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The economic and financial crisis of 2008 has raised some particularly challenging issues regarding assessing the performance of proposed financial institution bailout solutions. The need for quick action to avoid financial disaster often precluded a full airing of the possible advantages and disadvantages associated with the accountability and performance indicator mechanisms put in place. Now, a vigorous debate is occurring over performance indicators related to the effectiveness, efficiency and equity aspects of the solutions that have been implemented both in the U.S. and Europe. The United States major bailout proposal was the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) overseen by the Office of Financial Stability in the US Department of Treasury which has taken major ownership positions in US banks. The British bailout plan called the Bank Recapitalisation Scheme (BRS) is being directed by HM Treasury and the United Kingdom Financial institutions, Corp. which has also taken equity positions in major UK banks. These similarities and differences form the backdrop for the empirical case studies. The particular nature of these government programs make them ideal candidates for an extreme type case analysis in the characterizing the fight over defining performance. Not surprisingly, a host of academics, private financial institutions, government agencies and even intergovernmental governing bodies such as the IMF are airing their respective performance definitions. The competition between these bodies will serve as the empirical basis for assessing the arguments and motivations over how to define performance in the context of the bank bailouts. These case studies will be analyzed in the performance regime and competing values conceptual frameworks as initially brought together in Talbot (2008). . The performance regime frame will help assess the institutional forces who are attempting to exert influence over indicators. The competing values frame advances the notion that there are four major types of models by which social relationships are constructed and the form through the regime influences impact indicators and performance definitions. The major new contribution presented here will be in using these case studies to define the types of variables and factors that drive different types of private and public agents in constructing the definition of performance as well as advancing this combination of the performance regime and competing values framework. It is felt that these financial bailouts provide a rich set of data upon which new insights and the advancement of knowledge can be constructed. The United States and United Kingdom models represent important cases where large scale financial bailouts have occurred in two countries that have similar business cultures and yet there remain important differences in their approaches.

This paper looks at the recent debt crisis in Greece and argues that the crisis exemplifies a sequence of systematic mistakes made by International Financial Institutions, mistakes whose consequences had been clearly anticipated at the time of the first bail-out and could have been avoided. I will argue that the "original sin" of international creditors has been that of refinancing, rather than partially writing off, the debt. This mistake has led to excessively restrictive policies, and has ultimately to interventions of bail-out/in much larger than those which would have solved the problem at the outset, causing unnecessary pain to the economy and damaging both creditors' and debtors' interests.

Pension policy in Italy presented diverse traits in two different phases. Until the early-1990s, policies were mostly expansionary and distributive; after 1992 retrenchment interventions were accompanied by measures aimed at prompting a transition towards a multipillar system. The article argues that these changes affected the very nature of pension policy making, which actually split in two different arenas respectively regarding the first pension pillar and supplementary funded schemes. While in the former traditional actors government, parties and social partners – remained central, the latter was characterized by the emergence of a «new politics» of pensions. Institutional transformations and the prominence of regulatory issues have thus radically modified the constellation of actors involved, by opening the pension policy making primarily to groups representative of financial institutions.

