Suchergebnisse

Hva er holdningene i de nordiske landene til utenlandske investeringer? Spiller det noen rolle for befolkningen hvor de utenlandske investeringene kommer fra? Er man mer skeptisk til utenlandske investeringer innenfor noen sektorer av økonomien, mens man er mindre skeptisk til utenlandske investeringer innenfor andre sektorer? Dette essayet presenterer resultatene fra en omfattende spørreundersøkelse blant befolkningene i alle de nordiske landene.
Abstract in English:Attitudes to Direct Investments from China in the Nordic CountriesHow does the Nordic public view foreign investments? Does the country of origin for such investments matter for the public? Would the public be more critical of investments into certain sectors of the economy, whilst being less critical to foreign investments in others? This essay presents the results from an extensive survey of public opinion conducted across all the Nordic countries.

NATO har i det seneste årti orienteret sig mod de defensive aktiviteter i cyberspace, men i slutningen af 2017 gjorde alliancen det klart, at fremtidig planlægning af militære operationer også kommer til at indeholde muligheden for offensive cyberspaceoperationer (OCO). Inklusionen af OCO sker ved hjælp af en såkaldt "effektbaseret model". Ifølge denne model efterspørger NATOs øverstkommanderende – igennem det nyoprettede NATO Cyber Operations Centre – en specifik cybereffekt hos medlemsstaterne. Nærværende artikel peger på modellens muligheder og udfordringer. For selvom OCO indeholder et potentiale som redskab for løbende forstyrrelser af modstanderens netværk, så indeholder OCO også en række begrænsninger og faldgruber, når de skal integreres i en forespørgselsdreven og effektbaseret model: Det gælder i særlig grad manglende koordination omkring effekter (risiko for kollisioner) samt vanskeligheder ved inddæmning og vurdering af effekter. Disse begrænsninger svækker signalet om, at alliancen nu mestrer og for alvor vil gøre brug af cyberdomænet. Ønsker NATO at sende et klart signal, bør alliancen drøfte internt, hvordan man forholder sig til de aktiviteter, der ikke blot knytter sig til væbnet konflikt, som cyberspace også – og primært – tilbyder.
Absract in English
For the past decade, NATO has prioritised a strengthened cyber defence. However, at the end of 2017, the alliance made it clear that future operational planning will include the possibility of offensive cyberspace operations (OCO). The integration of OCO will happen through an effect-based model where the NATO commander – through the new NATO Cyber Operations Centre – requests a specific effect from member states. This article assesses the risks and opportunities of this model. It argues that even though OCO holds much potential for constant disruptions of an adversary's networks, OCO comes with several limitations and pitfalls when integrated through a request- and effect-based model. These include the risk of confliction and the difficulty of containing and assessing cyber effects. Such limitations weaken the ability to signal that NATO has the capacity to master this new domain. If NATO wants a to send a clear signal to adversaries, then the alliance needs to start discussing how it can utilise the possibilities below the threshold of armed conflict, which cyberspace primarily offers.

The Nordic countries have long been renowned for their contribution to international peace and security. This contribution – occasionally viewed by both Nordic and non-Nordic policy-makers and academics as a particular model for facilitating peace and development in international affairs – is based on a combination of active contributions to peaceful conflict resolution, a high level of development aid and a continuous commitment to strengthening international society. However, recently Scandinavians have been making headlines for reasons that seem to contrast with their well-established brand as humane internationalist peacemakers. This article identifies the characteristics of the Nordic model for international peace and security and discusses how and why it has changed.

Selv om norske myndigheter ligger på verdenstoppen i digitalisering av offentlige tjenester, står landets forsvar fremdeles «på stedet hvil». I kjernen av problemet finner vi en styringsmodell der 14 ulike forsvarsgrener og selvstendige driftsenheter kjemper om makt og innflytelse. Dette gjelder særlig i spørsmålet om hvem som skal ha ansvar og myndighet når Forsvarets IKT-systemer skal knyttes sammen for å øke cyberberedskapen. Hvordan kan vi beskrive, forklare og forstå de digitale problemene som Forsvaret står oppe i? Nyere forskning gir ikke klare svar, blant annet fordi de fleste studiene er opptatt av å studere utfordringene som kommer utenfra og inn mot Norge. Spørsmålet om hvorfor Forsvaret ikke klarer å forsvare seg mot cyberangrep, eller hvorfor etaten ikke holder tritt med resten av samfunnet, forblir derfor ubesvart. Ved å bruke instrumentelle og kulturelle perspektiver fra organisasjonsteorien finner vi store huller i forsvarsevnen på grunn av intern fragmentering og rivalisering.
Abstract in English:National Defence in a Digital Crisis?Even though the Norwegian authorities are world leaders in digitalization of public services, its armed forces are falling behind. In its essence, the problem lies in a management model with 14 different services striving for power and influence. This is particularly so when it comes to whom should have supreme authority as information and communication technology (ICT) systems are standardised across the force. How can we describe, explain and comprehend this digital complexity? Contemporary research does not provide clear answers, much due to over-emphasis on external cyberthreats. The question of why Norway's armed forces are incapable of providing a proper defence against cyberthreats therefore remains unanswered. By means of instrumental and cultural theories, we find grave deficiencies due to internal rivalry and organisational fragmentation.

