Suchergebnisse

"Am 20. Mai wurde in Taiwan der im März neu gewählte Präsident Ma Ying-jeou in sein Amt eingeführt. Er hat angekündigt, die Beziehungen zur Volksrepublik China verbessern zu wollen. Ma Ying-jeou wurde vor allem aus innenpolitischen Gründen gewählt (Korruption in der Regierung seines Amtsvorgängers Chen Shui-bian, Verschlechterung der Wirtschaftslage), aber er hat auch ein starkes Mandat bekommen, die Beziehungen zu China zu verbessern. Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Taiwan und China haben sich in der Zeit der Präsidentschaft Chens kontinuierlich verschlechtert, da China dessen 'Identitätspolitik' als schrittweises Streben nach Unabhängigkeit de jure interpretiert hat und Taiwan mit dem Antisezessionsgesetz und der Stationierung von Kurzstreckenraketen bedroht. Chens riskante politische Manöver haben nicht nur das wechselseitige Misstrauen extrem gesteigert, sondern darüber hinaus die Beziehungen Taiwans zu den USA und anderen möglichen Verbündeten belastet und diese zu offenen Warnungen vor 'einseitigen' Änderungen des Status quo veranlasst. Die Aussagen Mas zu einer neuen Chinapolitik wurden daher nicht nur in China, sondern auch im Westen und in Ostasien mit Erleichterung aufgenommen. Es wird erwartet, dass sich die Sicherheitslage in der Taiwanstraße stabilisiert und dass dies positive Auswirkungen auf die bi- und multilateralen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen haben wird. Die chinesische Führung und Ma erklärten sich zu Gesprächen auf der Grundlage des '92 Consensus' bereit, einer stillen Übereinkunft von 1992, d.h., nach dem gemeinsamen Bekenntnis zum 'einen China' (yi zhong), dessen konkrete Interpretation jedoch offengelassen (ge biao) wird, soll die Lösung praktischer Probleme angegangen werden. Erste Kontakte und Gespräche wurden bereits unmittelbar nach der Wahl aufgenommen. Vieles wird davon abhängen, ob Ma in Taiwan und Hu Jintao in China innenpolitisch die nötige Stärke besitzen, um flexibel und pragmatisch an Lösungen arbeiten zu können. Ma braucht darüber hinaus Zugeständnisse Beijings hinsichtlich der Erweiterung des 'internationalen Raumes' Taiwans, um in vier Jahren bei den nächsten Wahlen Erfolge vorweisen zu können. Sonst riskiert er seine Abwahl und Beijing hat die Chance, die Lage in der Taiwanstraße zu verbessern, vertan." (Autorenreferat)

The purpose of this article is to capture one of the key features of the political thought that developed in the United States of America. Assuming that the USA's political culture is indeed exceptional, the author attempts to find the common denominator that would reflect the singularity of the American political mind. The author states that such a feature is the radical anti-historicality of the American mode of thinking about politics. It is a phenomenon that is deeply-rooted in the political and spiritual past of the United States and seems to be crucial because it never developed to such an extent in other traditions. Furthermore, even today to a large extent it defines both the American left and right. It is also very much present in academic discussion as well as in ordinary political activities. By anti-historicality the author means the rejection of the thesis that politics within a given society depends on that society's past experience. The phenomenon defies simple normative assessments. On the one hand, it protects American politics from the perils of radical historicism; on the other hand, it hinders the USA's contacts with other political bodies. However, the author concludes that understanding American anti-historicality is crucial when entering into any relations with the USA. Celem artykułu jest porównanie i przeciwstawienie brytyjskiej polityki wobec kryzysu w Libii i w Syrii odpowiednio w 2011 i w 2013 roku. Szuka się w nim odpowiedzi na pytanie, dlaczego parlament brytyjski, który w 2011 roku tak zdecydowanie poparł użycie siły przeciwko Libii, wstrzymał swoje poparcie dla akcji militarnej w Syrii w sierpniu 2013 roku. Autor wskazuje, że perspektywa masakry w libańskim mieście Benghazi przekonała brytyjskiego premiera, że akcja międzynarodowa była pilną koniecznością. Rezolucja Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ pozwalająca na akcję militarną w celu ochrony libijskiej ludności cywilnej oraz fakt, iż interwencję poparło kilka rządów na Bliskim Wschodzie, również przyczyniły się do uznania jej przez rząd brytyjski za w pełni uprawnioną. Jednakże dwa lata później brytyjski parlament skutecznie zawetował udział Wielkiej Brytanii w atakach powietrznych przeciwko Syrii. Było to skutkiem, jak argumentuje autor, braku rezolucji ONZ w tej kwestii i wsparcia rządów w regionie dla Syrii oraz wątpliwości co do skuteczności akcji militarnej. W artykule podejmowane jest również pytanie, czy brak brytyjskiej interwencji w Syrii oznacza początek zwrotu w brytyjskiej polityce zagranicznej.