In contrasto con l'opinione prevalente nelle istituzioni di regolazione macroeconomica dell'Eurozona, che attribuiscono la recente esplosione del rapporto debito pubblico/Pil avvenuta in alcuni Stati membri al fatto di aver vissuto " al di sopra delle proprie possibilità" , nel presente contributo suggeriamo un'interpretazione alternativa del fenomeno. Facendo affidamento su alcune evidenze empiriche, sosteniamo invece che il crescente indebitamento di alcuni Stati membri sarebbe l'effetto congiunto di tre diversi fenomeni: (a) la propensione del settore finanziario all'assunzione di elevati rischi (una caratteristica peculiare del modello neoliberista di regolazione macroeconomica), tendenza che mette periodicamente il settore pubblico di fronte alla necessità di intervenire per salvare dalla bancarotta banche e altre istituzioni finanziarie; (b) la peculiarità del modello di regolazione macroeconomica adottato dall'Eurozona, che non prevede alcun meccanismo automatico di aggiustamento degli squilibri commerciali e in cui, quindi, i flussi di capitali compensativi tendono ad innescare bolle speculative nei paesi in deficit; (c) la strategia di contrasto alla crisi scelta dall'UE, caratterizzata dall'inasprimento della già rigida disciplina fiscale prevista dal Trattato istitutivo per effetto dell'entrata in vigore del Fiscal Compact e dei cosiddetti Two Pack e Six Pack. In sintesi, l'indagine suggerisce che l'esplosione del debito sovrano nell'UE sia una spia della crisi della filosofia neo-liberista di regolazione macroeconomica incarnata dal Trattato di Maastricht, basata sul sostanziale esautoramento dei governi dalle funzioni allocative e sul loro trasferimento alle spontanee forze di mercato. I venti anni di vita dell'Eurozona sembrano infatti dimostrare che l'aggiustamento degli squilibri commerciali in un'area a moneta unica sia difficilmente realizzabile attraverso l'operare di mercati deregolamentati senza il supporto di politiche fiscali anticicliche. ; In contrast to the opinion prevailing in Eurozone leading institutions, attributing the recent sovereign debt crisis in some member countries to the fact of ""having lived above their means" , in this contribution we suggest an alternative interpretation of public debt dynamics occurred in the last decade. Relying on some empirical evidence, we argue that the rising debt/GDP ratio in EU member States is instead the joint effect of three different phenomena: (a) the propensity of banks and financial institutions to assume excessively risky portfolio structures (a characteristic feature of the neoliberal model of macroeconomic regulation), which obliged the public sector to periodically bail-out banks and other financial institutions from bankrupt; (b) the peculiarity of the Eurozone's model of macroeconomic regulation, where there is no automatic mechanism for adjusting trade imbalances, and where compensative capital flows are likely to feed speculative bubbles in deficit countries;(c) the EU strategy to tackle the crisis, characterized by a further strengthening of the already tight fiscal discipline envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty. In summary, our investigation suggests that the explosion of sovereign debt in the EU reveals the crisis of the neo-liberal philosophy of macroeconomic regulation embodied in the Maastricht Treaty, based on a massive transfer of allocative functions from governments to market forces. However, these twenty years of Eurozone's life seem to testify that the adjustment of trade imbalances in a single currency area is difficult to achieve by simply relying on the working of deregulated markets, without the support of countercyclical fiscal policies.

States can borrow from a variety of sources. They can receive loans from international financial in-stitutions (IMF, WB, and MDBs), foreign governments and commercial banks, or they can issue sovereign bonds on the international capital markets. Over the past sixty years, the features of sov-ereign debt restructurings have been shaped by the type of creditors and by the nature of the debt. Debt restructuring vehicles therefore change according to the category of creditors involved: a) in-ternational financial institutions enjoy preferred creditor status and their b) official bilateral debt is renegotiated under the Paris Club umbrella; c) commercial bank debt is restructured through the London Club process; and d) bond debt is restructured via exchange offers and through the opera-tion of collective action clauses. The Greek sovereign debt crisis underlined the challenges of achieving an orderly and timely sovereign debt restructuring without a permanent institutional mechanism in place. Collective action clauses were retroactively introduced by law, 'quasi-sovereign bondholders' (i.e. the ECB, the national central banks of the euro area and the EIB) were shielded from the restructuring, austerity measures had to be implemented with dire consequences for the population, citizens suffered from shrinking resources to be spent for social, economic and cultural rights, and bondholders claimed a violation of their right to property in front of investor-State arbi-tral tribunals and the ECHR. This study argues that, at least in the European monetary union framework, a sovereign debt crisis resolution mechanism will better achieve a fair balance between the public and private interest.

