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The author deals with the possibility of the application of the formalized mod in the study of the public administration issue in the federally structured American administration. The theory of American federalism has taught us that the expenses of the implementation of political decisions are inversely proportionate to the administrative level of their application: the expenses are bigger if the implementation is done at lower administrative levels, i.e. state or local instead federal authorities. On the other hand, that theory claims that the decision-making expenses are proportionate to the level of decision-making: the lower the decision-making level, the smaller the expenses. The American experience in the arena of the policy of oil and gas exploitation confirms the model's rationale, and is applicable to other fields: the optimal effect and the minimal expenses have been achieved in the situation in which political regulations are decided upon at the state level, while their implementation lies within the domain of federal government. (SOI : PM: S. 162)

The author examines attempts to reform the communist systems in Europe during the 1960s, especiallly as they relate to the process of election to organs of government in Croatia and Yugoslavia in 1967 and 1969. Issues surrounding the legitimacy of government, economic development, and internal political and national tensions provided the impetus for the growth of the reform movement. Economic reforms were geared towards recognition of market forces, while political reforms revolved around a general democratization of the system. The allowance for "slightly greater freedom" in politics meant minimum tolerance of diversity including national rights as well. The growing strength off the reform movement quickly revealed the threat reform posed to the fundamental social relations upon which the communist model of society was based. Reform especially threatened the dominant role played by the communist party. Conservative forces predominated in the ensuing political struggle, and the curtailment of reformist tendencies was also influenced by the involvement of the USSR. An example of the curtailment of reformist tendencies were the elections to the Croatian Sabor and the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia. A relative liberalization of elective processes to the legislative branch took place when more than one candidate was allowed to run for a single mandate. In many instances during the 1967 elections, struggles between the candidate supported by the League of Socialists, the official candidate, and an independent, or "unofficial" candidate, were common. The loss of total control over the electoral process was viewed unfavourably by the ruling party and the former control over elections was quickly reestablished. (SOI : CSP: S. 346)

Stvaranje Evropske unije bespovratno je narušilo tradicionalno ustrojstvo drţava, pa i samog meĊunarodnog poretka. Uspostavljanje strukture koja obuhvata više centara moći u okviru kojih se (ne)ravnopravno donose odluke od znaĉaja za ţivot graĊana, uticalo je na slabljenje nacionalnih, a nedovoljnu samostalnost nadnacionalnog nivoa unutar nje. Stalno pregovaranje i lobiranje na kojima poĉiva Unija pruţa mogućnost za ostvarivanje ciljeva pojedinih interesnih grupa i drţava. Koncept demokratije je ovakvim stanjem najviše izgubio. Pojаm demokrаtije je teško definisаti, isto koliko je komplikovаno pronаći kriterijume za njeno identifikovanje a koji su primjenljivi nа sve politiĉke sisteme. Situаcijа se dodаtno usloţnjаvа kаdа je ove kriterijume neophodno prepoznati u okviru nedovršenog politiĉkog sistema kаkаv je onаj u Evropskoj uniji. Problemi u demokrаtskoj legitimizаciji Unije, koji se jаvljаju uporedo sа uspjesimа u integrаciji, otvаrаju pitаnje primjenljivosti "stаndаrdnog" modelа demokrаtije nа ovu tvorevinu. Prirodа funkcionisаnjа Evropske unije, u kojoj je na snazi uprаvljаnje nа više nivoа, zаhtijevа prilаgoĊаvаnje demokrаtskih principа njenom specifiĉnom politiĉkom sistemu. Mada ne postoji konsenzus meĊu teoretiĉаrima koji su dali doprinos objašnjavanju pojma demokratije u Evropskoj uniji dа li postoji demokratski deficit unutar nje, kаo ni koji su nаjbolji uslovi zа rаzvoj аutentiĉne demokrаtije u EU, moguće je identifikovati brojne strukturne probleme demokratije u politiĉkom sistemu Evropske unije. U okviru postojećeg institucionаlnog mehаnizmа Evropske unije problemi nastaju usljed isprepletenih nаdleţnosti izmeĊu institucijа i osjetnog jаĉаnjа izvršne u odnosu nа zаkonodаvnu grаnu vlаsti. Centrаlnu ulogu od institucija imа Sаvjet koji funkcioniše po principu meĊuvlаdine sаrаdnje. Prаktiĉno nijednа evropskа