Intro -- Foreword DAPMARC'2015 -- CONTENTS -- 1. Are All We Need Heroes? - The New Role of the IT Project Manager -- 2. Fast or Smart? How the Use of Scrum Can Influence the Temporal Environment in a Project -- 3. Hidden Goals in Projects: A Qualitative Exploratory Study of their Occurrence and Causes -- 4. "Frontload" in Complex Project Program Management to Aim for Lifetime Sustainability of Offshore Windmill Parks -- 5. Metaphors in Projects - An Overlooked X-factor -- 6. Bridging Gaps between IT and Business: An Empirical Investigation of IT Project Portfolio Management using Process Mining and P3M3 Maturity Model -- 7. Governance of Projects and Value Generation in Project-oriented Organizations -- 8. Theory Meets Practice: Practical Implications of Process Theory in Project Management.

AbstractI estimate whether the ability to anonymously surrender an infant to a safe haven site such as a hospital, police station, or fire station in the United States affects child well‐being. By analyzing variation in state safe haven policies, I find safe haven laws significantly increase infant foster care entrance. I further find suggestive evidence of safe havens reducing infant deaths. The mortality effects are immediate but subside over time, implying infants have been relinquished when their alternative was not death from abuse or abandonment. Robustness checks and falsification tests support these findings.

Når og hvorfor velger stater å bruke militærmakt i grensetvister? Artikkelen argumenterer for at kvantitative studier av grensetvister i internasjonale relasjoner (IR) i for stor grad har fokusert på statiske forklaringsvariabler. For å forstå taktikkskifter må vi isolere hendelsesdynamikker, ikke konstante egenskaper. Paul Huths innflytelsesrike «nettverksmodell» åpner for nettopp dette, men jeg finner at dens logikk er ustø og dens empiriske støtte tvilsom. I stedet foreslår jeg en alternativ mekanisme, inspirert av Barbara Walters borgerkrigteori: En truet stat har et akutt behov for å signalisere kampvilje, og grensetvister er ideelle «scener» for slike signaler. Dermed kan vi forvente aggressive taktikkskifter innad i tvister like etter at eksterne trusler inntreffer – stikk i strid med Huths modell. Jeg tester de to hypotesene på et datamateriale om Kinas konfliktnettverk mellom 1954 og 2005. Mer omfattende tester er nødvendig for å fastslå modellens forklaringskraft, men dette materialet gir ettertrykkelig støtte til mitt argument. Sannsynligheten for at Kina ville militarisere en grensetvist mer enn tredoblet seg i ukene etter at Beijing ble utfordret militært av en eller flere utenforstående stater. Resultatet er uforenlig med litteraturens dominerende tese og styrker dermed oppfatningen av statiske forklaringsvariabler som utilstrekkelige for å kartlegge rykk og napp mellom fred og aggresjon i internasjonale grensetvister.
Abstract in EnglishFrom Peace to Fury: Reframing Tactical Shifts in Territorial DisputesWhen and why do states violently contend their territorial claims? I argue that the quantitative literature in IR stands ill-prepared to solve this puzzle due to an endemic appetite for static variables. Territorial disputes escalate because states' tactics shift; to grasp the dynamic sequences spurring those shifts is therefore critical. Paul K. Huth's network approach provides a powerful starting point, and I interrogate his hypothesis that threatened states acquiesce in disputes. The inference is both theoretically misplaced and empirically dubious, I find. Yet by injecting the Schellingian logic of 'commitment-signalling', drawing on Barbara Walter's theory of civil wars, I recast Huth's model: tactical shifts are aggressive, not conciliatory, when states perceive outside threats. I test this antithesis using a sequence-sensitive logistic regression model, employing China's territorial-dispute history between 1954 and 2005 as a crucial-case experiment. Strong evidence favours this paper's argument. That has implications for further research. My Network-Signalling model has promise and should be tested more extensively.