The process towards accountancy harmonization in the European Union has made crucial steps after the approval of directive 2001/65/EC, concerning the introduction of the fair value evaluation criterion, and of regulation (EC) 1606/2002, concerning the application of I.A.S. – I.F.R.S. by the listed companies. Furthermore, these two measures have been the premise for promoting a progressive common approach for the accountancy laws and procedures of the EU countries, with the aim of creating a shared accountancy language: the adoption of directive 2003/51/EC. This directive affects the IV directive, namely the core of EU Accountancy Law and therefore, as its specific consequence and emanation, the VII directive, directive 86/635/ EEC on banks and other financial institutions and directive 91/674/EEC concerning insurance companies. Furthermore, the European Commission intends to support those companies – not a minority share – which are not required to apply the I.A.S. – I.F.R.S. directly, in compliance with regulation (EC) 1606/2002, in producing annual accounts with internationally accepted criteria, characterized by a transparent information system in relation to investors and creditors. Once the prominent aspects of directive 2003/51/EC have been specified, the purpose of the work is to assess their potential impact on the laws in force and on the practice generally accepted in Italy in the present day, whilst considering how the national legislation has so far received and implemented directive 2001/65/EC and regulation (EC) 1606/2002. Notably, the perspective we will apply to this purpose relates to small- and mediumsized enterprises, namely the typical characters of an economic model rooted on family capitalism; as such, these characters are frequently distant from the capital financial market.

Il saggio esamina il nuovo Reg. (UE) n. 2402/2017, in vigore dal 1° Gennaio 2019, che istituisce un quadro generale per le operazioni di cartolarizzazione e, al tempo stesso, un quadro specifico per le cartolarizzazioni semplici, trasparenti e standardizzate (s.t.s.). Unitamente al Reg. (UE) n. 2401/2017 (in materia di requisiti prudenziali per enti creditizi e imprese di investimento), il Regolamento raccoglie larga parte della disciplina unionale in materia di cartolarizzazioni (Securitisation framework). L'analisi, che prende avvio da una preliminare descrizione dell'architettura essenziale di un'operazione di cartolarizzazione (Cap. 1), muove, in primo luogo, da un'indagine di tipo ricognitivo e funzionale all'individuazione dei fallimenti di mercato e della regolamentazione osservati nel settore dei prodotti cartolarizzati durante la crisi finanziaria 2007-2008 (Cap. 2). A seguire viene ricostruito il dibattito sulle linee di politica legislativa di settore sviluppatosi, a livello internazionale, attraverso i lavori, fra gli altri, dell'International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) e, a livello europeo, nell'ambito dei lavori sull'Unione dei mercati dei capitali (Cap. 3). Infine, il lavoro si concentra sull'analisi del nuovo Regolamento e, in particolare, sugli obblighi di dovuta diligenza, di mantenimento del rischio e di trasparenza (Cap. 4), nonché sul nuovo quadro normativo delle cartolarizzazioni s.t.s. (Cap. 5), con l'obiettivo di fornire una prima valutazione in ordine ai risultati raggiunti dal Legislatore europeo nell'ambito della reform agenda del mercato dei prodotti cartolarizzati. ; The essay examines the new Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, in force since 1 January 2019, which establishes a general framework for securitisation transactions and, at the same time, a specific framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisations (s.t.s.). Along with Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 (on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms), the Regulation collects a large part of the Union's securitisation framework (Securitisation framework). The analysis, which starts from a preliminary description of the essential architecture of a securitisation operation (chap. 1), moves, first, an investigation of a reconnaissance and functional type to identify the market failures and regulation observed in the sector of securitised products during the financial crisis 2007-2008 (chap. 2). Following this, the debate on the legislative policy lines of the sector developed at international level through the work of, among others, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and, at European level, in the context of the work on the Capital Markets Union (chap. 3). Finally, the essay focuses on the analysis of the new Regulation and, in particular, on the obligations of due diligence, maintenance of risk (risk retention rule) and transparency (chap. 4), as well as on the new regulatory framework of securitisations s.t.s. (chap. 5) with the aim of providing an initial assessment of the results achieved by the European legislator in the context of the reform of the market agenda for securitised products.