Suchergebnisse

According to quite a number of scholars, even non-Austrian, some theories of Austrian school of economic thought do provide an increasingly relevant material to explain recent boom-and-bust economic cycles as well as financial crises. However, I argue, this development is not adequately reflected by a corresponding growth of Austrian influence within the economic orthodoxy. Quite to the contrary, many orthodox scholars have taken over rigidly Keynesian positions since the financial crisis culminated in 2008 and 2009. In my article I maintain that Austrians themselves have contributed significantly to such a situation by not preventing three major tactical mistakes, related to the domain of sociology of economics, from occurring. Firstly, they have not formed a really unified and thus influential group of scholars; instead, they have been divided into a few streams, sometimes with highly contradictory stances. Secondly, many Austrians have made bold predictions, especially with regard to possible enormous inflation stemming from the unprecedented provision of liquidity to the financial system during and in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, which have not been fulfilled at all. Thirdly, a critical number of Austrian school's economists do not effectively communicate with the rest of the profession and even, it seems, fail to adequately comprehend the orthodox analytical tools and theories. Adapted from the source document.

The article analyses the changes in norm enforcement in the EU that were triggered by the Eurozone crisis. It attempts to demonstrate that the Eurozone crisis contributed to a 'transplantation' of conditionality instruments (which traditionally exist within the EU's external relations) into the internal operations of the European Union. In particular, the article identifies which new internal rule-enforcement mechanisms of the EU share common structural features with the external EU conditionality (e.g. a vague legal framework; the use of the expertise of non-EU actors; an excess of competencies conferred to the EU; the institutional weakening of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice; the format of the sanctions). The article comes to the conclusion that the formation of the EU's internal conditionality occurred mainly within the instruments aimed at the crisis management of public finances of the Eurozone states (the EFSF, the EFSM, and the ESM), but it also concludes that there was an expansion of the new EU conditionality into other areas of the European integration, such as the Schengen cooperation and cohesion policy. Adapted from the source document.