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Editors: E.D. Morel, July 1919-Nov. 1924; Helena M. Swanwick, Jan. 1925- ; "A monthly digest and interpretation" (varies). ; Supplements accompany some numbers. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Continued after 1931 as supplement to: Time and tide.

v. 1. Organization and functions -- v. 2. General -- v. 3. Personnel -- v. 4. Financial management -- v. 5. Communications and records -- v. 6. General services -- v. 7. Consular affairs (2 pts.) -- v. 8. Citizenship and passports -- v. 9. Visas (4 pts.)-- v. 10. Economic affairs -- v. 11. Political affairs (classified) -- v. 12. Educational and cultural affairs -- [v. 13]. Supplement. ; Mode of access: Internet.

American statistics index ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Vols. for 19 - have supplement: Foreign affairs research special papers available. East Asia and Pacific area, ISSN 0270-6342; for have supplement: Foreign affairs research special papers available. Near East, South Asia, and North Africa, ISSN 0270-8914; for 1971/75- have supplement: Foreign affairs research special papers available. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, ISSN 0271-0226.

Description based on: Apr. 1982. ; Caption title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

How should courts handle cases that implicate foreign relations or national security? What weight should courts give to the executive branch's view of the law in these matters? To date, one can identify in the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court no less than four theoretical approaches—varying by the degree of judicial deference due to the executive—that suggest competing visions about the constitutional role of courts in these areas. Each approach has been criticized fiercely for either abdicating the constitutional duty of the courts or obstructing the nation's pursuit of its security and foreign policy objectives. Absent a clear principle guiding when to apply each approach, courts invoke these approaches intermittently, generating considerable confusion. Current doctrine is missing a framework for mediating tensions between the four approaches. This Article seeks to fill that gap. It draws from the Margin of Appreciation (MoA), a doctrine international courts, especially in Europe, use widely to calibrate the level of deference owed to the principal decision-maker in separation of powers and human rights issues. Compared to parallel doctrines courts traditionally apply, the MoA offers a sophisticated framework for addressing deference claims by the executive. The doctrine provides courts criteria for optimizing the mode of their review, disciplines judicial decision-making, and reduces costs of judicial errors in matters of national importance. This Article reconstructs the MoA as a domestic law doctrine. It makes the necessary adaptations for "domesticating" the MoA and develops criteria for considering deference claims in a variety of foreign affairs and national security matters. In doing so, this Article demonstrates how a domestic MoA approach can generate more nuanced judicial engagement with foreign affairs, encourage deliberative decision-making by policymakers, and promote interbranch dialogue about the role of legal institutions in the high-stakes areas of foreign affairs and national security.

Madison's argument, which attempts to state that the powers in foreign relations can be separated on principle, is in contrast to the arguments of Locke and Montesquieu that we have sketched as well as to the thrust of the Federalist. Our brief discussion of it does not do it justice, but is justified by the failure of the legislation under consideration to move in Madison's direction. The current legislation does not attempt to specify certain powers belonging to Congress as legislative in their nature, and others to the President as executive, but to limit discretion and share the remaining discretion among Congress and the President. It is thus more like the creation of an executive council. The views we have discussed raise three questions about this legislation. First, insofar as the legislation attempts to bring discretion under law, that is, to abolish some discretion, is it not an attempt to determine unilaterally what cannot be so determined? The occasion for the use of discretion in foreign affairs cannot be created by legislation, but depends on actions over which the President and Congress have a minimum degree of control. If circumstances arose that required the use of discretionary force but did not fit the congressional guidelines (and the legislation might even invite enemies to create such circumstances), the likely consequence would be a violation of law. The alternative would be a failure to act as the circumstances required. It can always be said that Congress could act through legislation or a declaration of war, but except in cases of great emergency, the very cases in which the legislation gives the President license to act, will it act with the dispatch that can seize the advantage of the moment? Secondly, to the extent that the legislation aims to include Congress in the exercise of discretion--not only, be it noted, in the commencement of hostilities but in its continuation and end--it attempts to create an executive council not only out of the Senate, as some proposed at the ...