Explores bilateral relations between China and Taiwan; Chinese reunification strategy, risk of conflict, Taiwanese national identity, and implications of Hong Kong's 1997 retrocession to Chinese sovereignty for Taiwan; 4 articles.

Impact of adhesion of Central and Eastern European countries to the alliance on relations with and between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Some emphasis on the "Kyiv (Kyev)--Visegrad--Moscow triangle".

Central Asia, much like other regions of Eurasia, has witnessed tensions and cooperation between the United States, Russia, and China. It is also recognized that Central Asia has its own regional dynamics that intertwine with the global inter-state relations, giving strong international tinge to local events and drawing-in extra-regional competition and tensions. Within the above theme is another—the hegemonic rise of China and the expected, or even existent, balancing response by Russia. However, Central Asia has so far witnessed more Russo-Chinese cooperation than competition while experiencing more Russo-American competition than cooperation, a trend likely to continue in the medium term. Suspicions and tensions in Russo-American relations are matched by similar trends in Sino-American strategic interaction. Russian national doctrines, and its policymakers, have repeatedly emphasized the extremist-terrorist threats and the U.S.-NATO preponderance and policies, including the ABM initiative and militarization of space, as the main non-state threats and state-based challenges, respectively. In this environment, China is an important regional and strategic partner, part of the response to challenges. Over the past twenty years and for the medium term, the major structural factors in relations between the three powers are the diverging priority vectors of Russian and Chinese foreign and security policies—toward the west and east, respectively—combined with the global power of the United States which confronts these states in Europe-CIS and East Asia, providing a measure of common interests to Russo-Chinese relations. On a number of important strategic issues, these interests converge on the U.S. problem—joint opposition to American global ABM initiatives, regime change and democratization policies, NATO expansion, competition over Ukraine, the balance of power in Europe and in East Asia. Meanwhile, Central Asia has had to experience elements of this broader competition, but at the same time has provided, and will continue to provide, its own contribution as a force for cooperation and competition, not only as a symptom but as a cause in its own right. Central Asia is where one can expect a more immediate and pronounced Sino-Russian clash of interests as it abuts both states, has countries susceptible to external influence and domestic subversion, is endowed with energy resources and strategic location, and is porous to non-state threats. Therefore, strictly from the realist geopolitical standpoint, Central Asia has been primed for Russo-Chinese power and security competition for well over a decade, as has been Mongolia, for example, geopolitically one of the more quiescent and inactive areas. However, unlike Eastern Europe and the CIS, which experience continuous Russo-American tensions, Central Asia has not witnessed pronounced Sino-Russian security and power competition. This is partially due to its secondary or tertiary priority in foreign and security policies of Russia and China. Yet this more passive explanation does not account for the cooperative, active elements in Russo-Chinese relations, as demonstrated by the establishment and development of the SCO along with the Russia's CSTO and Customs Union projects. Therefore, rather than undertake a security and power competition, Russia and China have instead institutionalized cooperation, as local non-state threats and the somewhat rapid arrival of the United States have helped catalyze the partnership between these Eurasian powers. Hence, both the local and the external trends have buttressed Russo-Chinese relations in the region, leading one analyst to conclude that "the newly independent states have not become objects of rivalry between Moscow and Beijing, but rather a major unifying element."