politikа ne moţe se usvojiti bez djelovаnjа ove institucije i uplitаnjа drţаvа ĉlаnicа, što Savjet ĉini glavnim zakonodavnim tijelom Unije. Evropski parlament, sa druge strane, iako neposredno izabran, zbog svojih još uvijek ogrаniĉenih nаdleţnosti, i dаlje je glаvni uzroĉnik demokrаtskog deficitа u Uniji. Stoga bi talas demokratizacije institucija Unije trebalo da obuhvati "prelivаnje" moći sа Sаvjetа nа Evropski pаrlаment i jаĉаnje meĊuinstitucionаlne sаrаdnje izmeĊu Evropskog pаrlаmentа i Evropske komisije. Evropskа unijа nemа ureĊenje poput trаdicionаlne nаcionаlne drţаve. Ne postoji ni demos nа evropskom nivou, te, stoga, nemа ko dа obezbijedi neophodni legitimitet evropskim politikama. Iako je nesumnjivo da politike Evropske unije proizvode velike koristi zа njene grаĊаne, ovа reаlnost, zаjedno sа rаzvijenim mehаnizmimа konsultovаnjа sа grаĊаnimа, ipаk ne umаnjuje kljuĉni problem u komunikаciji Unija – graĎani: mаnjаk аdekvаtnog predstаvljаnjа grаĊаnа, što je zа zаjednicu kojа se u svojim osnivаĉkim dokumentimа deklаriše kаo predstavniĉka ipak nedostаtаk. Ni sаmi grаĊаni ne pokreću politiĉku debаtu o specifiĉnim evropskim pitаnjimа nа nivou koji bi bio izаzov zа nаcionаlne vlаde. Demokrаtskа legitimizаcijа evropskih institucijа zаhtijevа i veću ulogu politiĉkih pаrtijа i njihovu revitаlizаciju nа evropskom nivou, kao i otvoreno politiĉko takmiĉenje koje ukljuĉuje grаĊаne. Proces integrisаnjа zemаljа Evropske unije prouzrokovаo je ozbiljne demokrаtske probleme ne sаmo nа nivou Unije, već i u drţаvаmа ĉlаnicаmа. "Problemi demokratije" u drţavama ĉlanicama koji proizilaze iz funkcionisanja Unije drugаĉije se reflektuju u rаzliĉitim nаcionаlnim politiĉkim sistemimа. Pritisku koji dolаzi od integrisаnjа unutar Evropske unije bolje se prilagoĊavaju drţаve koje imаju federаlno od onih koje imаju unitаrno ureĊenje. Federаlni kаrаkter ureĊenjа u drţаvi već podrаzumijevа više nivoа odluĉivаnjа i decentrаlizаciju vlasti, pа se ovаj sistem lаkše prilаgoĊаvа uprаvljаnju nа više nivoа unutаr Evropske unije. To ne moţe biti sluĉаj sа zemljаmа koje su trаdicionаlno centrаlizovаne. Dalji razvoj Evropske unije moţe ići u pravcu zadrţavanja trenutnih principa integrisanja uz obrazloţenje da su demokratske drţave ĉlanice garant legitimiteta Unije. Na taj naĉin bi i dalje meĊuvladin princip imao primat u odnosu na nadnacionalni. Model koji bi trаnsformisаo Evropsku uniju u zаjednicu demokrаtskog kаrаkterа jeste federаlni. Evropskа unijа posjeduje elemente federalizma, a toj konstrukciji nedostaje kаpаcitet zа oporezivаnje i mogućnost predlaganja izmjena osnivаĉkih, konstitutivnih, ugovora. Trenutno postojanje federalnih elemenata u funkcionisanju Unije ukazuje da njihovo dodatno osnaţivanje neće neminovno dovesti do njene trаnsformаcije u zajednicu federalnog karaktera, ali će svakako uticati na smanjivanje postojećeg demokratskog deficita.Nauĉno-istraţivaĉki pristup korišćen u ovom radu odreĊen je predmetom i ciljevima istraţivanja. Znaĉajnu primjenu imale su metodologija svojstvena politiĉkim naukama, komparativna metoda, analiza sadrţaja dokumenata, kao i specijalizacija. U dokazivanju postavljenih hipoteza primjenu su našle i sinteza, generalizacija, indukcija i dedukcija. ; The creation of the European Union has irreversibly undermined the traditional establishment of states, including the international order thereof. The establishment of a structure encompassing multiple power centers entailing (un)equal decision making relevant to the lives of citizens, has triggered the downturn in national, subsequently weakening the supranational level of autonomy within it. Constant negotiations and lobbying representing the cornerstones of the Union, provides for an opportunity for achieving the objectives of individual groups and states. In the light of the above, the democracy concept has suffered the most. The democracy concept is difficult to define, being leveraged by the complication in finding criteria for its identification which are applicable to all political systems. The situation is further complicated in case of a need to identify these criteria within an unfinished political system like the one in the European Union. The problems behind democratic legitimization of the Union, arising along with the integration success, are opening up the question of the applicability of "standard" democracy model to this creation. The nature of the European Union functioning governed by the multiple levels management, requires adjustment of the democratic principles to its specific political system. Although there is no consensus among theorists who have contributed to clarifying the democracy concept in the European Union on neither whether there is a democratic deficit within it, nor