Mode of access: Internet. ; Vols. for -1948 issued by the Association's United Kingdom Branch; - by the Association's General Council. ; Vols. for -1948 issued by the Association under its earlier name: Empire Parliamentary Association. ; Absorbed by the Association's Report on world affairs.

Covers of vol. 2, no. 6-vol. 9, no. 4 carry volume designation vol. 1, no. 1-vol. 7, no. 5 respectively. ; Vol. 2, no. 6-vol. 9, no. 4 issued as Supplement to the Journal of the Royal institute of international affairs. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Sept. 1978. ; At head of title: 95th Congress, 2d session. Committee print. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Longstanding debates over the allocation of foreign affairs power between Congress and the President have reached a stalemate. Wherever the formal line between Congress and the President's powers is drawn, it is well established that, as a functional matter, even in times of great discord between the two branches, the President wields immense power when he acts in the name of foreign policy or national security. And yet, while scholarship focuses on the accretion of power in the presidency, presidential primacy is not the end of the story. The fact that the President usually "wins" in foreign affairs does not mean that the position the President ultimately chooses to take is preordained. Questions of foreign policy and national security engage diverse components of the executive branch bureaucracy, which have overlapping jurisdictions and often conflicting biases and priorities. And yet they must arrive at one executive branch position. Thus the process of decision making, the weight accorded the position of any given decision maker, and the context in which the decision is made together shape the ultimate position the President takes. This Article explores and critiques the foreign policy role Congress can—and does—play in structuring and rearranging the relative powers of those internal actors and the processes they take to reach their decisions, in order to influence and even direct the President's ultimate position. Having yielded much of the ground on substance, Congress has an opportunity for a second bite at the apple, and may influence the policy directions of the presidency by manipulating its internal workings. There are risks to deploying "process controls," as I term these measures, in lieu of direct substantive engagement, but I argue that Congress can and should use these tools more instrumentally to influence the course of foreign policy in areas where it is otherwise unlikely to assert itself as a coequal branch and necessary check on presidential power.

Some vols. issued with the numbering of the congressional series. ; Vols. for 1862-1868 issued in parts. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 1861-1899. 1 v. (Includes index to vols. issued under later title) ; Continued in 1870 by: United States. Dept. of State. Papers relating to foreign relations of the United States.

In April 2010, the Arizona legislature enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act. Commonly known as SB 1070, the law created a slate of new criminal offenses and arrest powers covering aliens within Arizona's borders. SB 1070 proved divisive. It inspired copycat legislation in several states, provoked sharp criticism from the legal academy, and-most relevant here- catalyzed a lawsuit by the U.S. Department of Justice seeking a preliminary injunction against the state law on the ground that it was preempted by federal law. Initially, the federal government's litigation prospects seemed dim. One term before SB 1070 reached the Supreme Court, the Justices had upheld an earlier Arizona effort to tamp down on undocumented aliens in the workplace. Doing so, the Court had limned a narrow reach for the preemptive penumbra of federal immigration law. In the SB 1070 oral argument, the Solicitor General seemed to fare poorly, with Justice Sotomayor even suggesting that his central preemption argument was not "selling very well" and that he try "to come up with something else." Yet in June 2012, the Court handed down an opinion giving the federal government "close" to everything it had sought. By a vote of five Justices to three, the Court invalidated three of the four challenged provisions and upheld the fourth subject only on condition that the state satisfied demanding limiting qualifications. What many expected to be a rout in favor of Arizona's position ended instead in a robust affirmation of national authority.

"Current project information." ; Report covers fiscal year. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Continues: Inventory of government-supported research projects on foreign affairs. Continued by: Government-sponsored research on foreign affairs.

Nos. 1-24 have subtitle: "Building the peace." ; Some nos. issued as: United States-United Nations information series (no. 6); Commercial policy series (no. 7, 18); European series (no. 11, 15); Far Eastern series (no. 12, 24); European and British Commonwealth series (no. 19, 26); Economic cooperation series (no. 20, 21); General foreign policy series (no. 22); International organization and conference series (no. 23, 25) ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Prepared by: No. 1-24, Dept. of State; no. 25- , Dept. of State, Office of Public Affairs.

Mode of access: Internet. ; Continues: Government-sponsored research on foreign affairs, ISSN 0194-8660, issued by: United States. Dept. of State. Office of External Research.