تشكل الممكنات الرقمية لإدارة العلاقات العامة محورًا مهمًّا في تحقيق الممارسات المتقدمة لها ضمن اطار وظائفها على الصعيد الدولي ، وتأخذ تلك الإدارة على عاتقها تطوير البنى التحتية موضع اهتمام كونها تمثل الأدوات الأساسية في تنفيذ تلك الوظائف بأساليب جديدة تمكنها من الوصول الى الأهداف ، ويعد الراي العام الدولي واحدا من اهم المجالات التي انعكست على الأنشطة الاتصالية لإدارة العلاقات العامة لوزارة الخارجية الروسية ولاسيما اتجاه عملياتها العسكرية ضد أوكرانيا ، مما ينسجم لك في الإشكالية الرئيسية للدراسة التي تكمن في دور اهمية الممكنات الرقمية إزاء التعاطي مع مجالات الراي العام الدولي ، فضلا عن ذلك توصلت الدراسة الى أن وزارة الخارجية الروسية استطاعت توظيف التكنلوجيا الرقمية والمتمثلة في إدارة الأنظمة والشبكات الاتصالية لتحقيق أهدافها السياسية اتجاه تلك العمليات والافادة من توجيه الراي العام لصالح اهدافها ، وتوصلت الدراسة الى ان المجالات الدولية كانت من اولياتها الاتصالية ولاسيما المجالات السياسية والاقتصادية بما يخدم المجال العسكري ضمن منصة الانستغرام الرسمية لوزارة الخارجية الروسية ، واستنتجت الدراسة ان هذه الممكنات جاءت بسبب ان الروسية الاتحادية تشكل احد الأقطاب العالمية التي تمتلك تكنلوجيا متقدمة من حيث الصناعة والإنتاج والإدارة ، فضلا عن ذلك كان الاهتمام بالراي العام يشكل عاملا مهما في تعريف المجتمع الدولي بشرعية عملياتها العسكرية كونها تمثل تجاوزًا على سيادتها ومصالحاها ومصالح حلفائها وهذا يتوافق مع الأنظمة والقوانين الدولية .

Lest we forget -- Colonial expansion -- A blind man's holiday [The Philippine problem] -- The colonial lessons of Alaska -- The lessons of the Paris tribunal of arbitration -- A continuing city -- The captain sleeps -- The last of the Puritans. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Even though the six Western Balkan countries (WB6) have close political ties with the EU, their alignment with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has in­creasingly come into focus since the beginning of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. The EU should take a differentiated view of the WB6's political and security cooperation with external actors such as Russia, China and Turkey. Within the WB6, the two "outliers" of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina's Republika Srpska use their for­eign and security relations with Russia to achieve their own political goals. While Serbia seeks support for its Kosovo policy, Republika Srpska is trying to get backing for its separatist tendencies. The WB6 are not expected to end their cooperation with the aforementioned external actors in the near future. Nonetheless, in today's shift­ing geopolitical arena, the EU must set priorities that bind the WB6's outliers to the CFSP. (Autorenreferat)

Awakening to China's Rise provides the most comprehensive analysis to date of how Europe's major powers have responded to the re-emergence of China as a great power in world politics since the end of the Cold War. To do so, it puts forward a unique cross-regional comparison of how the major European powers (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) have confronted Chinese assertiveness both in the Asia-Pacific and in Europe. Firstly, it analyses their response to China's increasingly muscular regional posture in the Asia-Pacific through the development of diplomatic and security initiatives with partners in the region. Secondly, it delineates how they have confronted China's inroads into Europe, looking at the measures that they have taken to tackle Chinese investments in, and supply of, technologies in strategic sectors such as critical national infrastructures, dual-use technologies, and in the digital domain, including Huawei's 5G networks. A longstanding assumption in the IR literature has been that European foreign policies toward the People's Republic of China have been driven by a 'naïve' and self-interested focus on the economic opportunities presented by such a vast market, overlooking security considerations. This book challenges such common belief through a detailed examination of the policies of France, Germany and the United Kingdom from 1989 to the present. Its central argument is that, whereas this assessment aptly characterized the first two post-Cold War decades, Beijing's growing assertiveness after 2009 caused the three major European powers to awaken to China's rise. In the 2010s, heightened threat perceptions of China, coupled with increasingly competitive bilateral economic relations with the PRC, have gradually and cumulatively caused the hardening of their policy goals which, in turn, translated into the formulation of new policy instruments to confront such a challenge. To substantiate this argument, the book relies on a large body of previously undisclosed primary sources, including: 223 interviews conducted with senior officials in Europe (Berlin, Brussels, London, Paris), in the United States (Washington DC), and in Asia (Beijing, Shanghai, New Delhi, Seoul); declassified archival documents from France, the UK and Germany; leaked US diplomatic cables; and new data on European naval deployments.

Analyzes US need for an alliance with President Musharraf's authoritarian regime in the war on terror and risks the US incurs due to Pakistan's long-standing support for the Taliban, domestic Muslim extremism, and its reputation as a haven for terrorists; perspective on US foreign policy blunders in Afghanistan during the Soviet intervention.