what are the best conditions for the development of a genuine democracy in the EU, nevertheless it is possible to identify a number of structural problems of democracy in the political system of the European Union. In the framework of existing institutional mechanism of the European Union, the problems arise because of overlapping responsibilities between the institutions and the appreciable strengthening of the executive over the legislative branch of government. The Council plays the central role, operating on the principle of intergovernmental cooperation. Practically not a single European policy may be adopted without the operation of this institution and the interference of the member states, making the Council the leading legislative authority of the Union. The European Parliament, on the other hand, although directly elected, due to its still limited competences, being the main trigger of the democratic deficit in the Union. Thus, the wave of democratization of the EU institutions should include the "spillover" of power from the Council to the European Parliament and strengthening the inter-institutional cooperation between the European Parliament and European Commission. The European Union has not been grounded as the traditional national state. Demos don"t exist at the European level and, therefore, there is no one to provide the necessary legitimacy of the European policies. Although undoubtedly, the European Union policies are generating great benefits for its citizens, this reality, along with developed mechanisms of consultation with citizens, however, does not reduce the key problem in communication between the Union - citizens: lack of adequate representation of citizens, representing a deficiency having in mind that its founding documents are declaring it as a representative Community. Even the citizens themselves are failing to launch political debate on specific issues at the European level that would be a challenge for the national governments. Democratic legitimization of European institutions requires a greater role of political parties and their revitalization at the European level, as well as open political competition involving the citizens The integration process of the European Union counties has caused serious democratic problems not only at the level of the Union, but also in the member states. "Democracy problems" in the member states deriving from the functioning of the Union are reflected differently in different national political systems. Unlike unitary governments, federal ones are better adapting to the pressure deriving form the integration within the European Union. Federal feature of organization in the state already implies the multiple levels of decision making and decentralization of powers, thus the system is easily adapting to the multiple levels of management within the European Union. This is not the case with countries that are traditionally centralized. The further EU development may be directed in retaining the current integration principles with the rationale that the democratic member states represent legitimacy guarantor of the Union. In the light of the above, the intergovernmental principle should supersede the supranational. However, a model that would transform the EU into a democratic community is federal. The European Union has elements of federalism and this structure lacks the capacity for taxation and possibility of proposing amendments to founding, constitutional contracts. Currently the existence of federal elements in the functioning of the Union is pinpointing that its further strengthening will not inevitably lead to the transformation of the Union into the community with federal character, but will most likely impact on reducing the existing democratic deficit However, the model that would transform the European Union into the Community with democratic feature is the federal one. The European Union has the federalism features, and this structure suffers the lack of taxation capacity and the option of proposing amendments to the founding and constitutional treaties. The current existence of federal elements within the functioning of the Union is implying that its additional strengthening will not inevitably generate the transformation of the Union into the Community of federal feature, yet it will affect the decline in the current democratic deficit. Scientific methods used in this thesis are based on specific topic and research objective. Therefore, the methodology inherent in political science, comparative method, content analysis of documents, as well as specialization are used to a large extent. In proving the hypotheses a great usage has found the synthesis, generalization, induction and deduction.

