception that government will succeed where the market is thought to fail. Alexander Shand, formerly Senior Lecturer in Economics at Manchester Polytechnic, surveys economic theory to demonstrate that the state itself is prone to failure; government intervention is often the cause of deficiencies in the market economy.

There is some tendency to lump together policy failures arising from different sources and having different fundamental characteristics. This is a problem conceptually, as well as for building effective theory about policy failure, but it can also be a practical difficulty for policymakers if they fail to differentiate these various possible roots of failure. This paper explores the linkages among these types of failure within the public sector.

This essay examines the role of failure in the work of Leo Bersani through the lens of self-shattering, impersonal narcissism, and castration. It revisits Bersani's account of narcissism and masochism in "Erotic Assumptions" and critiques his subsequent shift toward impersonal narcissism in Homos and Intimacies. The essay concludes by showing how the notion of castration, roundly rejected by Bersani, may address the impasse between solipsism and sociality that he attempted to resolve through sameness.

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- CONTRIBUTORS -- INTRODUCTION -- PART I MUST DEMOCRACY FAIL? -- 1 DEMOCRACY AS FAILURE -- 2 FAILING DEMOCRACY -- 3 WHY NO GOOD, VERY BAD, ELITIST DEMOCRACY IS AN ACHIEVEMENT, NOT A FAILURE -- PART II FAILURES OF REPRESENTATION -- 4 REPRESENTATION FAILURE -- 5 DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND DEMOCRATIC FAILURE A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH -- 6 DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATIVES AS EPISTEMIC INTERMEDIARIES -- 7 POLITICAL PARTIES AND PUBLIC POLICY -- PART III FAILURES OF KNOWLEDGE -- 8 DU BOIS'S DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY -- 9 PRETEXTUAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION COMMENT ON DARBY -- 10 DEMOCRATIC REMEDIES IF IGNORANCE THREATENS DEMOCRACY -- INDEX

How can market failure interact with choice of institutional reform made by an electorate? We study this question in the framework of occupational choice where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our model, market failure due to unobservability of talent endogenously creates a class structure that affects vote on institutional reform. We find that the preferences of these classes may be highly nonmonotonic in wealth and are often aligned in ways that creates a tension between institutional reforms that are growth maximising and those that are politically feasible. This is in contrast to the world without market failure where the electorate unanimously vote in favour of surplus maximising institutional reform. We find that inefficiencies of market failure may be further amplifed by political choices made by interest groups created in the inefficient market.

We study how inefficiencies of market failure may be further amplified by political choices made by interest groups created in the inefficient market. We take an occupational choice framework, where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our model, market failure due to unobservability of talent endogenously creates a class structure that affects voting on institutional reform. In contrast to the world without market failure where the electorate unanimously vote in favour of surplus maximising institutional reform, we find that the preferences of these classes are often aligned in ways that creates a tension between surplus maximising and politically feasible institutional reforms.