This dissertation treats the competence of Constitutional courts in settling the disputes of jurisdictional conflicts, both in theoretical and historical as well as practical, sense. It is common knowledge that the Constitutional court is the most efficient mechanism for protecting the constitutionally determined separation of power. The role of the Constitutional Court is especially significant with regard to the fact that the separation of power does not exclude the possibility of interweaving jurisdiction of different levels of state power. By settling disputes of jurisdictional conflicts, the Constitutional Court gains competence for the determination of clear boundaries of state power organs in terms of their constitutional authorisation. Given the fact that the jurisdictional conflict is mainly motivated by political agenda, the Constitutional Court must settle an originally political dispute by implementing the constitutional norms. The jurisdictional conflicts are a common competence of Constitutional courts. They are a direct representation of the government, or the constitutionally determined separation of power. A distinction between horizontal and vertical disputes can consequently be made. Various factors cause these disputes, including the following: state power, government, political parties system, level of democratic development, the level of precision of constitutional norms determining the boundaries of state power, etc. The constitutional disputes of jurisdictional conflicts should, however, be thought of in a broader sense as well. The Constitution commonly views these disputes as a separate jurisdiction of Constitutional courts. If the disputes of jurisdictional conflicts are regarded as a factual violation of constitutionally proclaimed separation of power, then the other constitutional disputes can be seen as an infringement of the power separation principle as well. In that way the Constitutional court indirectly settles a competence dispute while simultaneously carrying out normative control, its basic duty. Assuming that the separation of power is based on the idea of preventing the abuse of state power by guaranteeing the fundamental rights and freedoms, one can say that, while deciding on the protection of rights and freedoms proclaimed by the Constitution, the Constitutional court indirectly protects the power separation principle. The matter of jurisdictional conflicts can decided upon by the court when the court is asked to give an interpretation of the constitutional provisions. If the fact that this jurisdiction is a necessary consequence of federal division of the state is exempted, one can say that in the countries without federal division the settling of competence disputes, also represents a separate jurisdiction of Constitutional courts. The guiding principle for all the countries was the fact that the abuse of power or the realisation of its separation (or balance) can only be reached through the operating system of an independent and unbiased institution, as the Constitutional court itself is. An analysis of various countries' Constitutions and the practice of Constitutional courts in settling competence disputes has shown that Constitutional courts have made a significant contribution to the realisation of power separation, especially in the transitional processes of non-democratic regimes to democratic ones. Naturally the real effects of the constitutional jurisprudence depend on the political climate-the relationship between the political institutions and the one these have with the Constitutional court, as well as their willingness to abide by its decisions-and this is a fact one should not neglect.

Crime and violence pose a serious challenge to Mexico. The problem appears to be growing worse, with 2011 on pace to become the most violent year on record. The rising violence in Mexico has resulted in a sharply heightened sense of fear among citizens, who now feel the presence of cartels in their every day lives. The use of extortion and kidnapping by cartels combined with a lack of trust in security forces terrorizes the population and makes them feel like they have no where to turn. Despite this fact, crime rates in Mexico remain lower than in other parts of Latin America. Venezuela, for example, has among the highest homicide rates in the world. Yet the pervasive infiltration of cartels into public life gives Mexicans a heightened sense of the severity of violent crime in their own country. Although accurate statistics are hard to come by, it is quite possible that 60,000 people have died in the last six-plus years as a result of armed conflict between the Mexican cartels and the Mexican government, amongst cartels fighting each other, and as a result of cartels targeting citizens. Mexico has been struggling with drug production and drug transit through its territory from South America to the U.S. for many decades, given the fact that it is the most important transit country for drug production originating from South America. In recent years, the escalating violence in Mexico has led to dramatic deterioration of the security situation. Recent wave of drug-war violence is associated with the beginning of the term of President Felipe Calderón in December 2006. The immediate implications of his assumption of the presidency and his hard-line policy, which he has applied against drug cartels and organized criminal groups across the country, were the deployment of Mexican army to fight cartels and the gradual weakening of the influence of local and state police at the expense of federal troops. This was done in order to combat corruption and collaboration of local law-enforcement institutions with drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). The consequence of such a policy, however, has been increased violence among rival cartels and between them and the federal police and military, resulting in a dramatic increase of the number of victims. The future of US-Mexican counter drug cooperation, as well as of the whole bilateral relation in the area of security, depends on the outcome of US presidential elections. As for Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto takes the office on December 1, 2012 that will mark a comeback of his party PRI after 12 years in opposition. As far as the security strategy of the future Mexican President is concerned, there are no significant changes to be expected. Peña Nieto seems to be aware of the current situation and its consequences as well as of the inevitability of an extremely close and dynamic mutual cooperation with the US.

When in 2007, after the rejection of the Constitution for Europe in France and the Netherlands, European politicians defined their mandate to work on the Reform Treaty, they explicitly promised that 'the constitutional concept is . abandoned' and that 'the Treaty of European Union and Treaty on Functioning of the Union will not have a constitutional character.' In its Maastricht and Lisbon decisions, the German Federal Constitutional Court concluded that the European Union did not have a constitution since it did not have demos. The main purpose of this article is to prove the opposite. Accepting Weiler's argumentation that the EU is a political messianic venture par excellence, the author claims that, in addition to pursuing messianic goals, Europe's political elite has for a long time been streaming to root Political Messianism into democracy and position the EU in the global world. The main vehicle to transform the Community/Union from an international to a constitutional legal order has been constitutionalism. Starting from the French revolutionary Declaration, which declared civil rights and in Article 16 proclaimed 'a society in which the observance of the law is not assured, nor the separation of powers defined, has no constitution at all,' the author has showed that the Union has an antirevolutionary, uncodified and evolutive constitution, whose elements are to be found in the Lisbon Treaty and its related documents, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, and to some extent in the constitutional orders of the Member States. The European constitution does not mirror a national constitution in the sense that it is attributable to the people, nor it is a revolutionary product aimed at limiting the government in the name of individual freedom. It is a rule of law-oriented type of constitution, born in the process of constitutionalization and aimed at submitting public power to law on the Union level. From the perspective of modern constitutionalism, the quality of this constitution is a matter of concern, since it has managed to connect the rule of law with the protection of human rights, but has failed to do the same with regard to democracy. Despite some efforts to entrench the democratic principle in the Lisbon Treaty, the present crisis in the Union is to a great extent the result of this failure. The fact that democratic defects at the Union level appear less visible when pitted against the state of affairs in national constitutional systems cannot mitigate this failure. Yet, assuming that the EU will survive the present crisis and having in mind that the Union is 'work in progress', the issue which still remains open is whether the future efforts to eliminate the defects of the European Constitution should be tied to traditional ways of thinking about democratic accountability within nation states, or one should stop thinking in terms of a Westphalian nation-state, and accept that transnational systems can provide a cure for democratic failings in ways that differ from traditional postulates of democracy.